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Abstract 
This thesis defends an account of what it is to trust other people, and what gives matters 
of trust a characteristic interpersonal or normative importance to us. Trust is an attitude 
of the ‘trust stance’; a more general attitude we take toward others in matters of trust, that 
includes distrust. Matters of trust are situations we trust/distrust others in. I put forward 
an account of the trust stance, that explains why matters of trust have interpersonal 
importance to us. 
Chapter 1 introduces the key questions to be addressed by the account. I outline 
how trust can be tied to specific actions, but can also be a general attitude we have about 
a person, or people. I set out how trust is standardly conceived as an 
anticipatory/predictive attitude, that also involves interpersonal import. That import is 
glimpsed in the possibility of betrayal by those we trust, and I point toward existing 
accounts of betrayal. I present arguments against accounts of trust that take it to be purely 
predictive, i.e. those of the rational choice/game-theoretic tradition. 
Chapter 2 introduces the dominant philosophical view of trust, which holds that 
to trust is to rely on another, such that we can be betrayed by her. I call this the ‘Reliance 
plus’ (REL+) view. I offer a critical overview of three prominent REL+ accounts, from 
Baier (1986), Holton (1994), and Hawley (2014). I illustrate how an account of distrust 
that Hawley endorses, of ‘betrayable’ non-reliance on another, results from REL+. 
Chapter 3 presents an argument against REL+. I argue it cannot allow for the 
possibility of uncertainty about another, where uncertainty is a trust stance attitude 
between trust and distrust. Uncertainty is possible, so REL+ must be false. 
Chapter 4 presents another argument against REL+. The argument is that distrust 
cannot be a product of non-reliance, so REL+ must be false. I argue that REL+ fails 
because it ignores a distinction between two senses of ‘trust’: an activity of reliance, and 
a mental state of assurance. Distrust is only an attitude of wariness, opposed to assurance, 
rather than reliance. I defend the claim that reliance requires practical dependence on 
what is relied on. I build upon in this claim in the next chapter. 
Chapter 5 defends an account of reliance as an activity, in support of the 
active/stative trust distinction from chapter 4. I evaluate Smith’s (2010) account of 
reliance, which endorses practical dependence. I argue that Smith’s account faces a 
dilemma, showing the account is either incomplete, or that it renders reliance impossible. 
I defend an ‘role placement in activity’ account of reliance, that avoids the dilemma. 
Chapter 6 defends a distinction between reliance and dependence in general. 
Where reliance involves practical dependence, I argue that dependence is a matter of 
fundamentally needing something as a matter of functioning and wellbeing. My account 
of the concept comes into play in chapter 8. 
Chapter 7 sets out a more detailed account of the ‘stative’ trust stance attitudes. I 
use the active/stative distinction to address a question over whether we can trust 
voluntarily, and the relation between specific and general trust. I set out the concept of a 
situational vulnerability, that the trust stance attitudes are ‘about’, and which can result 
from reliance on another. I defend an account of the trust stance as a ‘rolling schema’: an 
anticipatory framework that involves interpreting another’s motives toward us, in respect 
of situations of vulnerability. 
Chapter 8 argues that the interpersonal import of trust is a product of our felt 
need for secure attachments to individuals, and to belong to a group. I explain the 
relationship between social dependence on others and ‘betrayability’. 
 
Andrew J. Kirton, PhD Philosophy, “Matters of Interpersonal Trust”. 2018 
The University of Manchester 
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1 Matters of interpersonal trust 
In this chapter, I introduce the central question this thesis seeks to answer: what it is to 
trust or distrust another person on some matter. I also give an overview of the central 
philosophical issues that arise in addressing this question, and the different positions in 
the trust literature taken on these issues. As part of this, I also offer an overview of the 
positions I endorse, and the key concepts I appeal to, in the overall account of 
interpersonal trust and distrust that I defend in this thesis. 
 
1.1 Matters of trust & the trust stance 
What is it to trust or distrust another person? The presence of other people impacts upon 
us in a certain way. As a result, we must trust or distrust others sometimes. In a situation 
where the question of whether to trust or distrust another is at issue, we are confronted 
with a matter of trust. The matter of trust is the situation or issue itself. In these situations, 
we respond to or regard others with an attitude of trust, distrust, or some shade in 
between these. These attitudes belong to what I call the trust stance. This includes trust and 
distrust as the opposed ways we respond to others in matters of trust. Between trust and 
distrust though we also have a ‘middle ground’ attitude: a feeling of being unsure, 
unsettled, or uncertain about another.  
 
These trust stance attitudes share a characteristic concern about how another will respond 
in a matter of trust. However, they each involve a different way of anticipating how 
another will respond; with trust involving anticipating the matter as settled, distrust 
involving anticipating the matter as unsettled and decidedly fraught, and uncertainty as 
anticipating it could go one way or the other. This gives us two key concepts that will 
shape the enquiry. A matter of trust as the situation or issue, and the trust stance as the general 
stance we take in matters of trust; that involves attitudes of trust, distrust and uncertainty. 
 
There is a characteristic concern we have about other people in matters of trust. That 
concern is not a purely theoretical concern, in being a matter of what we ought to believe 
about others, or what we can predict they will do. It is also not purely practical; a matter 
of what we ought to do. Because we have the capacity for interpersonal trust and distrust, 
matters of trust have a kind of import. The trust stance attitudes are ways of adopting a 
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position on the question: ‘can I live alongside this person?’. This question is made pressing 
when we recognise that, as Annette Baier puts it, those we live alongside have a power 
over the things we care about, such that these things, “can be left or put within the striking 
power of others” and may be taken advantage of (1986 : p.235). The things we care about 
will broadly include the projects and goals we want to pursue, which stem from the people 
and objects and other things we are attached to. What we care about will also include our 
own sense of efficacy or agency in looking after the things we care about. It may be that 
others we live alongside will simply not treat the things we care about with enough due 
concern, or competence. They may also not let us exercise our independent agency in 
taking care of some of those things ourselves. Those things we care about, in falling under 
the control of others, may thereby come to harm, through their recklessness or 
carelessness, even if this carelessness isn’t borne out of any specific malice toward us. By 
asking ourselves whether other individuals we encounter will respect our desire to 
determine our own ends, and help us pursue our projects, and to preserve and nurture 
what we are attached to, we thereby ask ourselves whether we trust those individuals. 
 
Matters of trust thus have a kind of interpersonal import. This thought is the starting 
basis for many views of trust and distrust in the philosophical literature. Typically, views 
of trust proceed by identifying some sort of basic attitude for the anticipatory element of 
trust, and giving an account of the interpersonal import. Before discussing ways the 
anticipatory and interpersonal elements are accounted for (sections 1.6 and 1.7), though, 
I will first cover some of structural features of matters of trust, and the trust stance 
attitudes. 
 
1.2 Domains of trust & competence/willingness 
Matters of trust tend to be about the possibility of another’s performing some action in 
some particular scenario. As a result it is common, in the trust literature, to endorse a 
view of trust as essentially a three-place predicate (Baier 1986; Castelfranchi and Falcone 
2010 : p.29; Faulkner 2007a; Hawley 2014 : p.1; Hieronymi 2008; Holton 1994 : p.67; 
Horsburgh 1960 : p.343; Jones 1996, 2004; Levi 1998; Simpson 2011 : p.327). Typically, 
this will mean analysing the trust attitude as one such that X trusts Y, in respect of some 
action φ. Matters of trust, on this model, are where the performance of some action is at 
issue, in a particular situation, or domain of interaction. 
  14 
 
This makes sense: it is commonplace that we trust people in specific respects and not 
others. Just because we trust someone, this doesn’t mean we trust them infinitely, across 
all domains of interaction that we could possibly have. Often, that we do trust someone 
in some respect, is tied to the fact that another’s competences lie in certain areas, and we 
trust her in those areas. We trust people in respect of their areas of competence, e.g. a 
midwife during childbirth, a music journalist in recommending records, a friend in being 
able to look after our cats while we’re away. Given that matters of trust are domain 
specific like this – we apportion our trust to people in certain matters – the three-place 
predicate, tied to an action, seems highly plausible, as a formalisation of the attitude of 
trust. 
 
It isn’t generally enough to make some domain a matter of trust, just based on a 
recognition of competence in that domain. Trust of another in some domain requires 
attributing some sort of willingness on her part to perform. While the midwife might be 
an expert on helping others through the birthing process, and the music journalist might 
be capable at identifying records particularly worth listening to, expertise is nothing 
without the willingness to follow through on the ability to help. The jaded music journalist 
may, despite having gained her position through having good taste and expert analysis, 
have become unwilling to bother recommending good records, instead promoting 
whatever releases big labels pay her to promote. Similarly, the friend who could look after 
the cat, might be lazy. A lack of motivation to act will thus defeat the possibility of making 
that a matter of trust. Because of these thoughts concerning competence and willingness, 
authors therefore suppose that matters of trust revolve around another’s competence and 
willingness to act (e.g. Baier 1986 : p.259; Hawley 2014 : p.1; Jones 1996 : p.4; Rowe and 
Calnan 2006 : p.377). 
 
1.3 Two-place 
While it is standard to treat trust as a three-place predicate, and matters of trust as tied to 
specific actions (e.g. feeding the cat, delivering the baby, recommending a good record), 
we do nonetheless talk of trusting people more broadly than in one specific respect. We 
can, it seems, simply trust others. We can construe trust simpliciter, as a two-place predicate 
such that X trusts Y (Becker 1996 : pp.44–45; Faulkner 2015 : p.424). Baier calls this form 
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of trust ‘plain trust’ (and ‘plain distrust’), since it isn’t relative to some particular matter 
(1986 : p.259). You might for example say that you simply trust your friends or colleagues, 
where this doesn’t appear to amount to saying that you trust your friends or colleagues 
to do specific things. 
 
We can also express a strong kind of two-place trust. Horsburgh, for example, says, “The 
[general] sense is much wider. It may be illustrated by the trust in B that A expresses when 
he says, 'I'd trust him with my life'. It implies absolute confidence in B's good faith.” 
(1960 : p.343). Arguably, of those we say we generally trust, where we leave the domain 
unspecified, we only trust a few in the strong sense Horsburgh alludes to. The kind of 
deep two-place trust that Horsburgh raises implies a level of intimacy with the other. 
 
There are various positions in the trust literature on how we ought to understand the 
relationship between two-place and three-place trust. Those who view the three-place 
form as in some sense primary, sometimes suggest that even though we might say of 
another that we simply trust her, this can be elliptical for saying that we trust another with 
a range of more specific things (Smolkin 2008 : p.446). The point noted above, that just 
because we trust someone we don’t thereby trust them infinitely, may lend credence to 
this position. Faulkner emphasises that even when we might be said to trust another 
generally, there are always limits to what we trust her to do (Faulkner 2015 : p.425). 
 
Of those who we trust generally, such as our friends and colleagues, we clearly do not 
trust them in all matters of import to us, because often the respects in which we do trust 
them are limited to the contexts and activities we share with them. As such the ‘elliptical’ 
interpretation of the two-place formulation, may account for such general trust. It may, 
for the same reason, account for deep trust of the ‘I’d trust him with my life’ sort. Even 
those we trust deeply, such as (in an ideal world) our close friends, family, and romantic 
partners, we don’t trust on all matters of importance to us, e.g., in recommending good 
records, or to fix our boiler when it breaks. We apportion trust, even in these two-place 
cases, based on where another’s competence and willingness lies, and everyone’s 
competence and willingness has limits. Our general/deep two-place trust needn’t become 
contaminated with distrust because of the fact that there are limits. It is simply that certain 
matters ought to be closed off, as avenues on which you can or should adopt a trust stance 
  16 
on those matters. Otherwise, you will just be led to disappointment, possibly through no 
fault of the one you trusted. 
 
We typically expand our trust to the limits of what we recognise another is competent in, 
and willing to help us out in. Even then, of the trust within those limits, it is still sensible 
to evaluate what others say or do. This isn’t because we should necessarily be constantly 
wary of the motives of those around us, but because everyone can make mistakes on such 
matters. When your friend insists that it was at her birthday two years ago, not three years 
ago, where you had that embarrassing incident involving the cup of tea and her mother, 
you can fail to trust her on this, because you are convinced that it was in fact three years 
ago when that incident happened. That you disagree needn’t imply you think your friend 
is a liar, and out to mislead you. She may just be convinced you are wrong. 
 
There are further ways of drawing the distinction between two-place and three-place trust, 
though, and these would cast doubt on the claim that two-place is elliptical for three-
place trust. Holton for example argues that two-place trust is really describing a 
phenomenon that he calls a ‘trusting relationship’, and this appears to involve more than 
just having a set of domains of interaction, in which we three-place trust another: 
 
If you and I trust each other in various ways over time, and our trust is not 
betrayed, we will be likely to build a trusting relationship. That is not to say that 
there will be some particular thing that I will trust you to do. Rather it is to say 
that I will in general be more ready to trust you: partly because I am confident 
that you will not betray that trust, and partly because, having trusted you before, 
further trust becomes appropriate. A trusting relationship makes a greater range 
of trust available to me. (1994 : p.71) 
 
The crucial thought in this passage, that casts doubt on the ‘elliptical’ proposal, is that 
when we two-place trust another, we are readier to trust her in specific three-place 
respects. In two-place trust of the sort Holton describes, we feel as though we have 
stepped beyond a set of specific domains of interaction, and now are ‘comfortable’ with 
the other person. The trust we extend to the person, instead of being confined to one 
domain, now permeates or bleeds into other possible domains. This sense of cross-
boundary trust is captured in Horsburgh’s ‘I’d trust him with my life’, noted above. It 
implies that, given some situation we may not even have thought of, even one where we 
are at the gravest sort of risk, we would have absolute assurance in his competence and 
willingness to help us. Two-place isn’t elliptical for a range of three-place trusts, if it 
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describes a disposition to trust in specific three-place respects, as many of these we won’t 
even have considered yet. 
 
1.4 Basic/one-place & voluntariness 
Also opposed to the ‘elliptical’ position is Hertzberg’s (1988). His view takes inspiration 
from Wittgenstein’s remarks in On Certainty, concerning the central role of trust in 
learning about the world. Wittgenstein focuses particularly on the kind of dependence 
that a child has on adults to induct her into language use, and forming beliefs about the 
world. Hertzberg builds on Wittgenstein’s remarks to argue that trust is a more basic 
attitude involving a readiness to believe others, not on a particular matter, but across 
matters. Again, this is much like Holton’s notion of a trusting relationship: being readier 
to trust a particular person in specific maters, as glimpsed in the kind of faith expressed 
in Horsburgh’s ‘I’d trust him with my life’. But, Hertzberg is pointing out a different form 
of trust to that Holton and Horsburgh point out. He is unpacking a more fundamental 
kind of trust; not one that we have to particular people, but that we have toward people 
in general. 
 
This type of fundamental trust is central to our lives, because dependence on other people 
is an unavoidable feature of our lives (I return to this point shortly). For dependents, e.g. 
children, this dependence is immediate and ever-present. Children have little choice but 
to trust by default. It’s through this that children develop basic abilities to help them 
navigate the world. As children, we learn what particular words refer to, what is safe to 
eat, who is safe to approach, and how we conduct the most basic tasks involved in 
feeding, cleaning, and looking after ourselves.  
 
But, we also have little choice but to trust the adults we find as guides. Small children are 
often not in a position to pick and choose who they trust on what matters: they have to 
be willing to trust adults across matters. But part of growing and maturing - becoming an 
independent, empowered person - is learning who we should trust in what domains. We 
learn where it is safe to make roots, thereby anchoring us in a group of individuals we can 
feel safe around.  
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By paying attention to the basic sort of dependence on others found in childlike trust, we 
also glimpse the fact of our ongoing dependence on the community around us as adults. 
We can’t simply opt out of belonging to some community for our language, our knowledge, 
our wellbeing, or help in pursuing many of our goals. Life without this basic trust is not 
simply the Hobbesian picture of a state of war of every person against every other person; 
it is one with the most rudimentary form of language, and a drastically limited worldview. 
 
The basic form of trust we have toward our community, is discussed by Herman (2001) 
and Jones (2004). Their concern with basic trust is in how it becomes disrupted by 
traumatic events. Jones points out that there must be a basic form of trust we have toward 
people in general, underpinning the trust we have to particular individuals and in specific 
matters, because this is the very thing that is shaken in the indiscriminate violence of 
terrorist attacks. 
 
Herman’s concern is to offer a psychotherapeutic method for overcoming trauma. As 
part of this method, we glimpse the importance of basic trust toward others. Herman 
argues that what is key to overcoming trauma is restoring our basic trust in others. Part 
of this process requires the suffering and status of the victim, as someone wronged, to be 
validated by her community. Without this, the trauma victim cannot readily trust others, 
because her sense of threat is ‘stalled’; stuck on playing back the traumatic event, and 
trying to integrate it or understand it, in light of her need to belong to that community. 
Herman says that, in abuse and trauma, “the profound disruption in basic trust, the 
common feelings of shame, guilt and inferiority ... all foster withdrawal from close 
relationships. But the terror of the traumatic event intensifies the need for protective 
attachments.” (Herman 2001 : p.56). A restored sense of basic trust follows, once the 
community validates both that a victim did experience a traumatic event, and that her 
experience is a matter of concern for the community. 
 
So, it seems that a willingness to two-place trust particular people, is underpinned by a 
more basic or fundamental type of trust toward people in general, or a community, which 
can be profoundly shaken as a result of trauma. This basic trust underpins our willingness 
to two-place individuals in a community, and thus to three-place trust others on specific 
matters. While basic trust is brought into focus when it is disrupted by trauma, we also 
glimpse it when we simply reflect on the mundane aspects of community living. 
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Community living is made possible by this basic, unconscious trust we have toward 
others. Thomas illustrates how it underpins day-to-day interactions in communities: 
 
We need to be able to have basic trust (as I shall say) in complete strangers. Much 
of what we do in life it would be well-nigh impossible to do if we could not trust 
many who are complete strangers to us. We would scarcely order a meal in a 
restaurant or ask a stranger for the time or walk down the street if we thought for 
a moment that every stranger in life was out to harm us - if we lived in a world in 
which basic trust among all complete strangers was not possible. (Thomas 1989 : 
p.34) 
 
These thoughts echo Hertzberg’s position. Without being able to trust others at the most 
ordinary level required of being able to live with others - what certain words mean, what 
the world is like, what other’s motives generally are - we can’t engage with others, or live 
alongside them in a community. This is why basic trust being disrupted by traumatic 
events is so damaging: it fosters withdrawal from a community that helps us to live 
comfortably, and moreover, understand the world around us. 
 
Along these lines, Govier (1992a : p.55) points out how, when that basic trust is replaced 
with basic distrust, our sense of reality can become entirely warped. An inability to treat 
any reported fact as settled, or anyone’s motives as generally honourable, leads to constant 
second-guessing. We start to constantly scan offers of help from those around us for 
hidden motives.  
 
It’s plausible to conclude, from these brief reflections on the relationship between the 
fundamental need for basic trust, that when we find ourselves with a basic distrust of the 
majority, we cling to those individuals who we do two-place trust. It follows that isolated 
worldviews could grow around small besieged-feeling groups, containing individuals who 
only trust one another, while distrusting others beyond them. Furthermore, as Herman 
points out, the terror of widespread distrust intensifies the need for protective 
attachments. So, even if these islands of two-place trust foster unhealthy or self-
destructive worldviews, the distrust of those outside of their small community, will keep 
them holding firm to the worldview shared by those they trust.  
 
So, just as we have seen that two-place trust is not simply elliptical for a set of three-place 
trusts, it appears that there is a basic trust that is not elliptical for a set of two-place trusts. 
We could also call this basic trust ‘one-place’. Faulkner (2015), for example, refers to it in 
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this way. He suggests that one-place trust picks out the disposition to two-place trust 
others, rather than being elliptical for saying whether we already do two-place trust a 
range of specific individuals. My ‘besieged-feeling community’ example would explain 
why: the individuals in this community are not one-place trusting, even if there is a set of 
individuals they two-place trust. 
 
At this point, a question is raised concerning how much we can voluntarily trust others. 
It’s commonplace, for example, that people offer imperative phrases such as “Trust me.” 
But the question arises as to what the function of such imperatives are, and how we ever 
choose to trust another on a specific matter, if we do not already two-place trust her. 
We’ve seen above that two-place trust appears to inform our willingness to trust another 
across different matters. Furthermore, we will be unable to trust another in a two-place 
way, unless we already have some basic trust. Lagerspetz (2015) raises a similar thought, 
in arguing that Baier’s (1986) three-place account of trust misses the fundamentality of 
basic trust; “not all trustful relations seem to be goods-related in this way,” and the 
starting point of an account of trust should be ‘simple’/basic trust, “considering that we 
are unlikely to trust people with anything unless we trust them” (Lagerspetz 2015 : p.51). 
 
I will be arguing for a view of the trust stance where three-place trust is not contingent 
on prior two-place trust of another, nor on prior one-place trust of others. In chapter 4 I 
will argue for a distinction between two senses of ‘trust’ that sheds light on why. One 
sense of trust is an activity that is within our control to undertake, and another is a mental 
state of assurance about another. My suggestion is that while we can voluntarily undertake 
the activity of trusting another, we cannot voluntarily adopt the mental state of assurance 
that another will come through for us. In other words, we can decide to put ourselves in 
a vulnerable position toward another, but we cannot decide to feel fine about that. The 
process of rebuilding two-place trust and even basic trust, involves rebuilding the state of 
basic assurance about others. We do so via specific individuals. This, furthermore, 
involves undertaking three-place active trust of another, even when we lack the mental 
state or feeling of assurance that she will fulfil it. 
 
In sections 7.1 and 7.2 I discuss the voluntariness question and its relation to the widely 
recognised two-place/three-place distinction. I will argue that the voluntariness question 
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is better resolved by the active/stative trust distinction I put forward, rather than the two-
place/three-place one that is commonplace in the literature. 
 
For now, I will point out that there simply is the possibility of voluntarily trusting another. 
Lagerspetz is right to point out that three-place accounts like Baier’s miss the 
fundamentality of basic trust. However, while it is right that we might be less likely to 
trust another with anything (three-place), unless we already do trust them (two-place), it is 
not required that we do. Baier (1986 : p.259) notes, for example, that we can have no 
choice but to trust others sometimes on specific matters, when all other options have 
exhausted themselves. I may desperately need someone to drive me to A&E, and the only 
person on hand to help is my next-door neighbour who I distrust. Still, I am desperate. 
Should my neighbour fulfil my trust in this matter, I may come to change my view of her. 
Holton (1994) also points out instances where we can voluntarily trust, despite lacking 
assurance that our trust will be fulfilled. While Lagerspetz is right to note that it is 
sometimes unlikely we will trust people with anything unless we trust them, it is not 
impossible or unreasonable to trust people in a three-place way, despite lacking the more 
general trust picked out by the two-place form, or even the basic/one-place form. 
Trusting another in a three-place way, beyond our two-place or even one-place form, is 
a way of rebuilding trust. 
 
1.5 Practical & testimonial 
Here I draw attention to a distinction between types of trust that has already come into 
play. This is in terms of a distinction between broad categories of domains of interaction. 
Just as we trust others to perform specific actions based on a supposition of competence 
and willingness, we also believe what others say on this basis. When you fail to trust your 
friend that the embarrassing incident (involving you, the cup of tea, and her mother) was 
two years and not three years ago, or when the schoolchildren no longer trust what the 
teacher tells them, what you and the schoolchildren are failing to do is trust the assertions 
or testimony of another on some matter. Again, this failure to trust needn’t be because 
the other is suspected of lying, such that you distrust her. It could be that you suspect she 
is mistaken about a fact of the matter. Nonetheless, you fail to trust her.  
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The distinction at issue is this: just as we can specifically/three-place trust another to 
perform certain actions, we can also trust her assertions, or her testimony. Testimonial trust 
(or interpersonal epistemic trust) is the subject of a vast literature, e.g. (Adler 1994; Audi 
2006; Coady 1994; Faulkner 2007b, 2011, Hinchman 2005a, 2005b; Lackey,J. & Sosa,E. 
(eds.) 2006; McCraw 2015; Zagzebski 2012). Testimonial trust is often discussed as a 
distinct phenomenon from trusting another in some specific action. In trusting another 
to perform a specific action, X trusts Y to φ. Instead, accounts of testimonial trust are 
concerned with cases where X trusts Y that p, whereas p is what Y asserts. 
 
No doubt there are key differences between the two phenomena. Practical trust involves 
trusting Y to bring some desired state of affairs about, as a result of her action. 
Testimonial trust on the other hand involves trusting Y that some fact about the world 
holds (that Y may or may not have had a hand in making true). But while the distinction 
between testimonial and practical trust is worth noting, they are not the completely 
isolated phenomena that the division in the literature between discussions of each, would 
have us believe. For one, when we trust Y that p, and when we trust Y to φ, it’s true that 
in both cases we treat that matter (whether p, whether Y will φ) as settled. We would 
anticipate that p is the case, and that Y will φ. The same type of positively anticipatory 
attitude is at issue in either case. This is also true when we fail to trust Y that p is the case, 
or that she will φ: we regard the matter as unsettled. When we distrust Y, and she tells us 
p or that she will φ, we may scan for ways that ulterior motives could be behind her 
proposal. I also take it that in both cases of trusting testimony and trusting another to act, 
these are matters of import to us, partly because of the practical consequences that can 
befall us. Our own welfare can be at risk in either case; either from misinformation about 
how the world is, or from Y’s possible failure to φ, when Y’s φ’ing matters to us. 
 
A further point to note is that in any given scenario, practical and testimonial trust are 
intertwined and enable one another. They simply do not occur in isolation of one another. 
For one, testimonial trust also involves trusting another in respect of a certain action: 
telling the truth. X trusts Y to provide accurate information, or to be honest and 
competent. But similarly, ‘practical’ trust, when directed toward future actions, often 
involves trusting the testimony of another that she intends to perform a specific action. If 
we are trusting another that she has φ’d, this also involves trusting her testimony, about 
the past action she has completed. I take it that, in any given scenario, the two forms of 
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trust are so closely intertwined that it would be misguided to discuss them as isolated 
phenomena. An account of matters of trust and the trust stance ought to pay attention 
to both. 
 
In section 7.1 I discuss an example of testimonial trust, in the context of the puzzle of 
when trust can be voluntary, that I raised at the end of the previous section. It appears 
that testimonial trust appears, in one way, to be unable to be voluntarily given, unlike 
practical trust. But, I will use the active/stative distinction that I argue for in chapter 4 
(mentioned at the end of the previous section), to explain why this appears to be so. 
 
1.6 The anticipatory element & the interpersonal element 
In the first section, I referred to how the trust stance attitudes had an anticipatory 
element. I have repeatedly made tacit appeal to that anticipatory quality of trust, when I 
have said that trust involved anticipating some matter as ‘settled’. We can now flesh out 
our understanding of the way in which the trust stance involves an anticipatory quality.  
 
In very simple terms, trust involves anticipating good things from another. And 
correspondingly, distrust involves anticipating bad things from another. When we are 
somewhere in between trust and distrust of another we may not be able to anticipate one 
way or another, despite trying to. Trust and distrust involve opposed ways of anticipating 
another’s actions within a matter of trust. What is common to the trust stance attitudes 
then is an anticipatory element. 
 
In the trust literature, this anticipatory element is pinned to various ‘predictive’ type 
attitudes. Some authors identify the anticipatory element along the lines of what 
philosophers call a ‘cognitive’ or belief-like attitude. Here the anticipatory element of trust 
(/the trust stance) is construed a type of subjective probabilistic expectation of another’s 
performance (Dasgupta 1988; Gambetta 1988), as a type of belief (Castelfranchi and 
Falcone 2010; Hardin 1998; Hieronymi 2008; Hill and O’Hara 2006; Keren 2014; Levi 
1998), and as a type of confidence (Pettit 1995). In contrast there are accounts that 
identify the anticipatory element as a product of ‘non-cognitive’, or affective attitudes. 
Here we have the anticipatory element of trust (/the trust stance) construed as a type of 
optimism (Jones 1996), an emotional attitude comparable with faith (Lahno 2001), a form 
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of hopefulness (McGeer 2008), a feeling of security about another (Becker 1996) and as 
a Strawson-style (1974) reactive attitude we take toward others actions (Helm 2014). This 
is just a selection of accounts to help give an impression of the variety of ways that the 
anticipatory element of the trust stance is understood. 
 
The anticipatory element is not exhaustive of the trust stance (though this is disputed: see 
section 1.8 below). As mentioned above, matters of trust and the trust stance attitudes 
we take concerning them, possess a characteristic interpersonal importance. That 
interpersonal importance is defined in various ways (discussed in more detail in the 
following section), but the central thought is that we take matters of trust seriously in a 
way beyond merely predicting someone will/won’t perform some action. As such it isn’t 
enough to predict or anticipate that someone will act, to have a trust stance attitude about 
her. Simply having a predictive attitude wouldn’t be enough to make the matter of her 
possible acting a matter of trust. This is obvious for one broad category of actions: those 
that we are indifferent to. We don’t treat it as a matter of trust that our neighbour gets in 
her car and drives to work in the morning, because it doesn’t matter to us whether she 
does. 
 
Even if we stipulate that what is at issue is whether the other’s acting would be 
instrumentally beneficial for us, this still doesn’t suffice for making it a matter of trust 
that she does so act. And, likewise, it isn’t enough to predict that someone won’t perform 
the action that would be instrumentally beneficial for us, or to predict that she will act in 
some way that would be detrimental to us, for us to thereby distrust her. 
 
This is the thinking behind a dominant philosophical view of trust that I will be discussing 
more in depth in subsequent chapters, particularly 2, 3 and 4. This is the ‘reliance plus’ 
(REL+) view. This view stems from Baier (1986). Baier suggests that trusting someone is 
like relying on her in some respect, but it isn’t just relying on her. It is relying on her with 
the susceptibility to being betrayed or let down by her (1986 : p.235). We could for 
instance, rely on our neighbours’ regularly-timed leaving for work in the morning, as a 
guide for own morning schedule. This wouldn’t entail we trust our neighbour to leave for 
work at that time. The lesson from such cases is that trust is reliance on another’s acting, 
plus an interpersonal factor that allows us to be betrayed by the one we’re relying on, in 
case of her non-performance. In other words, it isn’t enough to risk a goal of yours on 
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the possibility that someone acts, for you to thereby trust her to act. Instead, there is an 
interpersonal importance to matters of trust. Baier’s key observation is that this 
importance can be gleaned from the difference in reactions to disappointed trust (feelings 
of wronging, betrayal, being let down, interpersonal disappointment) and frustrated 
reliance (simple frustration and disappointment). 
 
REL+ is a pervasive view in the trust literature. Yet considering the accounts referred to 
above, we can see that reliance is just one way of construing the anticipatory element of 
the trust stance. But because it is so widespread, REL+ will be the target of my enquiry 
in ensuing chapters. Using it as a foil, I will argue that reliance cannot fully account for the 
actual nature of the anticipatory element of the trust stance. Interrogating the view will 
prove to be philosophically productive, providing a rich seam to mine in revealing what 
the nature of the trust stance attitudes are, and so what is really at issue in matters of trust. 
 
REL+ takes seriously the thought that there is an interpersonal importance to matters of 
trust. Many of those accounts of the anticipatory element of the trust stance, mentioned 
above, also take this thought seriously. REL+ provides one way of drawing attention to 
that interpersonal importance; by drawing a contrast between ‘merely relying’ on another, 
and trustingly-relying on her to act. Yet this is just one way of drawing the distinction, 
just as reliance is one way of accounting for that anticipatory element. There is a 
difference between a generic anticipation of another’s acting, and trusting/distrusting her. 
I offer some simple contrast cases of trust and mere anticipation about the possibility of 
another performing an instrumentally beneficial act, to illustrate that the 
‘mere’/‘interpersonal’ contrast is a generic one. 
  
Food Stealing Flatmate: John anticipates that his flatmate Elis will keep putting food 
in the shared fridge that can be taken without Elis noticing. 
 
Ailing Flatmate: Maria is ill and contagious, but her flatmate Izzy has told her not 
to worry and that she will do her food shopping for her until she gets better. 
Maria is unwell, but also anticipates that Izzy is true to her word, so gives Izzy 
her debit card and pin number for the time being. 
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Food Stealing Flatmate is a case of ‘mere anticipation’ of another’s instrumentally beneficial 
act, while Ailing Flatmate is a case of trusting another to act. Maria and John could be 
relying on their respective others (Izzy and Elis), or have one of the other types of 
anticipatory attitudes referenced above. The key intuition is that in Food Stealing Flatmate, 
John’s anticipatory attitude (toward Elis’ continuing to put food in the fridge) doesn’t 
have the requisite kind of interpersonal salience to make the matter of Elis continuing to 
put food in the shared fridge a matter of trust. In Ailing Flatmate though, Maria’s attitude 
toward Izzy does have the requisite kind of interpersonal salience to amount to trust, and 
Izzy buying the food is a matter of trust between them. So, matters of trust are not simply 
matters of anticipating that someone will perform an instrumentally beneficial act. 
 
The following cases bring out that it also isn’t enough to anticipate an instrumentally 
detrimental act in order to distrust another. Again, this is because these are not yet matters 
of trust. 
 
Wary Flatmate: Elis suspects John’s reassurances about the missing food are lies 
and that John has been stealing from him. 
 
Cash Stealing Flatmate: Izzy has been exploiting the opportunity presented by 
Maria’s illness by stealing cash from Maria, and is now stressed and pessimistic, 
because she anticipates that Maria will figure this out soon and cancel her card. 
 
Wary Flatmate is a case of distrusting another, while Cash Stealing Flatmate is a case of merely 
anticipating another’s instrumentally detrimental act. In Wary Flatmate, Elis’ suspicion 
concerning John clearly does have the requisite kind of interpersonal salience to amount 
to distrust of John. There is something in addition to Elis’ anticipating that John has taken 
the food despite his assertions to the contrary, that makes his attitude amount to distrust. 
On the other hand, Izzy’s anticipating that Maria will cancel her card doesn’t amount to 
distrust of Maria. The matter of her cancelling her card is not a matter of trust, because 
it lacks the interpersonal salience that Elis’ attitude possesses. 
 
The important point from each of the above cases is that matters of trust have some sort 
of interpersonal import. That interpersonal import cannot be purely a matter of whether 
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the other person performs some instrumentally beneficial or detrimental act, because 
those are at issue in the Food & Cash stealing flatmate cases above. 
 
1.7 The trust-betrayal connection & vulnerability 
The thought that trust is connected to harms such as betrayal is, as mentioned above, the 
insight that Baier offers to differentiate cases of mere reliance from those of trust. The 
trust-betrayal connection is widely appealed to in the wider trust literature, and not just 
in the literature that construes trust as a form of reliance. What it provides is a test of 
sorts for whether something is a matter of trust, or simply of mere anticipation of 
another’s beneficial/detrimental acting. This also applies with distrust: Hawley points out 
that the betrayal connection also captures how distrust is an attitude with the same 
characteristic interpersonal import, because we can be betrayed by those we distrust (2014 
: p.13). For example, it seems right to say that Elis, despite his anticipating that John has 
been lying to him, could still be betrayed by John, should Elis discover that John has been 
lying. Even when we distrust another, we are still responding to a matter of trust. 
 
Because trust and distrust share the ability to be betrayed, it might be thought that, with 
the trust-betrayal connection, we have the beginning of an account of the interpersonal 
import of matters of trust and the trust stance attitudes. Matters of trust are those 
involving a susceptibility to being betrayed. While it is certainly a starting point, the trust-
betrayal connection doesn’t yet get us an explanation of why matters of trust involve 
some sort of interpersonal import. Pointing out that matters of trust involve a 
susceptibility to betrayal gives us a good angle on what sort of import is at issue, but it 
doesn’t offer an account of it. Rather, susceptibility to betrayal gives us a useful 
placeholder for a condition of what it is for an attitude to belong to the trust stance. To 
arrive at an account of the interpersonal import though would require looking at the 
underlying reasons why matters of trust create a susceptibility to betrayal. It would also 
arguably require looking more closely at what sort of harm betrayal is. With a better 
understanding of betrayal – what sort of structural features are common to betrayals, 
what the effects of them are, and what the characteristic thoughts and feelings that result 
from them – we might be able to shed light on the anticipatory nature, and interpersonal 
importance, of the trust stance. 
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Remarkably, despite the widespread adoption of the trust-betrayal connection, it is rare 
to find a sustained treatment of betrayal in the philosophical literature on trust. I will 
briefly mention two rare exceptions – Jackson (2000) and Shklar (1984) – who both note 
that literature and history, rather than philosophy, are more fruitful in attempting to 
understand the nature of betrayal (drama, whether fictional or non-fictional, high and low 
brow, tends to revolve around the dynamics of trust and betrayal). Both also offer their 
own useful characterisations of the nature of betrayal. Shklar for instance, draws on 
dictionary definitions of betrayal, in order to paint a vivid picture of the emotional turmoil 
that accompanies betrayals: 
 
Betrayal […] is to place another person “in the power of an enemy, by treachery or 
disloyalty,” and also “to prove false to, to disappoint the hopes or expectations of.” 
This, I think, should include breaking an appointment that means much to the other 
person, neglecting those who depend on our care, and talking maliciously about 
our friends. […] There is, as the dictionary does show us, an irreducible experience 
in betrayal: desertion. That brings into play the greatest of childhood anxieties, the 
fear of abandonment. In quitting a bonded group, an equally primeval fear is stirred: 
of the failure to distinguish kin and stranger, the latter almost always called “enemy” 
as well. To reject a blood relationship for a new and alien association, or for none 
at all, is to deny the most elementary of social ties. (Shklar 1984 : p.139) 
 
Where Shklar connects betrayal with neglect and abandonment, Jackson on the other 
hand suggests that we ought to distinguish between betrayal proper and abandonment. 
Noting that literature provides more detailed illustrations of betrayal than philosophy, he 
draws on an example case from Sense and Sensibility: 
 
The spirit of instrumentality and deception imbues the entire relationship; it colors 
all the betrayer’s actions and words. Whatever compliments or tenderness the 
violator extends to the truster is suspect […] Further, because of the engagement 
of betrayers, they operate with an awareness, a foreknowledge of what the 
inevitable violation will do to the truster. The more that a violation is marked by 
these features the more we see it as betrayal. 
 
Although Willoughby initially entered into the relationship with this attitude, it 
quickly vanished as he fell in love with Marianne. Willoughby does not see his trust 
relationship with Marianne in instrumental terms; his actions are not the calculated 
manoeuvring of a traitor setting up his victim. What Willoughby does instead is to 
unilaterally withdraw from the relationship, indifferent to (or at least insufficiently 
concerned with) the effect on Marianne. He abandons his care of the relationship 
of trust. While this is clearly a violation of her trust, it is not betrayal. He is not 
engaged in the relationship to manipulate it; rather, he disengages from it entirely. 
(Jackson 2000 : pp.85–86) 
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While Shklar’s point seems correct, that in betrayal there is an element of felt 
abandonment, Jackson’s view is also convincing, in drawing a contrast between two 
different sorts of act; abandonments and betrayals. It seems right to say that there is a 
difference in kind, based on the different actions and attitudes of the violator of trust, in 
the run up to that violation. In a case of abandonment, the abandoner will simply 
withdraw from what was presumably a relationship that was otherwise not marked by 
deception and manipulation. The abandoner may simply stop caring about furthering the 
relationship at a certain point, so up and leave. A betrayer however, as Jackson says, seems 
to do more; to imbue the relationship with prior deception, to lull the trustor into a 
position where she can be exploited for some gain. 
 
However, Jackson arguably places too much emphasis, in characterising the nature of a 
betrayal, on there being prior intent of deception on the part of the violator. There needn’t 
be prior intent of deception, to call the violation a betrayal, at least in everyday vernacular. 
A cheating spouse may have had no prior intention of deceiving her significant other 
before betraying his trust. If the cheater instead gives into selfish temptation, this seems 
sufficient to call what the cheater does a betrayal of trust, and there needn’t have been 
any “calculated manoeuvring of a traitor setting up his victim”. Of course, the result of 
the betrayal may be that, for the betrayed partner, all the previous loving acts of the 
cheater are now tainted and coloured with a spirit of deception. But the cheater needn’t 
have actually been deceiving, for us to call her action a betrayal.  
 
Furthermore, abandonments and betrayals are not mutually exclusive. An abandonment 
could also be called a betrayal of trust in at least some contexts, on the presumption that 
prior trust involves a recognised expectation of not being abandoned or left unfulfilled. 
It is plausible to imagine those with strong fears of abandonment viewing perceived 
abandonments as betrayals of trust. An act can be both an abandonment, in being a case 
where someone ups and leaves another without warning, and also a betrayal, if there was 
a presumed mutual recognition between trustor and trustee, that upping-and-leaving was 
a matter of concern for the trustor. For example, think of the parent who ‘goes out for 
cigarettes’ and never comes back, leaving the child with a lingering sense of both 
abandonment and betrayal.1 
 
                                                      
1 Thanks to Justina Berskyte for this example. 
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It’s for these two reasons that Shklar’s definition of ‘simple betrayal’ is more appealing 
than Jackson’s, which requires too much presumed scheming on the part of the betrayer. 
Shklar’s is as follows: 
 
The one irreducible experience surely is having an expectation disappointed. For a 
simple act of betrayal, one person should have both intentionally convinced 
another person of his future loyalty and then deliberately rejected him. The latter 
then, not surprisingly, feels betrayed. (Shklar 1984 : pp.140–141)2 
 
This analysis would explain why we’re tempted to call what a cheating partner does an act 
of betrayal, even if her motives in doing so are just selfish and careless. It just requires 
that the cheater have previously intentionally convinced her partner of future fidelity, and 
then deliberately carried out the opposing action anyway, due to whatever motives. It also 
explains why an abandonment could also be called a betrayal, if the issue of abandonment 
was raised and recognised as of great import to the trustor. 
 
I thus suggest we endorse Shklar’s definition of ‘simple betrayal’, as it seems to capture 
the essence of disappointed trust. At this stage, though, I primarily draw attention to these 
accounts of betrayal as a way of helping flesh out our picture of the interpersonal import 
of matters of trust, given that the trust-betrayal connection is standardly appealed to 
without much elaboration. It’s clear that once we start to unpack the nature of betrayal 
itself, we reveal that violations of trust are complex and worthy of more interrogation. 
 
The focus on betrayal in the trust literature also shouldn’t make us lose sight of the various 
ways that matters of trust can be disappointed in an interpersonally significant way. Shklar 
for instance also alludes to “breaking an appointment that means much to the other 
person” as a distinct phenomenon, such that we can presume matters of minor import 
wouldn’t necessarily warrant being called betrayals. We can conclude that one dimension 
on which interpersonal import varies is just how important the matter of trust is, to the 
trustor.  
 
Another dimension of import is who the trustee is, to the trustor. Shklar’s and Jackson’s 
descriptions of betrayal place the phenomenon within the stance of close relationships, 
                                                      
2 I take it that the sense of ‘expectation’ that is disappointed is normative rather than 
predictive. Simply predicting that another will φ doesn’t suffice for it being a matter of 
interpersonal import, and thus betrayal. 
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alliances and so on, those that make salient notions like loyalty and fidelity. This makes 
sense, intuitively. Shklar’s remark that in a simple betrayal, the betrayer must have 
convinced the betrayed of her “future loyalty” is not hyperbolic. The matter itself – 
exactly what is trusted – will also tend to vary with the nature of the relationship. 
 
Matters of trust, though, can still occur between non-intimates, and such trust can still be 
violated, breached, or disappointed. Baier perhaps invokes a helpful notion here. At the 
same time as offering the trust/reliance distinction on the basis that trust can be betrayed, 
she says our trust might be simply “let down” (1986 : p.235). Those occupying 
professional roles can disappoint our trust by e.g. providing incorrect or misleading 
information, but it might be more appropriate to say we are let down by the individuals 
in question, in these cases. A “let down” might also be a more appropriate description of 
some sorts of disappointed trust between intimates. For instance, if a friend fails to show 
up to your regular lunch appointment without explaining why, you might say you were 
let down rather than betrayed. 
 
The question arises as to whether these harms in disappointed trust are all technically 
betrayals of trust, or different categories of wronging altogether. For now, I do not offer 
a systematic ruling on what is required for a disappointment to count as a betrayal, or a 
let-down, or an abandonment. I simply note the distinctions between these violations of 
trust, to point out that taking the trust-betrayal connection seriously, doesn’t require 
endorsing the view that all forms of disappointment are betrayals. I suggest that we use 
the trust-betrayal connection to characterise how there is a family of interpersonally-
focused harms associated with disappointed trust, of which betrayal is the flag-bearer. In 
chapter 8 I will further discuss the possible differences between these harms. 
 
The trust-betrayal connection characterises the interpersonal import of the trust stance 
in terms of what kinds of harms it leaves us open to. But, we can also characterise the 
interpersonal import in terms of how the trust stance leaves us open to such harms. In this 
respect, appealing to the notion of vulnerability is a common way of construing the 
interpersonal import of matters of trust. This is also a notion that seems to stem from 
how Baier describes the interpersonal quality of trust, when she describes trust as an 
attitude of accepting vulnerability toward another (1986 : p.235). Vulnerability has since 
become a common shorthand for characterising that interpersonal import of matters of 
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trust for a number of authors, e.g. (Govier 1992b; Hill and O’Hara 2006; Jones 1996, 
2004; Lahno 2001; McLeod 2015; Pettit 1995). Lahno for instance, rather than focusing 
on the possibility of betrayal, focuses on vulnerability to harm that results from engaging 
with others in matters of trust. Focusing on the notion of vulnerability rather than the trust-
betrayal connection, then, may be useful as a way of encapsulating the various 
interpersonally-focused harms that we open ourselves up to in matters of trust. 
 
Again, as I noted when introducing the notion of betrayal, we should recognise that 
vulnerability is only a characterisation of how matters of trust involve interpersonal 
import. I suggest that unlike the trust-betrayal connection, though, vulnerability as a 
concept loses explanatory momentum, once we try to lever it as a way of differentiating 
between cases of anticipating beneficial/detrimental acts, and matters of trust. That’s 
because there is a sense in which, by simply planning on the basis that others may perform 
instrumentally beneficial or detrimental acts, we are vulnerable. John the food stealing 
flatmate is vulnerable to not having food if Elis doesn’t buy any. If X is said to be 
vulnerable to Y, this can plausibly just mean that X is at risk from lessened wellbeing 
from Y’s action. This could apply to John’s anticipating/planning on Elis’ continuing to 
buy food that he can steal. Hawley for instance suggests that, “the notions of accepted 
vulnerability plus foregoing the attempt to reduce such vulnerability capture roughly the 
notion of reliance” (2014 : p.8). As such, even mere non-betrayable reliance could involve 
vulnerability. However, it also seems right to say that the kind of vulnerability we take to 
be at issue in matters of trust is distinct from the way that John is ‘vulnerable’ to not 
having food, if Elis doesn’t continue to buy any. John might be vulnerable to lessened 
wellbeing if Elis doesn’t buy food, but he isn’t vulnerable to interpersonal harm by Elis, 
in the form of a betrayal of trust. 
 
These brief reflections suggest that, if we are taking vulnerability as the concept that 
fundamentally explains the interpersonal import of matters of trust, we will need to do 
more to specify what sort of vulnerability is at issue. Vulnerability as a concept is broad 
enough to apply even to those who exploit and use against others. By exploiting another, 
we can be vulnerable to being attacked or found out, and losing everything. If we’re 
committed to vulnerability being the concept at issue in bestowing matters of trust with 
an interpersonal import, then, we need to specify what sort of vulnerability it is. In effect, 
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we still need an account of the interpersonal import of matters of trust, beyond noting 
that we are vulnerable in matters of trust. 
 
That said, I will later appeal to the concept of vulnerability. I will also be invoking it to 
help explain the trust-betrayal connection. I will argue that it is right to point out that in 
matters of trust we are vulnerable, because this is an important structural feature of 
matters of trust. I will use ‘vulnerability’ to describing a feature of our situation. In a matter 
of trust, we must be ‘open’. There must be a weakness or gap in our armour, such that 
we can be gotten at, or ‘struck’, by another. This will be because things we care about can 
be affected by another’s action. 
 
A weakness resulting from our situation does, I take it, roughly capture the concept of 
vulnerability. It equates to an ‘opening in our defences’, through which we or things we 
care about can be taken, or damaged. We might not even notice such weaknesses or 
openings. A military will look for vulnerabilities in the opposing force (that hopefully 
have gone unnoticed by that opposing force) in order to gain the advantage on the 
battlefield.3 We can imagine a unit tasked with carrying out a targeted killing using phrases 
to the effect of “that’s where he’s vulnerable”, meaning an opening or weakness.  
 
It isn’t enough to have such a situational vulnerability to another, for her actions toward 
us in respect of that vulnerability, to thereby become a matter of trust. Thus, it isn’t 
enough to have a situational vulnerability toward another, for us to be able to adopt trust 
stance attitudes toward her in respect of that. The trust stance requires interpersonal 
import. But, I will also argue that the interpersonal import of matters of trust results from 
there being a further kind of weakness we are open to in matters of trust. As such, the 
concept of a situational vulnerability can also shed light on what the interpersonal import 
of a matter of trust is. It results from an additional feature of the situation of those who 
have a trust stance attitude. 
 
I will offer a brief example to illustrate what the additional feature is. This amounts to a 
quick sketch of my broader account of the trust stance, as I point out the additional kind 
of vulnerability that is at issue in matters of trust. Suppose that two people - Xavier and 
Yolanda - don’t have robust passwords on their bank accounts. As such, both could lose 
                                                      
3 This sort of usage of ‘vulnerable’ is found in (Simpson 2011 : p.331). 
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all of their money to hackers. This is enough to say that Xavier and Yolanda are 
vulnerable, in some sense. Suppose also that both are unaware of their vulnerability to 
having their money stolen. Xavier and Yolanda aren’t aware that a lack of a robust 
password is a security weakness. As such, neither are paying attention to how another 
person could, if she wanted to, take all their money. 
 
Xavier, though, has a high level of basic trust toward people. It wouldn’t occur to him 
that someone would be capable or motivated to take his money from his account. 
Yolanda on the other hand, doesn’t trust anyone at all. Moreover, she long ago stopped 
caring about others’ opinions of her. Her money is from ill-gotten means. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that Xavier and Yolanda share the same basic situational 
vulnerability: their lax password protection. But, it also seems reasonable to say that 
Xavier is vulnerable to others in an additional way. Because of his trust, he can be hurt, 
in a way that Yolanda long ago stopped being able to. Where Xavier can be struck by 
being robbed, in a way that cuts to his core, Yolanda can only be struck by having 
something that she wants, be taken from her, or prevented access to. As such, Xavier’s 
situational weakness is a window on a deeper vulnerability he possesses. A further sort of 
concern, or thing that matters to him, is left exposed, by his lax password. That someone 
takes his money means something additional to him. Behind Yolanda’s situational 
weakness, though, simply lies her money. Her money is meaningful for her as means to 
more things that she wants. So, by taking her money, you can disrupt what she wants to 
do, and leave her angry and frustrated. But should you do this, it won’t mean the same 
thing to her as it would to Xavier. Xavier may feel angry, but he will also feel betrayed 
and disillusioned by the action, including at the fact that no one warned him about the 
need for a secure password. 
 
In chapter 8 I will put forward an account of what is behind Xavier’s window of 
vulnerability and so what the interpersonal import of matters of trust stems from. I 
suggest that Xavier has a concern for his need to form attachments to others, and this is 
exposed by his lax password, and what is struck at when someone robs him. Attachment 
concern is a form of emotional dependence on other people: a non-instrumental need to 
form social bonds with individuals, and to thereby feel a sense of belonging to a group. 
This represents an additional vulnerability for Xavier, because it makes him liable to be 
betrayed and hurt, should the community he is attached to, strike at him. Yolanda on the 
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other hand treats nothing as a matter of trust. She trusts no one, and has no attachment 
to the group. When she is struck by having her money taken, she admonishes herself, and 
possibly directs her fury out at the people she already feels no need for, beyond potential 
instrumental need. 
 
Windows of vulnerability exist because of our being physically unable to prevent actions 
that could hurt us. There are endless ways in which people can strike at us or things we 
care about. We needn’t be aware of these gaps in our defences, or pay attention to them. 
When we have high levels of basic trust, the possibility that another might exploit certain 
gaps, simply isn’t salient. 
 
Relying on another to perform an action is one way of creating a window of vulnerability 
to that attachment concern. In section 4.7.2 and chapter 5 I argue for an account of 
reliance that goes toward explaining how relying on another to perform some action φ, 
leaves the success of something we are trying to achieve, in the hands of another’s acting. 
From that reliance, some end we are trying to bring about, can be obstructed by another 
failing to φ; we create an opening for another to hinder our progress. Depending on 
whether we have a deeper attachment concern like Xavier, we can also be struck in the 
way characteristic of a matter of trust. It can mean something to us that another fails to 
φ when we rely on her to φ, beyond a frustration that something that we wanted to happen 
has now fallen through. What would happen is that she – the one we were relying on – 
hasn’t come through for us, in a time when we needed her to. 
 
1.8 Challenging interpersonal import as necessary for matters of trust 
The discussion in the preceding section, concerning the connection between matters of 
trust, betrayal and vulnerability, is intended to flesh out the claim that matters of trust are 
partly defined by carrying some sort of interpersonal importance. The position that 
interpersonal import is a necessary feature of a matter of trust, though, runs contrary to 
a range of accounts of trust in the literature. To use three examples: 
 
Trust is a fundamentally cognitive notion. To trust or distrust others is to have 
some presumption of knowledge about them. […] A common claim about trust is 
that it is inherently normative. Unless it is merely an abstruse definitional move, 
this claim is not well grounded and even appears to be false. (Hardin 1998 : p.11) 
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I am using the word ‘trust’ in the sense of correct expectations about the actions of 
other people that have a bearing on one’s own choice of action when that action 
must be chosen before one can monitor the actions of those others. (Dasgupta 1988 
: p.51) 
 
[...] trust – a particular expectation we have with regard to the likely behaviour of 
others – is of fundamental importance. […] trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a 
particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that 
another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can 
monitor such action (or independently of his capacity to ever be able to monitor 
it) and in a context in which it affects his own action […] When we say we trust 
someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the probability 
that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is 
high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him. 
(Gambetta 1988 : p.217) 
 
Hardin’s claim above, that trust is not inherently normative, amounts to the claim that 
the interpersonal quality of trust and distrust, is not a necessary ingredient in the trust 
stance attitudes.4 This is a position, also reflected in Dasgupta’s and Gambetta’s remarks, 
typically found in the trust literature that is, broadly speaking, informed by a rational 
choice theory, or game-theoretic perspective. 
 
It is perhaps telling that the typical example case of trust that these perspectives consider, 
is not the sort of case, found in the flatmate examples from section 1.6, of people who live 
alongside one another in close proximity. Instead, the game-theoretic views typically 
involve interactions between unknown individuals, groups, or institutions. In these 
interactions, we can be tempted to suppose that interpersonal import is missing. But, 
because it seems sometimes plausible to use ‘trust’ to characterise interactions between 
unknowns of this sort, it follows that the overtly interpersonal or normative features of 
the cases between intimates, are not necessary features of trust. Those features we could 
suppose are a side-effect of the underlying machinery of trust, because there are cases of 
trust – those between unknowns – where those features are absent. 
 
Against this thought, I take it that we can argue it is much less clear whether we should 
describe interactions between unknowns in the typical Prisoner’s Dilemma kinds of case, 
as trust-based. As such they serve as poor paradigm cases of trust. Compare this with the 
flatmate contrast cases. In Food Stealing Flatmate (John predicting Elis continues to buy 
                                                      
4 My phrase ‘interpersonally important’ is intended to encapsulate this normativity; it 
opens the possibility of harms and wrongs associated with disappointed trust i.e. 
betrayal. 
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food he can take) and Cash Stealing Flatmate (Izzy predicting Maria will cancel the card she 
is stealing from), these are cases of ‘mere prediction’ or ‘mere reliance’ concerning 
whether someone is likely to perform an instrumentally beneficial/detrimental act. In 
those cases it is just not appropriate to say that John trusts Elis to continue providing 
food, or that Izzy distrusts Maria regarding cancelling her card. On the other hand, Ailing 
Flatmate (Maria trusting Izzy with her debit card) and Wary Flatmate (Elis suspecting John 
is lying) are clear cases of trust and distrust. In those, the interpersonal quality is 
undoubtedly present. If the phenomenon we are attempting to understand is 
interpersonal trust and distrust, and it appears that our willingness to apply the concept 
of trust or distrust depends on there being interpersonal import/normative machinery, 
then we must suppose that matters of interpersonal trust inherently involve some sort of 
interpersonal import. It follows that even in the ‘distanced’ cases that the rational 
choice/game-theoretic perspective is concerned with, we have reason to suppose that if 
we are inclined to think they are examples of trust, then those examples must somewhere 
contain an interpersonal quality.  
 
It may be that a candidate case is not in fact describing a matter of trust, but instead a 
matter of mere prediction or risk. But then we can’t presume that reflecting on such a 
case of mere prediction or risk reveals anything about the nature of interpersonal trust or 
distrust. It is instead describing a separate phenomenon. We have more warrant to deduce 
that matters of trust involve an interpersonal quality, because in the flatmate cases where 
a matter of trust is present and where it is absent, the interpersonal quality coincides with 
the trust or distrust attribution. Yet the game-theoretic ‘pure prediction’ view of trust, 
which is reflected in Hardin’s, Dasgupta’s and Gambetta’s positions above, gives both 
necessary and sufficient conditions for John’s attitude toward Elis. But we are inclined to 
think that case is not a case of interpersonal trust at all. As such, we have reason to believe 
the game-theoretic view misses something essential for making a matter one of trust. 
 
It is also telling that the game-theoretic view of trust as pure prediction typically appeals 
to, or makes overtures toward, interpersonally loaded concepts like cooperation and 
betrayal. In a Prisoner’s Dilemma game, for example, there are two agents presented with 
two courses of action. The game is set up as follows: 
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Figure 1: The Prisoner's Dilemma.5 
 
  
PLAYER 2 
 
  
COOPERATES DEFECTS 
PLAYER 
1 
COOPERATES 
R=3, R=3 
 
Reward for mutual 
cooperation 
S=0, T=5 
 
Sucker’s payoff, and 
temptation to defect 
 
DEFECTS 
 
T=5, S=0 
 
Temptation to defect, and 
sucker’s payoff 
 
P=1, P=1 
 
Punishment for mutual 
defection 
 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is intended to depict the basic structure of matters of human 
cooperation. Players are presented with two courses of action, for how to go about 
procuring points. These points stand in for some outcome that each player desires, where 
the higher the number of points, the more desirable the outcome. How many points each 
player gets, depends on what course of action the other player pursues.  If both players 
choose ‘cooperate’ then both receive some reward. If one defects and the other 
cooperates, the defector takes everything (the other receiving the ‘sucker’s payoff’, i.e. 
nothing). If both defect, then both receive the ‘punishment’ payoff. The act of pursuing 
the lesser payoff is typically labelled as ‘cooperate’, whereas pursuing the larger payoff 
(the selfish option) is labelled ‘defect’ (synonymous with ‘betray’) (Axelrod 2006 : pp.7–
8). As such, the most instrumentally desirable outcome is had, when we ‘defect’, and the 
other ‘cooperates’.  
 
My point against the game-theoretic view concerns what warrants the application of 
concepts such as ‘cooperate’ and ‘defect’, to the different courses of action in the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma. By applying these concepts, found in the realm of trust, distrust, and 
betrayal, this indicates that the game aims to shed light on matters of trust. This is even 
                                                      
5 This table based on (Axelrod 2006 : p.8). 
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though the game is supposed to be describing a scenario where the machinery of pure 
prediction/risk is at play. 
 
But, we can question whether the Prisoner’s Dilemma does shed light on matters of trust. 
We can ask, for instance, what warrants using the label ‘cooperates’ for an act of choosing 
the lesser payoff? Imagine that Player 1, say, chooses the lesser payoff, out of motives 
that would align with John’s or Izzy’s. After all, a free-loader who knows to exploit others 
to just enough of a degree that the target doesn’t move elsewhere, is more successful than 
one that exploits the other, to the point that they leave. Player 1 might know this, and it 
forms the basis of his playing style. It could be inconsequential to Player 1 that Player 2 
may receive some payoff too, when 1 chooses the lesser payoff. Player 1 may just know 
that if the larger payoff is pursued, this closes off the possibility of future payoffs with 
this target. Yet, we don’t characterise what a freeloader or parasite is doing as 
‘cooperating’ with their target, in the same way we wouldn’t describe John’s choosing to 
only take enough of Elis’ food to not give the game away, as cooperating with Elis. Even 
if the action of a freeloader sometimes bears a structural resemblance to a genuine instance 
of cooperation, we aren’t warranted in using an interpersonally/normatively loaded 
concept like cooperation, to describe what is happening when one player chooses the lesser 
payoff. That is, without knowing more about the agent’s motives in that scenario. 
 
As a result, theorists sympathetic to the game-theoretic model of interpersonal interaction 
cannot appeal to the model itself as revealing that matters of trust aren’t inherently 
normative (or: that they can be purely calculative). By presuming that the concepts of 
cooperation and defection can be applied to acts of calculated manoeuvring, without 
further argument, we have already re-described matters of trust in a way that ignores our 
intuitions about cases like the Flatmate contrast cases. This makes it the case that, whatever 
scenario the game-theoretic model is describing, this scenario bears only a structural 
resemblance to matters of trust, as they appear in real life. That’s because, by supposing 
that we are permitted to call an act of choosing the lesser payoff (for whatever reason) an 
act of cooperation, we have already sanctioned an interpretation of an action with 
interpersonal or normative import like ‘cooperating’, as consisting in a calculated 
manoeuvre in the pursuit of self-interest. Deducing then that the interpersonal import in 
matters of trust contains nothing inherently normative, is short-sighted. It fails to 
recognise that our starting point was to say that actions that appear to have, on the 
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surface, interpersonal or normative salience, are in fact actions that have no interpersonal 
or normative salience. 
 
It is also the case that authors in the game-theoretic tradition typically make overtures to 
the interpersonal import of matters of trust, in their broader discussions of trust. 
Dasgupta for example appeals to the interpersonally vivid concept of betrayal (1988 : 
p.53) and emphasises the role of external pressures or “enforcement agencies”, which 
create incentives among individuals to fulfil trust. One such enforcement agency, 
Dasgupta notes, could be “society at large. Social ostracism, and the sense of shame that 
society can invoke, are examples of such punishment” (1988 : p.50). 
 
The role of enforcement agencies is a common concern in the rational choice/game-
theoretic, post-Hobbesian tradition. It stands to reason that it should be, since we have 
already seen that trustors, on this tradition, fit the psychological profile of John or Izzy. 
There is arguably little possibility, on this view, of such a thing as the two-place trusting 
relationship, or of one-place basic trust toward a community (as discussed above in 
sections 1.3 and 1.4). For such agents, there is no consequence to defection beyond 
(possibly) no longer having the other player as a source of procurement of resources. It 
therefore makes sense (it is rational) for these agents, given an abundance of other players, 
to continually ‘cash out’, and defect. But then, the ‘tragedy of the commons’ results: all 
will continually receive the ‘punishment’ outcome. It would therefore make sense for all 
players in this society to create an external agency to bootstrap their own and other’s 
incentives into favouring cooperation. In effect, these individuals cannot trust or rely on 
themselves to do the thing that makes sense for them to do: to co-operate. So, in a 
Hobbesian move, they pool together to create an institution or set of practices, that will 
incentivise themselves, and everyone else, toward this outcome.  
 
Appealing to the concept of social ostracism or shame as performing the function of an 
external enforcement agency, though, involves an appeal to a new set of motivations in 
the players. We aren’t creating a social institution or practice (a justice system, police 
force, etc.), the presence of which would threaten consequences that tip the balance in 
favour of a choice – co-operate – that would otherwise not be chosen. It rather amounts 
to a rewiring of the motivational make-up of the individual players; it as an overture to 
the players having a non-instrumental need to belong to a social group, and resulting social 
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emotions associated with feeling one may be ostracised. The original players didn’t have 
this, though. Hence, the problem of needing an enforcement agency. The original players 
only had an instrumental need to have another agent to play against, in order to receive 
any points. This set-up led to the very problem we are now positing the enforcement 
agency of society itself/social ostracism/shame, to resolve. Players like John or Izzy were 
not moved by social ostracism or a sense of shame; they were moved by taking what they 
can get from others. If we supposed that social incentives were already salient for John 
and Izzy, we would not have faced the very problem – everyone defecting – that led to 
us positing such motivations, as a solution. In effect, we are not talking about the same 
players that we were to begin with. Players that are moved by shame, don’t have need of 
an external enforcement agency. 
 
Hardin’s account also gestures toward something interpersonal. His account is that trust 
is not just a prediction about whether another will perform some instrumentally beneficial 
action. He suggests that when I trust you to φ, I trust you to φ from “a reason in some 
way grounded in me […] I do not trust you to [φ] if I have no reason to suppose you do 
so somehow on my behalf. I trust you with respect to some action if your reason for 
doing it is to take me into account in some relevant way. Typically, your reason will be 
that it is in your interest to maintain our relationship. Hence, my trust in you is typically 
encapsulated in your interest in fulfilling my trust.” (Hardin 1998 : p.12). As such, his 
account of trust is that it involves a supposition of shared or ‘encapsulated’ interest: it is 
in your interest to fulfil my trust, because it is in your interest to maintain our relationship.  
 
While this inches Hardin’s account into the domain of interpersonal import, it isn’t 
definitively placed within it. Depending on which of his phrases we focus on, Hardin’s 
conception of trust could amount to an attitude of cynical knowingness; a positive 
prediction that another will act, with full awareness that she does so in order to continue 
getting what she wants from us (“it is in your interest to maintain our relationship”). This 
arguably falls short of capturing the interpersonal import of an attitude like that Maria 
has toward Izzy. On the other hand, Hardin’s conception could characterise the attitude 
Maria has toward Izzy (“you do so somehow on my behalf”; “to take me into account in 
some relevant way”), but this is more due to the vagueness of the descriptions allowing 
our intuitions, that trust does involve interpersonal import, to fill in the blanks of what is 
meant. 
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It is also telling that Hardin makes an overture to the notion of trustworthiness – but not 
trust – being inherently normative (Hardin 1998 : p.11, 1996). This is puzzling, though. 
By making a concession to trustworthiness as inherently normative, while still holding 
that trust isn’t, this creates an implausible disconnect between the attitude of trust, and 
what the attitude is ‘about’. The question is raised: at what point does another’s 
trustworthiness matter in that normatively/interpersonally significant way, if our trust of 
her doesn’t? Presumably, if trustworthiness is normatively significant, we would blame 
others and ourselves for breaching trust.6 If we were to suppose that trust wasn’t 
normatively significant, but trustworthiness was, then perhaps the trustor would have no 
claim against the trustee who breaches her trust, but bystanders would. They would 
sanction the trustee, because it is important to be trustworthy. This is clearly absurd: if 
broken trust matters to anyone, it is the trustor. It stands to reason that, when we suffer 
a betrayed trust, this is a matter of normative significance to us. It therefore seems that, 
once we hold trustworthiness to be ‘inherently normative’, it would follow that matters of 
trust, and the trust stance attitudes, are also inherently normative. 
 
In chapter 8 I will further discuss Hardin’s account, as part of defending my attachment-
based account of the interpersonal import in matters of trust (my account suggests that 
Dasgupta’s overture to social ostracism and shame, is well-motivated). 
 
1.8.1 ‘Trust that’ 
Here I raise a point about different usages of the term ‘trust’, that may shed light on 
confusions over whether a particular case is one of interpersonal trust, or mere prediction. 
The concept ‘trust’ has a broader application beyond the domain of interpersonal trust. 
This because we can also have trust stance attitudes toward our own judgements. As such, 
we could reach a judgement about the likelihood of another performing some action, and 
                                                      
6 On this front, we can compare trustworthiness with ‘creditworthiness’, as assessed by 
credit ratings agencies. Creditworthiness is not interpersonally normatively significant, 
as entering into a loan contract isn’t either. The ‘worthiness’ in question isn’t deservingness 
of credit, because it is just the conclusion of a risk assessment. This brings out that trust 
and trustworthiness involve something more than this. Thanks to my supervisor 
Thomas Smith for raising this comparison. 
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describe ourselves as trusting this. However, this is not interpersonal trust, where the target 
of our trust stance attitudes is an individual or group of persons. 
 
Along these lines, a distinction between “trust that” and “trust in” is drawn by (Hill and 
O’Hara 2006 : pp.1725–1727). Lagerspetz also notes the difference, in drawing a 
distinction between interpersonal ‘normative’ trust and non-normative trust: 
 
While some uses of the word ‘trust’ are normative in the way just described, there 
are others that surely are not. Some of these instances of ‘trusting’ are simply 
predictive beliefs with no clear moral implications, as when I trust that the 
weather will stay warm or that the Euro will not fall in relation to Pound Sterling. 
The crucial question is how plausible it would be to construe nonfulfilment as 
betrayal. However, I am not suggesting that these other cases are not ‘really’ 
instances of trust after all. That I leave to the reader to consider. Differentiating 
between cases is philosophically important, but legislating about language use is 
not. (2015 : p.20). 
 
There are interesting questions to ask about the overlap between the concept of 
interpersonal trust, and trust in a judgement concerning an event/state of affairs. My 
purpose in pointing out the difference is just to note a possible source of the confusion 
in the rational choice/game-theoretic literature over whether interpersonal trust carries 
normative significance (interpersonal import).  
 
I will use ‘trust that’ to characterise the non-normative trust directed toward states of 
affairs. When we trust that p, this could be directed toward a judgement that another 
person Y will φ/would φ/has φ’d. But, when X trusts that Y will φ, this isn’t yet a case 
where X trusts Y to φ. It reflects X’s trust of a judgement. The matter of trust then isn’t 
yet obviously interpersonal, because the concern is with her own judgements and plans. 
It’s possible that in the case of the Food Stealing Flatmate, John trusts that Elis will put 
food in the fridge. This doesn’t entail that John thereby trusts Elis to put food in the 
fridge. The usage of ‘trust’ in ‘trust that’ picks out a slightly different attitude to 
interpersonal trust. 
 
No doubt ‘trust that’ can also be present in a case of interpersonal trust, insofar as whether 
or not X trusts Y to φ will be a factor in whether X trusts that Y will φ.  The key point is 
that even if it is appropriate to describe a case as one of ‘trust that’, it doesn’t follow that 
it must also be a case of interpersonal trust.  
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But, I don’t claim that an instance of ‘trust that’ in everyday life is always only used to 
report an attitude of this sort of propositional trust. It seems right to say that, for example, 
one might say to another “I trust that you’ll come through for me on this”, where this 
would report an instance of interpersonal trust. I only mention the ‘trust you’/‘trust that’ 
contrast as a way of drawing attention to a possible source of confusion, over whether 
interpersonal trust is not essentially different from a prediction about whether certain 
states of affairs will obtain. As such we can sometimes use this distinction as a guide to 
determining why our judgement may be clouded about a particular case. Furthermore, 
much of what Hardin et al. say about interpersonal trust is not true of interpersonal trust, 
but is true of ‘trust that’. 
 
  
  45 
2 The Reliance Plus view of trust and distrust 
In this chapter I will set out the dominant view of trust in the philosophical literature. 
This is the view I call the ‘Reliance Plus’ (or ‘REL+’) view. It claims that to trust another 
is to rely on her to act, where that reliance is invested with interpersonal or normative 
significance.  
 
In section 2.1 I will set out the generic form of a REL+ view. REL+ views account for 
what I referred to in chapter 1 as the anticipatory and interpersonal elements of the trust 
stance, by pinning the anticipatory element to reliance on another, and the interpersonal 
element to the ability to be betrayed, in case of disappointed reliance. In section 2.2 I 
offer a critical overview of three prominent REL+ accounts: Baier’s (1986) ‘Goodwill’ 
account, Holton’s (1994) ‘Participant Stance’ account, and Hawley’s (2014) 
‘Commitment’ account. In the last section of this chapter – section 2.3 – I illustrate how 
committing to the generic REL+ view also commits us to a broader account of the trust 
stance, i.e. it also commits us to a view of distrust. This is a view of trust and distrust that 
Hawley (2014) and Helm (2014) commit to. 
 
In chapter 3 I set out an argument against this REL+ account of the trust stance. This 
argument illustrates that REL+ is false. In chapter 4 I set out a further argument against 
the REL+ view of the trust stance, that brings out the underlying reason why REL+ is 
false. 
 
2.1 Reliance plus betrayability 
In this section I set out the generic form of a REL+ view. REL+ is the view that trust is 
an attitude consisting of “reliance plus some extra factor” (Hawley 2014 : p.5). The extra 
factor is, roughly, an ability to be betrayed by the one you rely on. I will frequently use 
the term ‘betrayability’ to stand in for this extra factor. 
 
REL+ represents a species of views of trust, that are pervasive in the literature (Baier 
1986 : pp.234–235; Hawley 2014 : pp.2–3; Helm 2014 : pp.199–205; Hieronymi 2008 : 
p.215; Holton 1994 : p.66; Jones 1996 : p.14; McLeod 2015; Walker 2006 : pp.80–83). 
The essential characteristic of a REL+ view is to take trust to be a species of the more 
generic attitude reliance. REL+ says that trust is a species of reliance, albeit an 
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interpersonally/normatively loaded variety. I refer to the view as ‘Reliance plus’, then, 
because it tells us that trust is reliance with an extra interpersonal quality, that sets trust-
reliance apart from other types of reliance. REL+ accounts for that interpersonal quality 
by drawing on the intuition that trust is connected to the harm or wronging of betrayal. 
Trust is interpersonally salient because when we trust another, we are susceptible to being 
betrayed by her. As such the thought is that trust is reliance, plus conditions that enable 
the possibility of betrayal. 
 
As we saw in section 1.7, the connection between trust and betrayal is immediately 
apparent, when we reflect on everyday cases of trust. Trusting your partner to remain 
faithful, for instance, entails the possibility of being betrayed should she stray. Trusting 
your friend to keep an embarrassing secret entails the possibility of his betraying your 
trust in telling your secret to others. The ability to suffer betrayal as a kind of action or 
event, or a feeling that tends to result from such actions, is a defining characteristic of 
trust. 
 
REL+ can be traced to Baier (1986 : p.234). Baier points out a connection between trust 
and reliance (or: the ‘trust-reliance’ connection). The connection, when unpacked 
amounts to this claim: trust entails reliance, but reliance doesn’t entail trust. In other 
words, reliance necessary but is not sufficient for trust. There is, as a result, a contrast 
between trust and ‘mere reliance’. Baier uses a comparison case to motivate this claim. 
There is an infamous piece of philosophical folklore that Kant was so predictable in his 
routines that his neighbours could rely on his walking for keeping time (1986 : p.235). 
The fact that Kant’s neighbours could rely on his walking doesn’t entail that they trusted 
Kant to walk, though. The trust-betrayal connection explains what is missing: the fact 
that Kant’s neighbours aren’t betrayed by Kant just in case he doesn’t go for his walk. 
 
If we imagine now that the neighbours trust Kant to walk every day, it seems that they 
still rely on his walking. But, their reliance now seems normatively/interpersonally loaded, 
in a way that their mere reliance on him isn’t. It seems right to say that Kant can betray his 
neighbours when they trust him to walk, but not when they merely rely on him walking. 
It therefore seems that, by reflecting on this case, we can draw out a general point about 
the difference between merely relying on another to φ and trusting another to φ. The 
difference between mere reliance and trust, is whether one can be betrayed by the one 
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you rely on, in case she doesn’t φ. When merely relying on her, one isn’t betrayable by 
her. But when trusting her, one is betrayable by her. 
 
Not every instance of disappointed trust need amount to a betrayal. As mentioned in 
section 1.7, we might also simply be ‘let down’ on some occasions. What is important is 
that there is a difference between mere reliance and trust, in that trust is interpersonally 
or normatively significant in some way. The trust-betrayal connection provides a useful 
way of characterising what that significance is. Trust, rather than mere reliance, is an 
attitude that opens up the possibility of interpersonally-focused wrongings or 
disappointments. The stereotypical or most vivid such disappointment we can suffer in 
trust is betrayal. As such focusing on the notion of betrayal is useful to help bring into 
focus the somewhat vague (though correct) remark that trust has interpersonal import. 
By saying that trust has ‘betrayability’, then, this doesn’t mean that any instance of trust, 
must be a case where X relies on Y φ’ing, such that Y’s not φ’ing counts as a betrayal. It 
could be that Y lets X down, or abandons X. It’s plausible that the sort of harm that 
results from Y’s failure to φ, will depend on what the matter of trust is, how significant 
that matter is for X, and in what way Y fails to φ. Then, the significance of the matter for 
X may well vary with who Y is to X. What betrayability denotes is that X’s attitude to Y 
carries the interpersonal import of trust, such that X is susceptible to the harms 
characteristic of disappointed trust, such as betrayal. 
 
As stated, variants of REL+ are often explicitly and tacitly endorsed in the literature on 
trust. This should come as no surprise since, as we’ve seen, the view follows from two 
intuitive claims about trust: that trust is connected to betrayal, and that reliance is 
necessary but not sufficient for trust. These are intuitions concerning what I referred to 
in chapter 1 as the anticipatory element and the interpersonal element of trust. On the 
one hand, the trust-betrayal connection accounts for the interpersonal element; it explains 
the interpersonal import of matters of trust. On the other hand, the trust-reliance 
connection accounts for the anticipatory element, because reliance on another seems to 
involve anticipating her fulfilling that reliance. 
 
REL+ is also useful in that it provides a method for analysing trust. Candidate accounts of 
trust can be assessed by how well they provide convincing conditions for reliance and 
betrayability. And, the reliance condition is very easy to satisfy: it can just be stipulated 
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that it holds in an example case. Critically evaluating a candidate REL+ account thus 
tends to involve raising doubts about how well the proposed account of betrayability 
holds up to counter-examples. So, how we ought to understand trust comes to rest on 
putting forward the correct account of betrayability. That the view is so widespread is no 
doubt partly due to the appeal of the procedural method for analysing trust that it grants. 
 
2.2 REL+ and narrowing down betrayability 
Following the REL+ paradigm has allowed trust theorists to rule out certain candidate 
accounts of betrayability. As such, REL+ is not only well supported by intuition, but has 
arguably been philosophically productive. Following the REL+ paradigm has allowed 
theorists to make important claims about what the interpersonal import of trust consists 
in. We can see the progress made on this score, in a thread of argument running through 
Baier (1986), Holton (1994) and Hawley (2014). Each puts forward a REL+ account 
offering a different formulation of the betrayability component. In the following sections 
I will offer a critical overview of this thread of arguments. The conclusion from this, I 
will argue, is that Hawley’s account of betrayability manages to crystallise the underlying 
structure of an issue of betrayal, and thus a matter of trust. 
 
2.2.1 Baier: the ‘Goodwill’ account 
Baier (1986) contains several different formulations of an account of trust. The first of 
these is largely responsible for the REL+ paradigm in the literature. It’s that account I’ll 
discuss in this section. Baier’s first formulation of a view of trust is as reliance on another’s 
goodwill toward one (1986 : p.234). Let’s call this the ‘Goodwill’ account.  
 
When we use the Goodwill account to explain the case of Kant’s neighbours, the account 
is convincing. Kant’s neighbours merely relied on Kant’s walking in going about their 
day, and this seems to lack any of the normative or interpersonal significance that trusting 
Kant would involve. It is possible, of course, that they merely rely on his walking as they 
would a clock. If we instead suppose that they rely on his goodwill toward them as the 
motive of his walking, then I take it that we are more inclined to agree that the neighbours 
trust Kant to walk. That we are so inclined suggests that, as an attitude with some sort of 
representational content, trusting someone involves representing the one you trust as 
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having some level of (perhaps minimal) goodwill toward you. So, what is missing from 
mere reliance, but present in trust as a type of reliance, is presumed goodwill toward you. 
Trust, therefore, seems to be reliance, plus (presumed) goodwill. 
 
The Goodwill account, though, is insufficient for capturing trust. This is because it 
doesn’t capture betrayability. Holton shows this by a counterexample: a con-artist (or 
‘trickster’) relies on your goodwill toward him, yet doesn’t trust you (1994 : p.65). It is 
possible to rely on another’s goodwill toward you, as the motive for her action, while 
precisely not trusting her. A con-artist, after all, feigns trusting, just to solicit the sort of 
action from others that will be beneficial to his own ends. The type of reliance that a con-
artist has on his mark is, surely, exploitative. This is opposed to the kind of interpersonally 
significant reliance found in trust, which, as intuition suggests, involves the possibility of 
being betrayed. So, even in stipulating that in trust we rely on another’s goodwill, we don’t 
guarantee that one can be betrayed in so relying. We can rely on another’s goodwill while 
not trusting her. The con-artist objection is a decisive one in showing that the ‘reliance 
on another’s goodwill’ account is insufficient for trust.7 
 
Holton also argues that presuming another has goodwill toward us is not a necessary 
component of trust. He gives three examples to show this (1994 : p.65). One involves an 
estranged couple, who can trust one another to look after their children, without having 
goodwill toward one another. Holton then anticipates a response to this case; even 
though the couple have no goodwill toward one another, they have goodwill to the child. 
As such, the response is that, even if the couple have no goodwill toward one another, 
goodwill is still relevant to trust. It’s just that, in some cases, we presume the person we 
trust has goodwill toward the thing we trust her with, rather than us.  
 
Holton raises a further case, intended to show that goodwill is irrelevant to trust. He 
suggests that when we are forced to surrender to an enemy while under gunfire, by waving 
a white flag, we can trust the enemy to not shoot us. But, Holton claims, we would also 
suppose that the enemy has no goodwill toward us, as part of our trust attitude. This 
                                                      
7 I will argue in chapter 8 that the underlying reason why the Goodwill account fails is 
because, when we rely on another’s goodwill toward us, whether she has goodwill is of 
instrumental concern to us; it is playing a practical role in achieving our goal. A matter of 
trust though must involve a non-instrumental concern for another’s goodwill (or 
something like it) toward us. 
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example is intended to show that trust needn’t involve any presumption of goodwill 
toward us. He suggests that, “Our enemies' restraint might be grudging, driven simply by 
a belief that it is wrong to shoot someone who has surrendered. To impute goodwill here 
would be to deprive the notion of all content. Nevertheless, talk of trust is not out of 
place” (1994 : p.65). 
 
While I take it that the con-artist case is definitive in showing that Baier’s Goodwill 
account is insufficient for trust, Holton’s arguments against the necessity of a concern for 
goodwill in trust are much less successful. In respect of the estranged couple case, I take 
it that, if there is any level of interpersonal trust between them, then there is some 
presumed goodwill. Each would presumably feel guilt toward the other, should the child 
come to harm under their care. If not, though, it may be a case that each ‘trusts that’ the 
other will look after the child (as per section 1.8.1), rather than trusts the other to look 
after the child. 
 
In respect of the ‘white flag’ example, this does not conclusively show that a concern for 
another’s goodwill is irrelevant to trust. It might be that Holton’s dispute is with the 
connotations of ‘goodwill’ as maybe implying some personal warmth toward you when 
you surrender. We can suppose the enemy doesn’t have personal warmth, because he 
does not know you, and has just engaged in combat with you. We could, on that front, 
simply use a different term that doesn’t have the connotations of personal warmth, but 
that is still within the realm of other-regarding attitudes, such as respect. I take it that 
respect equates to something like goodwill toward another, based on her status as another 
human. 
 
We can therefore respond to Holton’s dispute. Insofar the enemy is moved in a moral sense 
by your surrender, then he must have some goodwill toward you as another human being. 
After all, a soldier that doesn’t care about upholding proper rules of engagement has no 
goodwill toward enemy combatants. In that sense, if the soldier is simply adhering to the 
rules of engagement on the basis that a punishment could befall him should he not, then 
he is not apparently concerned about you, and so has no goodwill toward you. Overall, 
Holton’s claim that imputing goodwill to the enemy’s motives ‘deprives the notion of 
content’ can be easily disputed. The only plausible reading of the white flag case where 
you trust the enemy, involves appealing to something like his respect for you as another 
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combatant. Moreover, respect is certainly - like goodwill - within the realm of other-
regarding concepts. 
 
In the next section I discuss Holton’s own account, where I argue that his account 
involves a tacit appeal to goodwill as a relevant concern. 
 
2.2.2 Holton: the ‘Participant Stance’ account 
Holton’s positive account of trust is built to deal with the con-artist case. Where Baier 
pinpoints an attitude of the trustee that we rely on when we trust (the trustee’s goodwill 
toward us), Holton suggests that we do not rely on a specific attitude of a trustee. He 
supposes that while we rely on a trustee to do something, what actually makes our reliance 
trusting, and so what is missing from the con-artist’s reliance on his mark, is an additional 
disposition toward having reactive attitudes of a trustee, just in case she disappoints our trust 
(1994 : pp.67–68). 
 
The notion of a reactive attitude comes from Strawson, who conceives of the reactive 
attitudes as those ways we respond (react) positively or negatively to the good or ill will 
manifest in another’s actions, in a way that manifests our own engagement in an 
interpersonal relationship with her (1974 : pp.5–6). Such attitudes include blame, 
resentment and gratitude. Crucially though, betrayal is a reactive attitude that we have 
toward manifest ill will. Since our goal is to secure betrayability, our preferred account of 
trust should therefore require that a trustor has the sort of psychology that makes any 
sort of reactive attitude appropriate. This is what Holton suggests we build into our 
account of trust. As such, his account of trust is that it is reliance from the kind of stance 
we adopt toward others when we are disposed toward reactive attitudes from their 
actions. Holton adapts Strawson’s construal of this stance as an “attitude (or range of 
attitudes) of involvement or participation in a human relationship” (1974 : p.9), and gives 
it the more general label of a participant stance. On Holton’s account, then, trust is reliance 
on another φ’ing, plus a participant stance toward the one we rely on (1994 : p.66). We 
can call this the ‘Participant Stance’ account for short. 
 
The Participant Stance account appears to avoid the con-artist counterexample, because 
the con-artist fails to take a participant stance toward you. This is because he is not 
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disposed to reactive attitudes to you, in the matter of you e.g. giving him your bank details. 
While he may be disposed to frustration at your possible failure to give your bank details, 
this isn’t a reactive attitude in the sense that Strawson conceives of reactive attitudes. 
Reactive attitudes are those we have in our engagement or participation in an 
interpersonal relationship with another, not just attitudes we have due to things going 
well or badly for us, whatever our projects or ends are. A con-artist would experience 
those, but doesn’t experience the reactive attitudes, as they come from engagement in 
interpersonal relationships. 
 
Here we can raise a point against Holton’s previous argument, that goodwill was 
unnecessary for trust, discussed in the previous section. The Participant Stance account 
seems to involve an appeal to goodwill. That is because his account invokes Strawsonian 
reactive attitudes. As we have just seen, these are ways we respond to another, based on 
perceived good or ill will in her actions. They are attitudes reflecting involvement in 
human relationships. As such, the Participant Stance account provides a ‘Trojan horse’ 
for concern about another’s goodwill to re-enter the picture. This is not an issue for the 
account itself, because we saw that Holton’s arguments, against the necessity of 
considerations of goodwill, were unpersuasive. Holton does note, though, that he is open 
to the accusation of inconsistency, and he addresses this in a footnote (1994 : p.66 
footnote 9). There, he points out that Strawson later stipulates that the reactive attitudes 
can result from our concern about the regard in which others hold us. How regard is 
distinct from goodwill, though, is left unqualified. Presumably, a concern about regard is 
similar to a concern about respect (which I discussed above). So, a concern about regard 
is within the realm of concern about goodwill and ill-will. We are concerned about where 
we stand with another person. Thus, invoking regard doesn’t obviously remove goodwill, 
or something related to it, from the picture. 
 
I also suggest that the Participant Stance account, as a way of securing betrayability, can 
be accused of being relatively unexplanatory. It is right to point out that a con-artist 
doesn’t have the requisite attitude toward his mark, that allows him to be betrayed. Holton 
identifies the missing attitude as a participant stance toward the mark. However, the 
account doesn’t tell us why the con-artist doesn’t adopt a participant stance, or why he 
couldn’t. I claimed above that the con-artist doesn’t adopt a participant stance, because 
he doesn’t have an interpersonal relationship with the mark. But we don’t yet have a 
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principled reason for supposing that a con-artist couldn’t have an interpersonal relationship 
with his mark. As such, pointing out that the con-artist doesn’t have the required attitude 
to be betrayable by his mark, doesn’t shed light on why the con-artist doesn’t trust his 
mark.  
 
Certainly, the account identifies a missing necessary attitude, that would be required for 
the con-artist to be betrayable. But we already recognised that the con-artist lacked such 
an attitude, because he wasn’t betrayable. This was how it served as a useful counter-
example to the Goodwill account. The participant stance account avoids the example by 
brute stipulation that, if one is not betrayable, then one doesn’t have a participant stance. 
It thus asks us to infer from the lack of betrayability in the con-artist, that the con-artist 
doesn’t satisfy the conditions of the account. But it remains to be seen whether a con-
artist could also have a participant stance. In fact, it seems plausible to imagine a con-
artist being disposed to react at some level with interpersonal reactive attitudes, even if he 
may not be warranted in doing so. 
 
A related point against the participant stance condition, is that it is too general to account 
for the interpersonal import of matters of trust in particular. Hawley (2014) argues that 
while the Participant Stance account captures a necessary condition for trust, it doesn’t 
provide sufficient conditions for trust. It is indeed necessary that, in trust, we adopt a 
stance toward another from which reactive attitudes are appropriate. But, it is still true 
that we can rely on another from a participant stance, but not be disposed to betrayal 
specifically. If that is right then the Participant Stance account doesn’t capture trust, 
because it doesn’t get us betrayability. 
 
Hawley gives an example to illustrate that reliance from a participant stance isn’t sufficient 
for trust (Hawley 2014 : pp.7–8). I will re-frame it slightly. Suppose that Xavier comes to 
rely on his partner Yolanda cooking for him. He also adopts a participant stance toward 
her in his reliance, because he expresses gratitude to her when she cooks. However, 
should Yolanda not cook for Xavier one time, it isn’t yet appropriate that we, or he, call 
this a betrayal of trust. That’s because it isn’t yet enough for Xavier to be relying on 
Yolanda cooking from his participant stance, for it to thereby be a matter of trust that 
she does cook. 
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I take it that this example is persuasive. Xavier relying on Yolanda to cook while adopting 
a participant stance toward her, isn’t enough for Xavier to be betrayed, should she not 
cook. The participant stance, after all, isn’t an attitude that is exclusively adopted toward 
another in a matter of trust. It is simply the general attitude we adopt toward another 
such that we are disposed to interpersonal reactive attitudes, which are responses to 
manifest good or ill will in her actions. Considering this point, I suggest we can explain 
why it is intuitive that Xavier can express gratitude to Yolanda for cooking, while it not 
follow he thereby must feel betrayal should she not cook.  
 
Yolanda’s continued cooking for Xavier can manifest good will toward him, and so he 
can express gratitude toward her for it. He would do so, because her cooking can amount 
to a repeated series of affectionate gestures. But it doesn’t follow that not cooking can 
amount to a failure to cook or be a gesture of ill will, and so a failure to express respect to 
Xavier. Just because another has undertaken a schedule of affectionate actions, we aren’t 
warranted in supposing that a failure to maintain that schedule of affectionate actions, 
thereby expresses ill will (perhaps Yolanda has had a busy day at work). But betrayal is a 
reactive attitude to perceived ill will. So, it doesn’t follow yet that Yolanda’s failure to 
carry out the affectionate act is going to be perceived by Xavier as an expression of ill 
will, and thus a betrayal. 
 
However, there are two features of the case that, I think, stop the example being definitive 
in showing the Participant Stance account is inadequate. For one, I think our intuitions 
can be swayed toward thinking that Xavier could receive Yolanda’s not cooking as a gesture 
of ill will, or a lack of good will. So, he could be treat it as a matter of trust, due to her 
not cooking. Thus, the example doesn’t work as a case of participant stance without 
betrayability. This is because it arguably is a feature of human nature that a schedule of 
affectionate actions being maintained, can generate a normative/interpersonal 
expectation of those actions being continued. As a result, not performing an affectionate 
action one time, when we have come to anticipate it, can be received as manifesting a lack 
of concern/affection/good will toward us, or even as manifesting ill will.8 This inches us 
toward perceiving something like a betrayal, or perhaps a feeling of being let down, should 
                                                      
8 Hawley recognizes this - her account, discussed in the next section, explains this. It 
does so by allowing that we can incur commitments, which lie at the heart of matters of 
trust, via repeated actions. 
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that schedule be broken. Consider how even though as adults we know we shouldn’t 
expect it of our friends and family that they celebrate our birthday, we might still feel hurt, 
abandoned, betrayed, or let down, should they fail to remember to celebrate our birthday 
(think of their efforts to make you feel disappointed and forgotten, prior to the reveal of 
your surprise party). 
 
The ‘repeated kind gestures’ point indicates that the example may not be a case of 
participant stance without betrayability, as Hawley supposes it is. A further feature of the 
case can sway us toward the same conclusion. This stems from Xavier’s reliance on 
Yolanda’s cooking. We can argue that given Xavier’s reliance on Yolanda’s cooking, her 
cooking doesn’t just represent a kind gesture for Xavier. If Xavier has come to rely on 
her cooking, this indicates he now has a practical need for it: he hasn’t made alternative 
arrangements for dinner.9 Yolanda’s cooking is now an action that serves to ensure 
something else he needs is brought about. If Yolanda recognises his reliance on her cooking, 
and makes no effort to assuage it, he may be right in treating this as a matter of trust.  
 
This last point, though, is exactly what Hawley’s positive account can explain. That’s 
because the case begins to look like one where Yolanda has made a commitment to Xavier, 
to continue cooking. 
 
2.2.3 Hawley’s ‘Commitment’ account 
 
The two features of the Yolanda’s cooking case, that I suggested could make it possibly 
unpersuasive as an argument against the participant stance being a sufficient condition 
for betrayability, in fact help serve to motivate Hawley’s positive account. The 
betrayability condition that Hawley puts forward can explain why these two features draw 
our intuitions toward thinking that Yolanda’s repeated cooking could become a matter of 
trust to Xavier. That’s because, by undertaking repeated gestures, and carrying on with 
apparent recognition of another’s reliance on those actions, we can incur commitments 
to others. As such, the gap that is identified by Hawley in the Participant Stance account, 
between the participant stance and betrayability, is arguably filled by the concept she 
appeals to in her account of betrayability. 
                                                      
9 I defend the claim that reliance involves practical need, or dependence, in section 
4.7.2, and chapter 5. 
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Hawley’s positive account is concerned with pinpointing the specific type of “worldly 
situation to which (dis)trust is an appropriate response” (Hawley 2014 : p.9) and therefore 
what makes the possibility of betrayal appropriate. Betrayability then is secured by the 
trustor’s belief that this betrayal-enabling situation obtains. The betrayal-enabling 
condition Hawley identifies as underpinning matters of trust, is that the trustor believes 
the trustee has made an interpersonally, normatively binding commitment to acting, via 
explicitly promising or implicitly encouraging the trustor’s reliance on her to act (2014 : 
pp.10–12). Commitments, she explains, are broader than explicit promises: 
 
Aren’t there obvious, immediate counterexamples to the claim that trust and 
distrust presuppose commitment of this kind? We often trust people to do things 
which we know they have not explicitly promised to do. I trust my friends not to 
steal the cutlery when they come to dinner, and, at least in some areas, I trust 
strangers to let me walk unhindered. To make the account plausible I must use a 
very broad notion of commitment: commitments can be implicit or explicit, 
weighty or trivial, conferred by roles and external circumstances, default or 
acquired, welcome or unwelcome. In particular I will take it that mutual 
expectation and convention give rise to commitment unless we take steps to 
disown these. (2014 : p.11) 
 
In addition to this, we can trust those who make commitments to third parties. By making 
a commitment to Y, we thereby make ourselves open to being trusted by Z. Hawley 
defends this using an example of trusting a friend who makes a promise to your daughter 
to pick her up from a party (2014 : p.11). You can trust the friend in this respect, despite 
the commitment being to your daughter and not to you. 
 
So, on this account, when we trust another, we not only rely on her to act, but we also 
have a belief that she has made a commitment to acting, whether that is a commitment 
to us or to someone or other. We can call this the ‘Commitment’ account. 
 
The appeal of the Commitment account is plain. By isolating the kind of situation where 
susceptibility to betrayal is appropriate, it builds on the groundwork set by the Participant 
Stance account, to tell us something about trust specifically. The Participant Stance 
account secured the possibility of betrayal. But it only did so, because it secured the 
possibility of that participant stance being adopted toward a matter of trust. The Yolanda’s 
cooking case was designed to show that in relying from a participant stance we don’t 
necessarily rely in the manner needed for trust, because we can still fail to be betrayable 
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from the participant stance. That’s because we can still rely on another without taking her 
to have made a commitment. 
 
In the Yolanda’s cooking case, the two grounds on which we might have thought it was 
unpersuasive as an example of a participant stance without trust (repeated gestures of 
affection, and possibility of Xavier thinking she has recognised his reliance on her) are 
features that would lead us to attribute a belief to Xavier, that Yolanda has made a 
commitment to cooking. Philosophical accounts of promising (a species of commitment), 
tend to emphasise the importance of invited reliance/trust in generating promissory 
obligations, such that the reliance is recognised (Friedrich and Southwood 2011; Pink 
2009; Scanlon 1990; Thomson 1990). In this respect, we can imagine that it wouldn’t be 
completely unreasonable for Xavier to suppose that Yolanda has implicitly encouraged 
his reliance on her, by at least not assuaging his continued reliance on her cooking, 
following recognition of the fact of his reliance. What the commitment account does is 
crystallise a certain underlying structure to interactions found in matters of trust. This 
structure, roughly, is that another has led us to believe, or is acting in such a way that 
indicates, that she recognises the respect in which we could lose out from her not doing 
what she presents herself as doing. There may be some fact of the matter as to whether 
she has so acted. But, this is less important to the fact that she is trusted, than the trustor’s 
perception that she has so acted. 
 
I think we see how intuitive and explanatorily powerful the appeal to the notion of 
commitment is, when we reflect on how the notion of commitment closely maps onto 
Shklar’s definition of the simple act of betrayal, mentioned in section 1.7. This was of 
“having an expectation disappointed,”, where “one person should have both intentionally 
convinced another person of his future loyalty and then deliberately rejected him” (1984 
: pp.140–141). If Shklar’s definition is right (and I take it to be highly intuitive), the notion 
of a commitment or a promise then can’t fail to secure betrayability. That’s since, at the 
core of the notion of betrayal, there is the archetype or structure of a promise being made, 
and then broken. 
 
In summary, then; widespread adoption of REL+ in the philosophical literature has 
arguably enabled progress in understanding the nature of trust, because it has allowed us 
to reveal what the interpersonally normative aspect of trust consists in. By separating out 
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the interpersonally normative aspect of trust – betrayability - from its predictive aspect, 
we can systematically scrutinise what betrayability requires. Considering Hawley’s 
Commitment account, it appears that Baier’s Goodwill and Holton’s Participant Stance 
accounts were circling a submerged aspect of trust, that the Commitment account helps 
bring to the surface. We’ve thereby shown what was exerting a pull on our intuitions 
about betrayability in different cases, by showing that our intuitions on this seem to track 
with our intuitions about whether a commitment has been made. REL+, then, has 
arguably been philosophically productive. Given that, we appear to be well justified in 
adopting it as a general account of trust. 
 
2.3 REL+ as an account of the trust stance 
Once we commit to the idea that trust is reliance plus betrayability, a certain view of 
distrust falls out of this. This view of distrust falls out of the REL+ framework once we 
assume that distrust is in some sense an attitude that is similar or symmetrical to trust. 
Distrust is like trust in the same way that disbelief is similar to belief. Disbelieving 
something is similar to but not the same as believing it, and an account of belief ought to 
shed light on how. 
 
As set out in section 1.1: distrust, being similar to trust, exists in the trust stance. The 
trust stance contains the attitudes that are ‘trust-y’ in nature. This obviously includes trust 
and distrust, as attitudes we can have toward another in matters of trust. Something being 
a matter of trust, after all, is also necessarily a matter of possible distrust. Trust and 
distrust are in some sense defined by their standing in opposition to one another. We 
know what it is like to trust someone, by how it is opposed to what it is like to distrust 
them. Because of their similarity, we ought to be able to explain distrust within the same 
framework we use to explain trust.  
 
As stated above, a way of explaining distrust under the REL+ framework in fact falls out 
of the basic theoretical commitment of REL+. The basic theoretical commitment, of 
course, is that trust is built out of reliance. If we are assuming that trust is like distrust, 
then we should presume that distrust is grounded in a similar attitude to trust; one on 
same plane or in the same stance as reliance. We should assume, therefore, that the trust 
stance is built out of the ‘reliance stance’. We can see how this looks on Figure 2 below: 
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Figure 2: The trust stance and reliance stance under REL+ 
 
 
 
This illustrates that the basic theoretical commitment underpinning REL+ does afford a 
way of accounting for distrust. In fact, it affords only one way of plausibly accounting for 
distrust. The only conceptual space that makes sense for it is betrayable non-reliance. This 
is the account of distrust that Hawley in fact endorses, in her Commitment account (2014 
: p.10). I will explain what the motivation for endorsing this view of distrust is. 
 
Distrust can’t be mere non-reliance. We don’t rely on people in all sorts of respects, yet 
this doesn’t mean that we distrust them in those respects. We simply don’t rely on many 
of the actions others undertake in their day. This doesn’t entail that we distrust others in 
respect of those actions. That’s because, for many of those actions, we will be simply 
unaware that they are being carried out. Of those we are aware of, we will be indifferent 
to most of them. As with the trust/reliance distinction, there is some interpersonally 
loaded aspect to distrust that elevates it beyond mere non-reliance on another’s action. 
 
Yet while distrust is interpersonally loaded, it isn’t interpersonally loaded reliance. That just 
gets us trust again. So, given that distrust is interpersonally loaded, but isn’t 
interpersonally loaded reliance, the only remaining conceptual space that makes sense to 
place distrust in is betrayable non-reliance. 
 
Could we give a different account of distrust, while endorsing the basic theoretical 
commitment of REL+: that trust is reliance plus betrayability? Arguably not. For one, 
that trust and distrust are in some sense symmetrical – the mirror images of one another 
- compels us to endorse a reliance stance-based account of distrust. Recall the analogy 
between trust/distrust and belief/disbelief. Trust and distrust seem to be related in the 
same way that belief and disbelief are. This would imply that an account of the positive 
attitude (trust, belief) would use the same groundwork for an account of the opposing 
 Reliance Non-reliance  
Betrayability Trust Distrust (TRUST STANCE) 
Non-betrayability Mere Reliance Mere Non-reliance (RELIANCE STANCE) 
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negative attitude (distrust, disbelief). It would be surprising for instance if disbelief turned 
out to be a fundamentally different type of attitude from belief. In the same way, it would 
be surprising if distrust turned out to be a fundamentally different type of attitude from 
trust. If we were to, on the one hand, commit to a view of trust as a type of reliance, yet 
commit to a view of distrust as grounded in e.g. hope, we would have to ask why it isn’t 
reasonable to ground trust in hope also; such that trust was a variety of hope. If there were 
a reason for supposing that distrust was based in some other kind of attitude besides 
reliance we would have to wonder whether that same reason also suggested that trust 
wasn’t a variety of reliance either. So, taking distrust to be grounded in some different 
type of attitude to trust, would just call REL+ into question. Thus, given the way trust 
and distrust are related, we have prima facie reason to suppose that, by endorsing REL+ 
as an account of trust, we must endorse a reliance stance account of the trust stance more 
broadly. 
 
This means that we are restricted to this account of distrust on REL+, because the 
reliance stance has only two options: reliance and non-reliance. As noted, distrust is 
interpersonally salient, in a similar way to trust. But since we’ve given over interpersonally 
salient (betrayable) reliance to trust, we have only one option for another betrayable 
attitude: non-reliance. 
 
We’re therefore compelled to adopt the ‘non-reliance plus betrayability’ account of 
distrust, once we endorse REL+. This is because trust and distrust are similar, and 
reliance/non-reliance is a binary. But that we are compelled to adopt the non-reliance 
plus betrayability account needn’t be a problem. Such an account of distrust is an 
attractive one, for two main reasons. 
 
First, ‘non-reliance plus betrayability’ accords with our intuitions about the 
interpersonal/normative aspect of distrust. It’s already been noted that when we distrust 
another, we regard her in a way that casts an interpersonal/normative/ethical light on our 
dealings with her. As with trust though, we could reasonably pin this to betrayability, 
because we can be betrayed by those we distrust. Consider a case where, for example, a 
jealous husband hacks into his wife’s email, phone, social media accounts etc. and finds 
that she has been cheating on him after all. In such a case, he is betrayed, even though he 
already distrusts her. Similarly, distrusted politicians can still betray or let down 
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constituents by failing to do what those constituents expect of them (Hieronymi 2008 : 
p.229). Hawley gives an example in support of the thought that distrust can be betrayed; 
Jesus distrusted Judas, yet was still able to be betrayed by him (2014 : p.13). So that REL+ 
offers an account of distrust as betrayable non-reliance appears to accord with our 
intuitions: we can be betrayed by those we distrust. 
 
Second, this account of distrust accords with our intuitions about the predictive aspect 
of distrust. We’ve seen that while trusting someone casts them in a positive light, 
distrusting someone casts them in a negative light. Trust involves a certain kind of 
optimism about another, and distrust a kind of pessimism. This also applies to our 
understanding of trustworthiness. If you are trustworthy, this is (generally) a good thing, 
whereas being untrustworthy is (generally) a bad thing. That trust and distrust cast others 
in opposing lights cannot be due to them having a differing sort of interpersonal 
component, though, since they appear to have that as a common ground: they both leave 
us susceptible to betrayal. Given that the other component of trust is reliance and distrust 
non-reliance, we should infer that the optimism of trust is due to its involving reliance, 
and the pessimism of distrust due to its non-reliance. 
 
Tying the optimism of trust and the pessimism of distrust to the reliance/non-reliance 
distinction seems to make a lot of sense. For one, reliability is preferable to unreliability. 
Recall the Kant example: even if Kant’s neighbours merely rely on Kant, it is still 
preferable to them that he walks. If Kant’s walking was an unreliable measure of time 
they wouldn’t wish to rely on his walk for their timekeeping. It also makes sense that 
trustworthy individuals are reliable in some interpersonally loaded way, and 
untrustworthy individuals are unreliable in some interpersonally loaded way. 
 
The account of distrust that falls out of REL+ then is an attractive one. Trust involves 
optimism, and distrust involves pessimism, by the fact that trust involves reliance, 
whereas distrust involves non-reliance. There is good reason for thinking this, because 
reliability is connected to predictability. Kant was predictable in his routines and this made 
him reliable. This trust stance version of REL+ tells us that trust and distrust are distinct 
attitudes – the mirror image of one another – in terms of having opposing predictions of 
another’s performance of some action. While the REL+ schema leaves us one way of 
explaining distrust, that way seems to be natural and intuitive. 
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Now we can see that, in addition to committing to a view of distrust, committing to 
REL+ commits us to a view of what neither trust-nor-distrust of another amounts to. As 
per Figure 2 above, the trust/distrust and ‘neither-nor’ divide runs along the ‘trust stance’ 
and ‘reliance stance’ divide. In other words, all forms of ‘neither-nor’ reside in the reliance 
stance. See Figure 3: 
 
Figure 3: Trust/distrust and neither-nor under REL+ 
 
 
 
 
This figure is intended to illustrate how the distinction between trust/distrust and neither 
trust-nor-distrust, on REL+, runs along the betrayable/non-betrayable attitude 
distinction. This way of accounting for neither-nor seems to make sense. Once we switch 
off betrayability, we are left with mere reliance and mere non-reliance, which clearly 
amount to neither trust-nor-distrust. That Kant’s neighbours merely relied on Kant meant 
they didn’t trust him. But nor did they distrust him. Also, that we simply don’t rely on 
others doesn’t mean we distrust them. Mere reliance and mere non-reliance on others 
reside outside of the trust stance. Thus, it seems right that neither trust-nor-distrust can 
be pinned to the non-betrayable ‘reliance stance’, consisting of reliance and its absence. 
 
I’ve illustrated that if we assume REL+, then a certain account of distrust and neither-
nor results. Such accounts are also endorsed in the literature. Hawley for example sets 
out her account of distrust as non-reliance plus betrayability, along similar lines of 
reasoning as that set out above, concerning the symmetry between reliance/trust and 
non-reliance/distrust. She supports extending the REL+ schema to explaining distrust 
by noting that distrust can involve the expectation of betrayal (2014 : p.13), and ties 
distrust to an expectation of unfulfilled commitment (2014 : p.1). In other words, her 
account of distrust is as a predictive expectation of betrayal. 
 
A similar view of trust and distrust is endorsed by Helm (2014). While Hawley explicitly 
sets out her account of distrust, Helm intends that his account of trust extends mutatis 
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Betrayability Trust Distrust (TRUST/DISTRUST) 
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mutandis to explaining distrust (2014 : p.214 footnote 6). Hawley’s and Helm’s accounts 
differ in the details. Nonetheless, their accounts share common ground in the respects at 
issue here. Helm’s account presumes that trust is normatively significant reliance and that 
trust and distrust involve predictive expectations akin to optimism and pessimism about 
another’s performance. It also assumes that trust and distrust are similar in respect of 
containing the same commitment to a normative standard, and where that normative 
standard is what makes us betrayable (Helm 2014 : pp.199–205). The view of trust, 
distrust and neither-nor set out in Figure 2 and Figure 3 above is thus embodied by at 
least two prominent REL+ accounts of trust. 
 
In the next chapter, I present an argument against the view of the trust stance that we 
have just arrived at. Given that this is the view of the trust stance that falls out of REL+, 
this argument works against REL+. 
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3 The argument from uncertainty: against REL+ 
In this chapter I present an argument against REL+. REL+ cannot be correct as an 
account of trust, because the view of the trust stance that results from it is unable to 
accommodate an attitude that exists in the trust stance: uncertainty of another. As such, 
a necessary consequence of REL+ is false. Therefore, REL+ is false. 
 
3.1 Setting out the argument 
The argument from uncertainty is a reductio ad absurdum against REL+. It is used to 
motivate the claim that the trust stance cannot be grounded in the reliance stance, for the 
reason that the reliance stance doesn’t afford the number of attitudes needed to ground 
those of the trust stance. 
 
The argument is this. If REL+ is true, it is impossible to be betrayable by another on a 
matter of trust, while being neither trusting nor distrusting of her. This was clear on Figure 
2 and Figure 3 in the previous chapter. So, if REL+ is true, it is impossible for there to 
be a further attitude in between trust and distrust. But having a sort of middle ground 
attitude between trust and distrust is possible. We can be in between trust and distrust of 
another when we are uncertain of her. What sort of attitude do I mean by being uncertain 
of someone? Consider the following case: 
 
New Colleague 
 
A new person, Sophie, starts at your workplace. You make a point to introduce 
yourself and have a chat. Sophie seems very nice and you find yourself sharing a 
few jokes, getting to know a bit more about her, and you tell her a bit about 
yourself. You also bring her out for drinks after work with the rest of your team, 
where you get her up to speed with the office gossip. You have a good first couple 
of weeks getting to know her more, and she quickly becomes a trusted member 
of the team. 
 In the next week you catch yourself feeling oddly hesitant about Sophie. In 
the lunchroom you see her behave strangely before she takes her food from the 
fridge. Then while having a chat with her in the lunchroom she makes some 
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jarringly disparaging remarks about colleagues who you know very well and hold 
in high esteem. You can’t quite understand why she would make these comments. 
You’re keeping an open mind about her, even though you can’t ignore that you 
now feel a bit less sure than you did. If pressed, you wouldn’t say that you trust 
her, though you would have done previously. But you wouldn’t say you distrust 
her either; that would be too strong. You’re more inclined to say that you’re 
unsure or uncertain of Sophie. Depending on what instances of her behaviour 
you recall and what reasons for that behaviour you posit, your attitude about her 
could veer from some trust to perhaps some distrust. Nonetheless, your attitude 
remains somewhere in between trust and distrust of her. You subtly raise your 
concern with some of your colleagues and find that most of them also share your 
uncertainty about her (though one or two are simply indifferent, not caring or 
wanting to get involved in ‘office politics’). 
 A couple more weeks go by and Sophie has now consistently turned up to 
work late. One day last week she was missing from the office for several hours 
during work time. You sneak a glance at some timesheets she has on her desk, 
that it seems she has yet to submit to your manager (who rarely closely monitors 
anyone’s arrival and departure times). You notice that the times don’t correspond 
at all to the actual times she has been in. You also can’t help but notice that your 
other colleagues are much less talkative with each other. You suspect that her 
disparaging remarks have helped cultivate a bad, tense atmosphere. Your lunch 
has also gone missing from the shared fridge on a couple of occasions. You decide 
to raise that with her and she denies all knowledge, offering a longwinded and 
insincere seeming explanation, which you don’t buy at all. You now recognise that 
you are no longer keeping an open mind, because you’re not uncertain or unsure 
of her. Instead, you simply distrust her. You’re sure that she can’t be trusted. 
 
When you are uncertain of Sophie, I suggest that you are neither trusting-nor-distrusting 
of her, yet you are ‘betrayable’ – i.e., open to being interpersonally wronged or harmed in 
the manner characteristic of the trust stance – by her. For example, you can be betrayed 
by her in the period you are uncertain, should you see her steal your food from the fridge. 
Your attitude toward her there would involve the same characteristic interpersonal or 
normative salience as your attitude when you initially trust her, and when you later distrust 
her. It isn’t that your attitude is outside of the trust stance, in the mere reliance/non-
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reliance stance. As such, we have an attitude that constitutes a form of neither-nor, yet is 
betrayable. This is not possible on REL+, as we saw on Figure 2 and Figure 3. But this 
suggests that REL+ is false. 
 
While this is an imagined case, the kind of scenario it presents isn’t hard to envisage, or 
anything out of the ordinary. What’s being described highlights some everyday mechanics 
of our interactions with others. It’s commonplace to feel something in between trust and 
distrust about another. We can refer to this sort of middle ground attitude in different 
ways. Uncertainty of another is how I refer to it. We could also refer to it as a feeling of 
being unsettled. We can say we have some doubts or suspicions, are hesitant, unsure, 
ambivalent about another. Different idioms and phrases are associated with such an 
attitude: keeping an open mind, reserving judgement, or seeing how things pan out. In 
each case, what we report is that we neither trust nor distrust the other, yet our attitude 
and interactions with her are still at some level concerning a matter of trust. In other 
words, our attitude toward the other is within the trust stance, even if our attitude 
amounts to neither trust nor distrust of her. 
 
The possibility of being neither-nor about the other is acknowledged in various places in 
the trust literature. It is sometimes claimed that trust and distrust are contraries but not 
contradictories (Govier 1992b : p.18, 1998 : p.121; Jones 1996 : p.15). What this means is 
that the absence of trust needn’t imply the presence of distrust, and vice versa. If trust 
and distrust were contradictories it would be impossible to have an attitude of neither-
nor towards the other, because the absence of one attitude would necessarily entail the 
presence of the other. By negating distrust, you would affirm trust, and vice versa. But, 
we can both fail to trust and fail to distrust the other, because we can be neither-nor of 
her concerning some matter. 
 
However, a crucial distinction is often missed between two types of neither-nor. REL+, 
as we saw in the previous chapter, accounts for one category of neither-nor; that where 
our attitude is outside of the trust stance. REL+ is built to account for this sort of neither-
nor. Recall Baier’s example of Kant’s neighbours’ ‘mere reliance’ on him. In that case, 
Kant’s neighbours’ attitude toward Kant was neither-nor. They didn’t trust him because 
they merely relied on him. But this didn’t mean that they distrusted him either. Their 
attitude toward Kant wasn’t a betrayable one; it was outside of the trust stance altogether. 
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The possibility of being neither-nor toward another is part of the foundation of the view 
itself.  
 
Hawley in her REL+ account endorses this way of drawing the distinction between trust, 
distrust and neither-nor, claiming that just as trust is not mere reliance, distrust is not 
mere non-reliance. She says: 
 
Distrust is not mere absence of trust. Moreover, distrust is not even mere absence 
of reliance. Like trust, distrust has a normative dimension. The distinction 
between trust and mere reliance shows in our different reactions to misplaced 
trust (betrayal) and misplaced reliance (disappointment). […] So distrust is richer 
than mere nonreliance, just as trust is richer than reliance. Just as we should 
distinguish trustworthiness from mere reliability, we should distinguish 
untrustworthiness from mere unreliability: colleagues who do not buy me 
champagne are unreliable in this respect, but not thereby untrustworthy. Just as 
there is a middle ground between trust and distrust, there is a middle ground 
between trustworthiness and untrustworthiness—in the clearest case, inanimate 
objects merit neither trust nor distrust, so they are neither trustworthy nor 
untrustworthy. (2014 : p.3) 
  
The neither-nor middle ground that Hawley is referring to then is the same one that 
Baier’s ‘Kant’s neighbours’ example points out. It is the neither-nor where our 
trust/distrust concerns – the concern that makes us betrayable - are absent. This is of 
course going to be the case with most matters, because the majority of others’ 
actions/possible actions won’t be matters of trust. We will be unaware or indifferent to 
most of the things that others do/intend to do. 
 
Uncertainty is a different kind of neither-nor from the sort that REL+ is built upon, 
though. And, it is a problem for REL+, because it is an attitude distinct from trust and 
distrust, that nonetheless belongs in the trust stance. Being uncertain of another amounts 
to neither trusting-nor-distrusting another, yet with the possibility that we are betrayed 
by her. This is so in the New Colleague case. 
 
Furthermore, remarks from different authors suggest that the existence of this betrayable 
type of neither-nor is not in question. Govier for example notes the sort of attitude I 
mean: 
 
Trust and distrust are contraries, not contradictories. To say that it is the case that 
one trusts another person is not always to say that one distrusts him. We may 
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neither trust nor distrust another, either because we lack relevant knowledge or 
because the evidence and feelings we have are mixed. (1998 : p.121) 
 
What Govier says above is that we can neither trust nor distrust someone because we 
have mixed feelings; somewhere between trust and distrust. This is a distinct kind of 
neither-nor from that which we’ve noted above, where others’ actions just doesn’t matter 
to us in the way characteristic of the trust stance. In having mixed feelings, it can matter 
to us what another does, in the trust stance way. But our attitude just doesn’t amount to 
trust or distrust. It sits somewhere in the middle. 
 
Lagerspetz also acknowledges this middle ground attitude, which he refers to as suspicion. 
This occurs in the context of a critique of Baier’s ‘accepted vulnerability’ account of trust. 
He says that, in being geared toward finding a theory of what are the “appropriate objects 
and motives for trusting” (Lagerspetz 2015 : p.49), Baier’s account belies a tradition in 
trust theory, of treating the lack of trust as the default position toward others. He suggests 
that, on this tradition, distrust or suspicion is treated as the starting point of human 
relationships: 
 
The idea of looking (or shopping for worthy objects of trust implies a 
presumption in favour of distrust: distrust is the default stance until an assessment 
of the reasonableness of trusting has been produced. One might perhaps want to 
describe this initial attitude as neutral, but ‘suspicious’ might be the more apt 
description insofar as the agent is supposed to perceive the situation as implying 
that it is just as possible as not that the other has hostile designs. (2015 : pp.49–50) 
 
There is contrast drawn here between attitudes of distrust and suspicion, but also 
(crucially) with a ‘neutral’ attitude. Suspicion is taken to be the attitude of perceiving 
another as possibly having ‘hostile designs’ or motives, but also possibly not. Neutral, 
presumably, would be the more apt description for an attitude outside of the trust stance 
altogether, held when another’s motives do not concern us as a matter of trust. 
 
So far this is enough to help grasp what attitude I mean by uncertainty of another. But 
why exactly would uncertainty of another be problematic for REL+? Recall Figure 3: 
 
 
 Reliance Non-reliance  
Betrayability Trust Distrust (TRUST/DISTRUST) 
Non-betrayability Mere Reliance Mere Non-reliance (NEITHER-NOR) 
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Here we see that it is impossible for neither-nor to transcend the boundary between the 
betrayable and non-betrayable attitudes, set out by REL+. In other words, it is impossible 
for there to be an attitude which is betrayable, yet isn’t trust or distrust. Uncertainty of 
another is such an attitude. So REL+ must be wrong-footed. If it were true, an actual 
attitude wouldn’t exist. But this attitude does exist. So, REL+ is false. 
 
3.2 Responses 
The problem arises because the New Colleague case presents us with a further attitude to 
place in the trust stance, which is an attitude of betrayable neither-nor. But there is no 
further space for an additional betrayable attitude, because distrust has taken up the only 
other space left in the trust stance, once we’ve accounted for trust. This is the space for a 
betrayable form of non-reliance. As such one possible line of response could have been 
to deny that distrust should be placed in this category, since this would free up a space 
for uncertainty. But, this response was dealt with in section 2.3. Denying that distrust 
should be placed in the category for a betrayable form of non-reliance would just throw 
REL+ into doubt. 
 
It seems that the most obvious way of responding to the argument is to deny that 
uncertainty is a distinct attitude; to deny that there is a betrayable form of neither-nor. 
We could e.g. explain uncertainty away as one or both of the ‘mere’ attitudes, or as one 
or both of the trust stance attitudes. In any case, denying uncertainty amounts to keeping 
the binary categories in the betrayable and non-betrayable rows, i.e. to keeping the setup 
seen on Figure 2 and Figure 3. This response then explains away or dissolves uncertainty 
into one or more of the existing categories of attitude, represented in Figure 4 below: 
 
Figure 4: Denying uncertainty is distinct 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Reliance Non-reliance 
Betrayability Trust Distrust 
Non-betrayability Mere Reliance Mere Non-reliance 
“UNCERTAINTY” 
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First, I consider the prospects of explaining away uncertainty as a combination of the 
trust stance attitudes. Second, I will do the same but for the reliance stance attitudes. 
 
3.2.1 Dissolving uncertainty into trust/distrust 
The underlying thought in this type of response is that, once we drill down further beyond 
the surface appearances of cases like New Colleague, what we find is either trust, distrust, 
or some sort of mixture of trust and distrust, rather than a distinct sort of attitude. There 
are a few variants of this response, which I consider in turn. 
 
The ‘averaging out’ response 
 
One way we could motivate a response to the argument from uncertainty is by pointing 
out that trust is in some sense ‘domain specific’, as noted in section 1.2. This is the idea 
that we trust people in some respects but not others. Govier for example says that “Both 
trust and distrust are often relativized to role or context: we may, for example, trust 
someone as our dentist but not as an accurate commentator on political affairs” (1992b : 
p.18). So just because we trust someone in one matter, or possible domain of interaction, 
does not entail that we trust her in other domains. 
 
Perhaps then the New Colleague case is one where in some respects you trust Sophie, 
and in others you distrust her. The averaging out of all these respects is overall neither trust-
nor-distrust. But the average results from you trusting or distrusting her in specific 
respects. 
 
The quick counter to this is to point out that your attitude of uncertainty about Sophie 
also concerns specific things she does (or may have done). For example, you are initially 
uncertain about her with your lunch. Eventually though you just distrust her, after you 
confront her about it. So, if we pursue the ‘averaging out’ response, the problem of 
uncertainty arises again once we point out that uncertainty occurs at the level of specific 
domains. You can be uncertain of Sophie in respect of whether she’d taken your lunch. 
 
 
The ‘simultaneity’ response 
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A similar line of response, which again suggests that what we have is a mixture of trust 
and distrust, is to say that uncertainty is just simultaneous trust and distrust. This is a distinct 
response from the ‘averaging out’ one. The averaging out response left open the charge 
that we can be uncertain in specific domains. Simultaneity plugs this. We can explain the 
appearance of uncertainty in specific domains, as the result of you simultaneously trusting 
and distrusting in those domains. So, your uncertainty of Sophie in respect of taking your 
lunch is the result of you both trusting and distrusting her in that respect. There may be 
some reason for favouring this response when we recall that uncertainty could also be 
referred to as having mixed feelings, or being ambivalent. 
There are two problems with this response. First, it just strikes as implausible that we can 
simultaneously trust and distrust, in some specific respect. It is difficult to interpret this 
as a coherent psychology; akin to both believing and disbelieving p at the same time. 
Second, it seems that if we do presume that we can trust and distrust in some respect 
simultaneously, then so much for REL+. Simultaneity on REL+ has to be explained by our 
being in logically contradictory states; simultaneous reliance and non-reliance in some specific 
respect. In other words, both relying and not relying on another for something. This violates 
the law of non-contradiction, which dictates that a statement and its negation cannot both 
be true at the same time. Recall that non-reliance on another φ’ing amounts to it not being 
the case that one is relying on another φ’ing, as opposed to relying on her not-φ’ing. As 
such, ‘X is relying on Y φ’ing’ and ‘it is not the case that X is relying on Y φ’ing’ (/‘X is 
not relying on Y φ’ing’) are contradictory statements. But if X is to both trust Y to φ and 
distrust Y to φ at the same time, on REL+, then these statements must both be true. 
In some domains/areas of discourse, denying the law of non-contradiction may be an 
attractive course of action, due to problems that arise when pinning down the truth of 
statements about those domains. However, doing so in this domain - whether a subject 
is or isn’t relying on another - would be an ad hoc move, until we have a reason to think 
that the law of non-contradiction restricts us when describing reliance states. As yet we 
have no independent justification for supposing that it can be true we are both relying 
and not relying on another φ’ing. Instead, questions of reliance appear clear cut: if it is 
false that you are relying on Sophie to meet her workplace obligations, then it is true that 
you are not relying on Sophie to meet her workplace obligations. 
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The ‘oscillation’ response 
 
Instead of suggesting that there is simultaneous trust and distrust, we can say that 
uncertainty is the result of an oscillation between trust and distrust. Rather than 
simultaneous trust and distrust of Sophie in respect of your lunch, there is cycling 
between trust and distrust of her in that respect. Again, the example itself provides some 
motivation for this response. It says that when you are in that uncertain state concerning 
her, that your attitude can veer from trust to distrust depending on what behaviours you 
recall, and what sort of reasons you posit for that behaviour. 
 
The oscillation response though is suspect. In the specific respect of Sophie taking your 
lunch, it doesn’t seem that your uncertainty is due to your flipping from trust to distrust 
of her in that respect. You simply aren’t sure of her in respect of whether she would take 
it or not. There isn’t a clear period where you trust and then distrust her on this.  
 
Of course to this one may press the point about your attitude veering depending on how 
you construe it. But the veering only shows that uncertainty is unstable, easily tipping into 
one or the other state either side of it; not that it doesn’t exist as a distinct state. In fact, 
the veering provides more motivation to suppose that there is a distinct state between 
trust and distrust.  
 
If the oscillation picture is right, what we really have in uncertainty (in a specific respect) 
is transitions between discrete states occurring. But it seems odd to say that, whenever we 
transition from trust to distrust or vice versa (an everyday occurrence), oscillating or not, 
that there is a moment where our attitude clearly changes from trust to distrust. So in 
other words, where at t-0.00[…]1 we trust and at time t+0.00[...]1 where we distrust (or 
vice versa). It may be that there are rapid instances of transition from one to the other, 
when we quickly have it shown to us that someone is (dis)trustworthy by something 
they’ve done. Insisting that we always rapidly do this in every case, without further 
argument, is ad hoc. 
 
The ‘it’s distrust’ response 
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Presumably the response that uncertainty is just trust is implausible. However, it isn’t 
immediately implausible that uncertainty is just distrust. Rather than locating a distinct 
attitude in uncertainty, what we have found is just another case of distrust. 
 
One problem with the ‘it’s distrust’ response is how to make sense of why it isn’t obvious 
that uncertainty is distrust, without this collapsing into a variation of the mixture 
responses above. In New Colleague there is a period where you clearly trust and 
eventually where you clearly distrust Sophie. But in between this there is a period where 
it seems you neither trust-nor-distrust her. It isn’t clear how to explain what the qualitative 
difference is between that neither-nor period and the eventual distrust of her, without 
appealing to it being intermingled with trust at some level. 
 
A further problem with the ‘it’s distrust’ response is that this would mean your non-
reliance on Sophie in fact occurs much earlier than it would seem to. Remember that if 
we are committed to REL+, and arguing that that period of uncertainty is distrust 
(without also endorsing some mixture or intermingling response) then this cashes out in 
terms of you beginning to not rely on Sophie in some respects. In other words, it would 
require that you withdraw from Sophie in various respects much sooner than you in fact 
seem to do in the example. When you are uncertain of her in respect of your lunch you 
don’t stop putting your lunch in the shared fridge. Your uncertainty isn’t tied to any non-
reliance on her in that sense. But on REL+, distrust is tied to non-reliance. This gives us 
reason to suppose that your uncertainty isn’t just distrust. 
 
3.2.2 Dissolving uncertainty into reliance/non-reliance 
While we seem to have exhausted the prospects of explaining uncertainty in the trust 
stance attitudes on REL+, there is the possibility that we explain it away as belonging to 
the reliance stance. If we can do this then the pressure that uncertainty exerted on REL+ 
is deflated. Uncertainty turns out to not be betrayable after all. 
 
To do this though we need to make a case for uncertainty being outside of the trust 
stance. This seems difficult. That said, one way to motivate the response that uncertainty 
is outside of the trust stance might be to reflect on how the attitude is sometimes referred 
to: keeping an open mind, being unsure, reserving judgement, having doubts and so on. 
These seem to put what we might call a ‘cognitive spin’ on your attitude. In other words, 
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it could be argued that, from the sounds of things, when you are uncertain you are not so 
much engaging with another in adopting a trust stance attitude to them, but instead are 
stepping back from that, perhaps momentarily. You are attempting to figure out whether 
someone is trustworthy or not, rather than engaging with them in the direct interpersonal 
manner of trust and distrust. 
 
But even if we are in some sense stepping back, this stepping back needn’t take us outside 
of the trust stance. In other words, stepping back and trying to figure out someone 
doesn’t render us non-betrayable by them. In the New Colleague case for example you 
are still betrayable by Sophie even when you start to have doubts about her. She can still 
betray you by e.g. taking your food. 
 
This response can be made more pressing if we compare the kind of stepping back you 
do with Sophie from the kind of stepping back that Kant’s neighbours might do with 
Kant, if he began to noticeably deviate from his regular walking time. In that case the 
neighbours would also presumably step back, assessing whether Kant’s walking was still 
reliable. But this is a different kind of stepping back from that which you do in the New 
Colleague case. It is qualitatively different, because for Kant’s neighbours any stepping 
back would be assessing whether it was instrumentally prudent for them to continue 
relying on his walking. They are trying to figure out whether he will continue to walk or 
not. In the New Colleague case you are ‘stepping back’ not in the sense that you are trying 
to figure out whether Sophie will or won’t do something. You are stepping back and 
trying to figure her out. You have suspicions about her, and are trying to determine what 
her motives concerning you are, rather than figuring out whether she will or won’t do some 
specific action that would be instrumentally beneficial or detrimental for you. 
 
So, uncertainty is a trust stance attitude because, as the New Colleague case indicates, it 
involves being concerned about how others will act, where this concern is not purely a 
matter of whether relying or not on someone would be instrumentally beneficial. The 
trust stance involves a non-instrumental concern about how others will act (see chapter 
8 for further defence of this point), and this is what uncertainty involves. 
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3.2.3 The third category response 
An additional response might be to deny that reliance/non-reliance is a binary option. 
Instead, we could suppose that there is a ‘neither reliance nor non-reliance’ category of 
attitude (indicated by ??? in figure below). This would mean we had an additional category 
of non-betrayable attitude. Uncertainty would no longer be a problem with this extra 
category, because now we have the available conceptual space in which to ground a 
corresponding additional betrayable attitude. 
 
Figure 5: The third category response to uncertainty 
 
 
The issue with this response is that it violates the law of excluded middle, which states 
that for any statement p, either p or not-p must be true. Recall the simultaneity response; 
if we assert that ‘X is relying on Y φ’ing’, but also assert that ‘it is not the case that X is 
relying on Y φ’ing’ (/‘X is not relying on Y φ’ing’), we violate the law of non-contradiction. 
The third category response instead amounts to asserting that neither is it true that ‘X is 
relying on Y φ’ing’, nor is it true that ‘X is not relying on Y φ’ing’. Neither p (‘X is relying 
on Y φ’ing’) nor not-p (‘X is not relying on Y φ’ing’) is true. 
A similar point applies here to the one made in the simultaneity response, regarding the 
law of non-contradiction. In some domains/areas of discourse, denying the law of 
excluded middle may be an attractive course of action, due to problems that arise when 
pinning down the truth of statements made about those domains. However, doing so in 
this domain – whether a subject is or isn’t relying on another - would be an ad hoc move, 
until we have a reason to think that the law of excluded middle is inadequate for 
describing reliance states. As yet, we have no independent justification for supposing that 
it can be true we are neither relying nor not relying on another φ’ing. Again: questions of 
reliance appear clear cut: if it is false that you are relying on Sophie to meet her workplace 
obligations, then it is true that you are not relying on Sophie to meet her workplace 
obligations. 
 Reliance ??? Non-reliance  
Betrayability Trust Uncertainty Distrust (TRUST STANCE) 
Non-
betrayability 
Mere 
Reliance 
??? 
Mere Non-
reliance 
(RELIANCE STANCE) 
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3.3 Summing up 
The argument from uncertainty shows that REL+ leads to a reductio ad absurdum. It cannot 
account for the everyday possibility of being uncertain of another, where we neither trust-
nor-distrust another, yet where that neither trust-nor-distrust is still interpersonally loaded 
in the same way that trust and distrust are. Committing to REL+ though requires that 
neither trust-nor-distrust never be interpersonally loaded in the same way as trust and 
distrust. As such, we should revise our paradigm theory of trust, taking lessons from why 
REL+ failed. We should seek a different kind of base attitude in which to ground the 
‘trust stance’ of attitudes (trust, uncertainty and distrust); one that doesn’t lead to the same 
reductio. 
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4 The argument from distrust & the active/stative distinction 
Like the argument from uncertainty, the argument from distrust shows that REL+ is 
false. It goes further though, in illustrating that there is a distinction between two senses 
of ‘trust’: active reliance and stative assurance. This shows how reliance can ‘come apart’ 
from the trust stance, and provides us with a base for characterising what the base 
anticipatory attitudes in the trust stance are. 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, committing to REL+ means committing to a view of 
distrust as a type of non-reliance. In this chapter I show that distrust is not a product of 
non-reliance. Instead, X distrusts Y in respect of φ’ing, only if X is wary of Y’s motives. 
This wariness attitude is not a product of non-reliance, because it can also be present 
when X relies on Y to φ. This allows us to infer that there is a form of attitudinal trust, 
distinct from reliance, that opposes this wariness. I call that attitude assurance trust. 
 
The resulting picture of the trust stance is that we have an activity of trusting someone, 
where we actively rely on another. But this is underpinned by anticipatory attitudes. These 
are where we find assurance trust, uncertainty, and distrust as a form of wariness. The 
argument from uncertainty will show that there is no corresponding ‘active’ distrust, only 
an attitude of wariness. 
 
4.1 The Commitment account 
For the argument from distrust, I will be using Hawley’s Commitment account of trust 
and distrust as a foil. This is because it provides a clear pairing of conditions for both 
trust and distrust, which give a solid basis for constructing example cases of both. 
However, I am using the examples to show how REL+ is flawed, not that the 
Commitment account in particular is flawed. These example cases will ultimately allow 
me to illustrate the redundant role of non-reliance in attributing distrust to a subject. 
 
The Commitment account, recall, is the following: 
 
To trust someone to do something is to believe that she has a commitment to 
doing it, and to rely upon her to meet that commitment. To distrust someone to 
do something is to believe that she has a commitment to doing it, and yet not rely 
upon her to meet that commitment. (Hawley 2014 : p.10) 
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This gives us the following ‘plus’ condition, common to both trust and distrust: 
 
COMMIT:  X believes that Y has a commitment, to someone, to φ 
 
This is conjoined with a non-reliance condition, to make distrust: 
 
NON-REL: X doesn’t rely on Y to meet her commitment 
 
Commitments here are understood as akin to promises to perform certain actions. We 
can take it then that ‘X relies/doesn’t rely on Y to meet her commitment’, when 
unpacked, becomes: 
 
 NON-REL: X doesn’t rely on Y to φ 
 
Where φ is the action that Y has made a commitment to perform. 
 
To simplify the argument, I will use cases where the commitments in question are explicit 
promises, and not ones conferred by “roles and external circumstances” or convention 
(Hawley 2014 : p.11). 
 
4.2 An initial problem with COMMIT: non-direct commitments 
First, I deal with an initial problem with the Commitment account. This arises due to a 
problem with the formulation of COMMIT. The default formulation makes room for the 
possibility of trust and distrust toward those who make commitments to ‘third parties’. 
This allows that the commitment at issue not be to the subject X, but to someone or 
other. But allowing that it is to someone or other, makes the account vulnerable to a type 
of counterexample. An example of this type is given below: 
  
News Report: 
 
COMMIT: I see it reported on the news that Trump has a commitment to 
meet with Merkel. 
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NON-REL: I don’t rely on Trump to meet Merkel. 
 
It doesn’t follow that I distrust Trump from this example, even though the conditions 
for distrust are satisfied. This means that the initial formulation of the commitment 
account is off. 
 
A quick way of avoiding the above sort of counterexample is to restrict COMMIT to 
dealing with direct commitments. This is perhaps unsatisfactory in terms of accounting for 
how, as several authors agree (Helm 2014; Holton 1994; Jones 2004), we can trust or 
distrust others in ‘third party’ or non-direct trust cases. Such cases are those like the one 
Hawley gives, where your daughter’s friend promises to pick her up from a party, and you 
can take a trust stance toward the friend (Hawley 2014 : p.11). 
 
We can assuage this concern, I think. It may be that the ‘third party’ cases, that intuitively 
strike us as matters of trust, are really an odd sort of case where the commitment at issue 
is at some level to you. Consider for instance that both Holton’s and Hawley’s non-direct 
trust cases involve commitments of care, by someone else, to a dependent of yours. 
Holton’s case is one where you trust your estranged partner to look after the child you 
had together (Holton 1994 : p.65), even if the partner has made no overture or 
commitment to you in this respect. You can still trust the partner to look after the child, 
according to Holton.  
 
This and the daughter-friend case share the feature of being about dependents. This is 
telling. They are cases where someone takes on the burden of care for the third-party – 
the dependent – whose welfare is normally your responsibility. This suggests that these 
are cases where the role another adopts plays a part in her garnering commitments. The 
friend and partner take on the role of carer for someone of whom you are normally 
playing or sharing that role, and so with it incur a commitment to you. It seems right to 
suggest that by taking on certain roles we can incur certain commitments (and as noted 
above, Hawley suggests this). Taking on a temporary role of carer would arguably incur 
commitments to the normal carer. Even if we agree with our intuitions that these third-
party cases are genuinely cases of trust of the committers, we have reason to suppose that 
the commitment implicate you at some level. The News Report case above is the reductio of 
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the thought that there is no need for the commitment to be to you at some level in order 
to make it a matter of trust.10 
 
As such, we can make the commitment condition the following: 
 
COMMITDIR: X believes that Y has a commitment to her to φ 
 
Where a commitment being to X can be in the indirect way of the estranged spouse and 
daughter’s friend cases. 
 
4.3 Non-reliance is unnecessary for distrust 
In this section we move on to cases that put further pressure on the Commitment account 
of distrust. Ultimately, it will be shown that NON-REL (non-reliance) is unnecessary for 
distrust. 
 
Let’s return to the planned meeting between Trump and Merkel. Suppose that Merkel is 
known to have problems with acid reflux, and that before the meeting Trump promises 
to bring her some antacid tablets. 
 
Antacid Tablets: 
 
COMMITDIR:  Merkel believes Trump has a commitment to her, to bring her 
some antacid tablets for the meeting. 
NON-REL: Merkel doesn’t rely on Trump to bring her antacid tablets; she 
brings some to the meeting. 
 
It doesn’t follow, from these two conditions being satisfied, that Merkel distrusts Trump. 
The reason is that we do not know why Merkel has brought her own antacid tablets. To 
                                                      
10 Alternatively, perhaps it is that Holton’s and Hawley’s cases are not ones where we trust 
the committer, but trust that the committer will such-and-such (see section 1.8.1). Either 
way, we can resolve the problem case, because either solution indicates that the COMMIT 
condition should be finessed to say that the commitment must be to the subject of the 
trust stance, at some level. 
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see this more clearly, imagine the following variation of NON-REL, compatible with how 
it is specified above: 
 
Needed Change: 
 
NON-REL: Merkel doesn’t rely on Trump to bring her antacid tablets; she 
brings some to the meeting. She realised she needed change for 
the coffee machine in the meeting venue, and it was convenient 
to buy tablets in order to break into a bank note. 
 
The Needed Change variant of Antacid Tablets doesn’t suffice for distrust of Trump. The 
reason why Merkel doesn’t rely on Trump to bring the antacids is due to reasons unrelated 
to her trust stance of Trump; it is for reasons of practical convenience. To reinforce this 
point, imagine this further variation of the NON-REL condition: 
 
Jacket Pocket: 
 
NON-REL: Merkel doesn’t rely on Trump to bring her antacid tablets; She 
brings some to the meeting, because en route to the meeting, she 
discovers some in her jacket pocket. 
 
Now, it is just a matter of circumstance that leads to Merkel not relying on Trump to 
bring the antacids. It clearly doesn’t follow that she distrusts Trump, due to her non-
reliance. If it did, then we should suppose that, upon her discovering the antacids, her 
attitude becomes distrust. This is implausible. To drive this point home: it should follow 
that if, later, when near the meeting venue, Merkel discovers she has lost the antacids she 
found in her jacket pocket, she again relies on Trump. If the Commitment account is 
right, she therefore switches from distrusting to trusting Trump. Whether her attitude is 
one of trust or distrust thus hinges upon whether she has a hold of her antacids. But this 
is obviously implausible. We need to know more about Merkel’s attitudes toward Trump 
to determine whether she distrusts him. 
 
This indicates that what is missing in the Commitment account’s formulation for distrust 
is a stipulation about the reason for non-reliance. In both the Needed Change and Jacket 
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Pocket cases, Merkel’s non-reliance is due to factors that don’t touch upon whether she 
regards Trump as untrustworthy. To bring this out, consider a new variant on a case: 
 
Suspects Scheming: 
 
NON-REL: Merkel doesn’t rely on Trump to bring her antacid tablets; she 
brings some to the meeting. She suspects Trump has no intention 
of bringing any, and wants to embarrass her on the world stage, 
by leaving her at the mercy of her indigestion in the meeting. 
 
Now, when we ascribe to Merkel a wariness of Trump’s motives, the case is clearly one 
of distrust. By stipulating the reason for her bringing some tablets as relating to her feeling 
that she should avoid relying on Trump to bring some, we get a case of clear distrust. In 
addition, her reason for avoiding relying on Trump is not just because he is forgetful. 
Instead, it is because she thinks that Trump made the promise with the intent of deceiving 
her, to make her look weak (she knows that he likes to make other leaders look weak in 
comparison to him). Her wariness attitude here is quintessential distrust. 
 
This move, however, spells the end for the view that distrust is built out of non-reliance. 
Her non-reliance on Trump isn’t doing any of the work in attributing distrust to her. We 
have three variations of Antacid Tablets where Trump has made a commitment. All three 
of these cases involve non-reliance. Only one of them – Suspects Scheming – is a case that 
involves distrust. This is because we invoke a reason for the non-reliance: an attitude of 
wariness of the promisor, or suspecting ill motives behind the promisor’s promise. 
 
We might conclude from this that COMMIT conjoined with NON-REL is insufficient 
for distrust, rather than non-reliance being irrelevant. Rather, we just need to add a further 
condition – the reason for non-reliance, as wariness. This would preserve the REL+ view 
of distrust, and therefore the REL+ view of trust. 
 
However, non-reliance is in fact unnecessary for distrust. Merkel’s non-reliance on Trump 
in Suspects Scheming is a consequence of her distrust, not a component part of it. Consider 
how the other two cases – Needed Change and Jacket Pocket – are compatible with the 
possibility of Merkel having that wary, distrustful attitude. If she also had that distrustful 
  83 
attitude in those cases, we would say she distrusted Trump. Her non-reliance would be 
due to other factors, rather than her wariness, but this wouldn’t affect whether we called 
her distrustful. The non-reliance as such is irrelevant to whether there is distrust or not. It 
is irrelevant whether Merkel doesn’t rely on Trump for a reason unrelated to her having 
a wary attitude. All that is relevant is that she has a wary attitude. 
 
We can drive this home even further by pointing out how this distrustful attitude can 
even be present in cases where she relies on Trump to bring the antacids. Consider another 
case: 
 
No Other Option: 
 
REL: Merkel suspects Trump has no intention of bringing any antacids 
and just wants to embarrass her on the world stage by leaving her 
at the mercy of her indigestion in the meeting. Still, Merkel has no 
other options, having no antacids on her person, and no time to 
pick some up en route. As such, she relies on Trump to fulfil his 
promise. 
 
We would still say that Merkel distrusts Trump in this case, even though she relies on him. 
This example is significant for several reasons. Ultimately, it illustrates why REL+ is not 
correct. 
 
4.4 The argument from distrust 
No Other Option illustrates that distrust is not constituted by non-reliance. Merkel distrusts 
Trump in this example. Yet, she relies on Trump nonetheless. This tells us that non-
reliance is not necessary for distrust, because distrust can be present even with reliance. 
Distrust therefore just consists in an attitude of wariness about another’s motives. 
 
From this, the ‘argument from distrust’ can be made: 
 
P1. If trust is reliance plus, then distrust is non-reliance plus. 
P2.  It is not the case that distrust is non-reliance plus. 
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C. It is not the case that trust is reliance plus. 
 
Premise 1 follows from the core claim of REL+, that trust is reliance plus. This premise 
was shown to be true in section 2.3. There, it was argued that, if we commit to the view 
that trust is reliance plus, then we are committed to the view that distrust is non-reliance 
plus. Premise 2 has just been demonstrated by the preceding example cases. The 
conclusion, that ‘trust is reliance plus’ is false, follows by modus ponens. 
 
4.5 REL+ conflates an active and a stative sense of ‘trust’ 
Here, I’ll set out how REL+ is false. I argue that it conflates two senses of ‘trust’: an 
activity of reliance, and a state of assurance. We’re warranted in supposing that trust 
also is a state of assurance, because this is the type of trust that is opposed to the state 
of wariness, found in distrust. 
 
4.5.1 It is possible to actively trust and distrust at the same time 
We’ve demonstrated that distrust is wariness about another’s motives, not non-reliance. 
This wariness attitude is necessary and sufficient to attribute distrust to a subject. That 
wariness can come apart from reliance and non-reliance. It can even be present with 
reliance on another, as seen in No Other Option. But No Other Option, because it involves 
reliance, is supposedly a case where Merkel trusts Trump. This raises the question: how is 
that example tenable, such that it is possible to trust and distrust another at the same 
time? This is generally taken to be impossible, if we recall the claim that trust and distrust 
are contraries but not contradictories (Govier 1992b : p.18, 1998 : p.121; Jones 1996 : 
p.15).  
 
The contraries-not-contradictories claim is in line with the picture of the trust stance on 
REL+: it is possible to neither trust-nor-distrust another, but not possible to trust and 
distrust another at the same time. It might be thought that, given the contraries-not-
contradictories claim is generally accepted, then by concluding with a case that is 
apparently one of simultaneous trust and distrust, I have provided a reductio of my own 
position. 
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This is not so, because the contraries-not-contradictories claim is false. No Other Option 
would only be a reductio of my argument, if the kind of trust and distrust at issue in No 
Other Option involved simultaneous reliance and non-reliance, thus violating the law of 
non-contradiction. But distrust is not non-reliance, because it is an attitude of wariness. 
And, we haven’t shown, via the argument from distrust, that trust can’t be a form of 
reliance. Instead, what we can conclude is that there are two senses of ‘trust’: active 
reliance, and stative assurance. 
 
4.5.2 Activities, states and the progressive aspect 
 
The active/stative distinction is one that cleaves along different metaphysical/ontological 
categories: processes and states, with activities belonging to the broader categories of 
processes (Mourelatos 1978 : p.422).11 These are different categories of  temporal entities, 
things that occupy time in different ways. Typically, that something is a process/activity 
or a state is signified in a language by verb aspect. Aspect is a grammatical system that 
encodes how something (designated by a verb) undergoes or occupies a period of time. 
Aspect as such encodes the way an entity occupies the fabric of time.12 Activities can admit 
of the progressive or imperfective aspect, where typically, in English, a verb is given the 
suffix ‘-ing’, e.g. ‘I am running’. This is unlike states, which do not admit of the 
progressive or imperfective. They are complete entities, seen from outside as unchanging, 
e.g. ‘I believe that Paris is in France’. 
 
Crowther, in discussing Vendler’s (1957) way of distinguishing between activity / 
accomplishment / achievement / state categories (discrete categories of verbs which can 
and can’t admit of the progressive and perfective), draws the contrast like so: 
                                                      
11 For further discussion of the distinctions between activities, processes, events, and 
states, and the relationship with verb aspect see (Crowther 2011; Parsons 1989; Steward 
2012, 2013; Vendler 1957). Vendler’s system for distinguishing between types of verb 
according to whether they are activities, accomplishments, achievements, or states, has 
been superseded by recognizing the role of aspect. The aspectual system instead helps 
us designate whether some temporal entity belongs to which of the more fundamental 
ontological categories of process / event / state. The relevant distinction for my 
purposes here is just between states and processes, with assurance being a state, like 
belief and knowledge, and reliance being an activity, like running. 
12 Aspect is distinct from grammatical tense, which encodes how a subject stands in 
relation to something (designated by a verb) in time, i.e. the location in time. 
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I might intelligibly answer the question “What are you doing?” with “I am 
running” or “I am walking,” but not “I am knowing that p” or “I am believing 
that p.” The latter verbs, [Vendler] says, are statives; they single out a standing 
condition or a state, a way that someone or something is or can be. Like particular 
material objects, states such as knowledge and belief do not have temporal 
duration in the sense of having temporal parts or successive temporal phases over 
which they unfold. Running and walking, by contrast, are things that exist by 
developing or unfolding over a period of time. (Crowther 2011 : p.5) 
 
Reliance, in being an activity, falls under the temporal category of a process. Reliance is 
something we do, in proceeding to act (Hawley 2014 : p.4; Holton 1994 : p.74). It requires 
activity to be going on, unfolding over a period of time, in order for it to be true that we 
are relying.13 Like activities such as running, it admits of the progressive aspect, i.e. “I’m 
relying on you”/“I was relying on you”. Assurance on the other hand falls under the 
category of a state: it does not admit of the progressive. We can say “I am assured of 
you,” but not “I am assuring of you,” or “I am being assured of you”.14 
 
When we actively trust another by relying on her, our trust can admit of the progressive. 
We can say “I am trusting you on this/to φ”. The progressive corresponds to how we are 
reporting that we are doing something. On the other hand, when we want to report that 
we trust in a stative sense, we don’t use the progressive; we say “I trust you on this/to φ”.  
 
Crucially, we can note that distrust cannot admit of the progressive. “I am distrusting 
you” is ungrammatical, whereas “I distrust you” (or “I don’t trust you,” given relevant 
contextual factors to pull off the implicature that this means distrust as opposed to the 
absence of trust) is fine, just because distrust is only stative and not active, unlike trust. 
 
Invoking this distinction illustrates how it is in a sense possible to both trust and distrust 
another at the same time. This is because we can trust another in an active sense, by relying 
on her, and yet distrust her while relying on her. That’s because distrust is only a stative 
attitude, not an absence of reliance activity (as REL+ required it to be). This is the basis on 
which REL+ is false: it conflates two different senses of ‘trust’: an act of reliance, and a 
state of assurance. 
                                                      
13 See chapter 5 for further defence of this. 
14 We could on the other hand say, “You are assuring me,”, when we are describing how 
someone else is influencing our level of stative trust. 
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4.5.3 Why suppose that ‘trust’ can be both reliance and assurance? 
 
We might still be wondering what reason we have for supposing that there are two senses 
of trust, one referring to a form of reliance and another referring to a form of assurance, 
as opposed to concluding that trust is just assurance. The reason is that the active/stative 
distinction best accounts for the shape of the phenomena we’re discussing. 
 
For one, we haven’t, in the argument from distrust, also given an argument that shows 
that trust is only a form of assurance. The argument from distrust was able to go through 
because the Commitment account of distrust was vulnerable to counterexamples in the 
account of distrust it offers. It was vulnerable to those counterexamples because there is 
no sense of ‘distrust’ except an attitude of wariness. However, the Commitment account 
of trust is not vulnerable to equivalent counterexamples. Consider the following variant 
of Antacid Tablets – where Merkel relies on Trump instead: 
 
Antacid Tablets (reliance version): 
 
COMMITDIR:  Merkel believes Trump has a commitment to her, to bring her 
some antacid tablets for the meeting. 
REL: Merkel relies on Trump to bring her some antacid tablets. 
 
Immediately, it is intuitive that Merkel trusts Trump to bring her some tablets. This 
conclusion falls out of the case without having to say anything more about Merkel’s 
attitudes concerning Trump’s motives. This is because there is a sense of ‘trust’ that refers 
to a form of reliance. This is the type of trust that REL+ theorists have fixed upon, and 
the Commitment account provides a highly plausible explanation of when that type of 
reliance typically occurs; i.e. when someone has made a commitment to us. 
 
As such, the active reliance/stative assurance trust distinction accommodates the 
intuitions that motivated REL+ in the first place. Yet, it also accounts for the discovery 
that distrust is just a type of wariness. Recall the intuitions motivating the inference that 
distrust was non-reliance, which were:  
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1. Trust is like reliance on another, but not mere reliance on another. 
2. Trust and distrust involve an interpersonal import: they are both ‘betrayable’ 
attitudes. 
3. Distrust and trust are opposed attitudes to one another; they involve opposed 
anticipatory elements. 
 
Intuition 1 – the trust-reliance connection - is the main motivator behind REL+. The 
active/stative distinction respects this intuition, because it allows that there is a form of 
reliance we refer to as ‘trust’. In combination with intuition 2 - the trust-betrayal 
connection - and the observation that we can be betrayed while distrusting another, this 
led us to suppose that trust was reliance, plus betrayal conditions. That conclusion, in 
combination with intuition 3, led us to conclude that distrust was non-reliance (plus 
betrayal conditions). All we have to do is point out that the mistake made by REL+ 
theorists was assuming from intuition 1 that ‘trust’ only refers a form of reliance. This 
assumption was the baton taken up by authors following Baier in the REL+ tradition. 
These authors miss that, while we use ‘trust’ to refer to a kind of reliance on another, we 
can use ‘trust’ can refer to a kind of anticipatory mental state. What we’ve done with the 
argument from distrust is isolate that this anticipatory mental state is separate 
phenomenon from reliance trust. That is because, given that distrust is wariness, we are 
permitted to infer, as per intuition 3, that there is an attitude opposed to wariness of 
another. An obvious candidate for this is assurance of another. This assurance is the 
stative sense of ‘trust’, that is opposed to distrust. 
 
Once we reflect on the trust stance in everyday reality, this inference is highly plausible. 
An everyday sense of ‘trust’ does refer to an attitude of assurance about another. Consider 
this variation of Antacid Tablets (reliance version): 
 
Assured Merkel: 
 
REL: Merkel is assured that Trump has no intention of misleading her 
in his promise to bring her antacids. As such, she relies on Trump 
to bring her some antacid tablets. 
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What we would be tempted to say about this case, compared to No Other Option, is that 
Merkel both trusts Trump in the sense that she is assured of him, and also trusts him in 
her reliance on him. She trusts him in terms of her attitudes, in what she is inclined to 
think about his motives and his intentions. She also trusts him in terms of her actions, by 
proceeding to rely on him to bring her antacids. So, we have the active sense of trust, also 
underwritten by the stative sense of trust. 
 
However, we shouldn’t conclude from this case that stative assurance trust can only be 
present with active trust. It can be present without it. Just as we saw that wariness could 
be present with active reliance trust, so too can assurance trust be present with non-
reliance. See for instance this case where Merkel’s assurance is combined with her non-
reliance in Needed Change: 
 
Assured but Needed Change 
 
NON-REL: Merkel is assured that Trump has no intention of misleading her 
in his promise to bring her antacids, however doesn’t rely on him 
to bring her antacid tablets. She realised she needed change for 
the coffee machine in the meeting venue, and it was convenient 
to buy tablets on the way, in order to break into a bank note. 
 
This illustrates how active trust comes apart from stative trust. It’s not necessary that we 
actively trust when we assuredly trust too. 
 
Finally, returning briefly to the contraries-not-contradictories claim: it’s possible to both 
actively trust and distrust another at the same time (No Other Option). However, it is not 
possible to be both stative assurance trusting, and distrusting of another (though we could 
be somewhere in between these, in being uncertain). Simultaneous assurance and 
wariness is incoherent (try to imagine a case where Merkel is both assured of Trump yet 
wary of Trump). As such, the active/stative trust distinction accounts for the intuition 
underpinning the contraries-not-contradictories claim, while also explaining how it isn’t 
completely correct. 
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4.5.4 Setting out the new picture of the trust stance: active and stative layers 
The active reliance/stative assurance trust distinction also answers the challenge posed 
by the argument from uncertainty. That argument concluded by telling us that the trust 
stance is not grounded in the reliance stance. The argument from distrust reveals why: 
distrust isn’t non-reliance, but is instead an attitude of wariness. This provides a place for 
uncertainty: uncertainty sits comfortably between trust as assurance and distrust as 
wariness, as the state of being neither assured nor wary of another; just unsure. As a result, 
we can set out the picture of the trust stance that is revealed by the arguments from 
uncertainty and distrust: the active/stative trust distinction: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure above is intended to convey the following: 
 
1. The trust stance thus consists of two ‘layers’: something we do and a mental state 
of how we feel about another.  
2. Active reliance trust – where X relies on Y to φ – sits in the activity layer. There 
is only one category in this layer, with no equivalent ‘active distrust’ or ‘active 
uncertainty’. 
3. The stative layer is where we find the anticipatory trust stance attitudes. These are 
feelings we have of others, and dispose us toward certain actions. 
4. The arrows running from the state layer to the active layer convey a disposition 
one has, to actively trust another when under each category of attitude. Short 
arrows convey a strong disposition and longer arrows a weak/tenuous one. 
ASSURANCE 
TRUST 
UNCERTAINTY 
DISTRUST 
(WARINESS) 
RELIANCE TRUST ACTIVITY 
STATE 
Figure 6: Active and stative trust under the trust stance 
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Assurance trust involves a strong disposition to rely. When we are assured of 
another, we are ready and willing to actively trust her. So, there is a short arrow 
from assurance to reliance. The longer arrow in uncertainty conveys that we are 
more weakly disposed to rely when uncertain. The absence of an arrow from 
distrust to reliance conveys that we need some external reason to rely, whether 
this is through having no other option but to rely (à la the No Other Option 
example), or through having additional practical incentives to rely, e.g. of wishing 
to build a more trusting relationship. 
 
This figure also illustrates the way in which, as the previous section (4.5.3) noted, the 
commitment account has an asymmetric susceptibility to counterexamples, in its 
formulations of trust and distrust. When we are posed an example case of trust that 
satisfies the COMMIT and REL conditions, the case will immediately be one of trust. 
That is because there is an active sense of ‘trust’, consisting in reliance on another. In a 
sense, when we look for trust in such an example case, we hit the activity layer. We’re 
satisfied that such a case is one of trust (of a sort). We don’t need to dig deeper through 
to the stative layer. For distrust on the other hand, we won’t be satisfied, just from 
COMMIT and NON-REL, that the case is one of distrust. That’s because there is no 
such thing as distrust on the ‘activity layer’. We need to dig further, into the stative layer. 
Once we find the subject’s wariness, our intuitions are satisfied that the case is one of 
distrust. And, as we’ve seen in No Other Option, that wariness can even be present along 
with the activity of trust. 
 
4.6 Active/stative in the literature 
The active/stative trust distinction has not gone completely unnoticed in the trust 
literature. In this section I raise some instances where the distinction has been recognised. 
 
The most prominent and well developed account that recognises the active/stative trust 
is found in Hieronymi (2008). Hieronymi argues that there is both an act of merely entrusting 
oneself to another and what she refers to as a ‘purists’ notion of trust, as a trusting belief. 
She arrives at this conclusion through evaluating Holton’s REL+ view, and showing that 
it encounters difficulty in explaining a type of problem case where we cannot voluntarily 
decide to trust. This forces us to distinguish between trust as a state and trust as an 
  92 
action.15 Her own account, distinguishing between an act of entrusting and a trusting 
belief, thus mirrors two of the core elements of the account I put forward. For instance, 
she says that “the purist understands trust as a certain kind of confidence and understands 
trusting actions as actions performed in or from that kind of confidence.” (Hieronymi 
2008 : p.228) What I refer to as ‘assurance’ is what I presume picks out the same attitude 
Hieronymi identifies as ‘confidence’, and trusting actions can be understood as picking 
out the same phenomena as active trusting. 
 
However, our accounts differ seemingly on the basis that Hieronymi doesn’t wish to 
consider the active form as a fully-fledged type of trust in its own right. Rather, she says 
that it is plausible to adopt the ‘purists notion’ of trust - the trusting belief - as the primary 
form, such that “it is plausible to […] say that one trusts another to the degree that the 
one has and acts from a trusting belief, even in cases of entrusting”, [sic] (2008 : p.232) 
and that “the degree of one’s trust tracks the strength of one’s trusting belief,” (2008 : 
p.230). If this is right, then trust is in a sense really the stative, rather than the active form. 
The active form is a derivative form.  
 
I think we should deny this view. My view is that the term ‘trust’ can just be ambiguous 
between an activity and a state. We shouldn’t put either of these on a pedestal, such that 
if we are trying to determine whether a case is really one of trust, we appeal to whether 
there is one of these forms in particular. Instead, we should recognise that both forms 
can be referred to depending on how we use the term ‘trust’ in different contexts and 
with different sentence forms. Recognising both therefore helps us better make sense of 
the broad phenomena of the trust stance and matters of trust, because it makes more 
sense of everyday language surrounding it.16  
 
Active/stative trust is more explicitly recognized by Castelfranchi & Falcone (2010), who 
suggest that trust can be a “psychological attitude of X towards Y relative to some 
possible desirable behavior or feature” but also a “decision and the act of relying on, 
counting on, depending on Y” (2010 : p.18). On their view, the decision to trust is also 
                                                      
15 I discuss this type of problem case and why the active/stative distinction resolves it in 
section 7.1 
16 In section 8.6 I show that Hieronymi’s argument in favour of construing the stative 
form as primary, is an unsound one. 
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brought under the category the activity. While this may be right, the account of the active 
form of trust I put forward needn’t require this; the decision can be the decision to 
undertake the active form. 
 
Pettit (1995) suggests a three-fold distinction between types of trust, one in which we can 
glimpse the active/stative distinction: 
 
The most general usage of [trust] in this connection would equate trust with 
confidence that other people will treat you reasonably well: confidence that they 
will not waylay or cheat you, for example. We speak in this sense of trusting our 
fellow citizens or trusting the institutions under which we live. A somewhat less 
general usage would link it with confidence that other people are reliable under 
certain tests: they will treat you well, in the event of your placing yourself in their 
hands. We speak in this sense of trusting the police or trusting the courts. A third 
usage, more specific still, would associate trust, not with a detached confidence 
that people are reliable under such tests, but with putting that confidence to the 
test: with actually placing yourself in the hands of others. (1995 : p.204) 
 
The first two attitudes appear to be two-place stative trust and three-place stative trust 
respectively. The first is general confidence, and the second is confidence concerning a 
specific matter.17 The third attitude Pettit describes as active reliance, because he describes 
each of these three attitudes as forms of reliance, even the attitudes of confidence. This 
is a mistake that stems from the fact that REL+ tends to be taken as an axiom in trust 
theory; one that tempts authors to fold the positive anticipatory aspect of the trust stance 
into reliance, for which it is ill-suited. Nonetheless, I take it that Pettit recognizes the 
importance of the active/stative distinction, albeit misconstruing it slightly. 
 
Faulkner (2011 : p.23) gives a nice summary of the active/stative distinction. He 
distinguishes between an action of “putting oneself in a position of depending on 
something happening or someone doing something’ and an attitude “towards this 
dependence”. Horsburgh (1960 : pp.343–344) is an early case of the distinction being 
recognized. However, he seems to suggest, similarly to Hieronymi, that trust is really 
reserved for an attitude of confidence, with reliance as something we do as a result of 
trust. Marušić (2017) has recently put forward an account that distinguishes between trust 
as an attitude or judgement, and reliance as an action. Again, like Hieronymi and 
                                                      
17 Holton similarly blurs boundaries between the active/stative and two-place/three-
place distinction: see section 7.2. 
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Horsburgh, he takes it that trust is really the attitude of judgement, which he takes to be 
a belief to the effect that another will φ (2017 : pp.4–5). 
 
4.7 Responses to the argument & stative distrust 
We can deny the argument from distrust by denying that the Trump/Merkel 
counterexamples are legitimate problem cases for the Commitment account of distrust, 
and thus for REL+. Those examples purported to be problems, because they satisfied 
both COMMITDIR and NON-REL, yet still were not cases of distrust. So, if it could be 
argued that one or both of those conditions weren’t satisfied, then my charge that the 
Commitment account is flawed as an account of distrust, fails to get off the ground. The 
first three responses I consider are of this sort. The last response takes issue with my 
construal of distrust as wariness. 
 
4.7.1 COMMITDIR is not satisfied in the example cases 
We could argue that the commitment condition is undermined in the Antacid Tablets case 
and/or one or more of its variants. We could suggest this based on the stipulation in 
those cases that Merkel doesn’t rely on Trump to bring the antacid tablets, because she 
brings some herself. From this, we could argue, the COMMITDIR condition no longer 
holds; the thought being that if Merkel does bring her own tablets, then she wouldn’t 
believe that Trump still has a commitment to bringing her some. 
 
We could motivate this response by appealing to the thought that Merkel bringing her 
own tablets would relieve Trump, in her mind, of the commitment to bring her any. As 
such, once she had brought her own tablets, she wouldn’t believe Trump still had a 
commitment to doing so. Compare with the thought that, in order for a promise to 
obligate a promisor to φ, it has to be in some sense accepted by a promisee in order to 
obligate (Friedrich and Southwood 2011 : p.280; Owens 2006 : p.73; Thomson 1990 : 
p.298). Another way of putting this is to say it must be ‘taken up’ by the promisee. 
Without this uptake, the promise is expressed, but isn’t binding. We might also be 
tempted to construe uptake as the promisee actually proceeding to rely on the promisor 
to fulfil the promise/to meet her commitment. If this is plausible, then the Antacid cases 
fail to present a problem for the Commitment account of distrust, because they don’t 
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present cases of distrust. They present cases of mere non-reliance; the ‘plus’ condition 
doesn’t hold. 
 
There are two issues with this line of response, however. First, it is not obviously true 
that uptake of a promise by a promisee requires the promisee to rely on the promisor. 
Thomson suggests that uptake having occurred, and so the promisor being bound to act, 
is a matter of whether the promisee may at some point rely on the promisor to meet her 
commitment. Presumably, once the promise has been made such that the promisee would 
be warranted in relying on it (even if she never does), the promisor is “morally at risk” 
(Thomson 1990 : p.298). In other words, it isn’t necessary that Merkel relies on Trump, 
in order for Trump to have the commitment to bring her tablets. So, we can suppose that 
Merkel’s belief that Trump has the commitment, would not be extinguished by her not 
relying on him to bring the tablets. 
 
A deeper problem with that line of response is that undermines the Commitment account 
of distrust. If we argue that the COMMITDIR condition no longer holds in the Antacid 
Tablets case, on the basis that NON-REL holds, then the problem that arises is that, by 
the lights of the Commitment account, distrust is impossible. This is because, if our 
reason for suggesting that COMMITDIR doesn’t hold is Merkel’s non-reliance on Trump, 
then reliance must be a necessary condition of the COMMITDIR condition holding. The 
cost of avoiding the counterexamples then would be undermining the account of distrust 
altogether. 
 
4.7.2 NON-REL is not satisfied because risk is unnecessary for reliance 
We could argue that NON-REL is not satisfied, on the basis that Merkel buying her own 
tablets does not suffice for not relying on Trump to bring her some. It only would do so 
on the assumption that reliance entails risk, i.e. in having the success of your goal depend 
on another’s acting. I will refer to this sort of risk as practical dependence. 
 
Hawley suggests that reliance “needn’t imply risk or vulnerability”, because she adopts 
her account of reliance from Holton (Hawley 2014 : p.4). Holton suggests that to rely on 
something happening is to plan on the supposition that it will happen (1994 : p.65). This 
understanding of reliance is also adopted by Alonso (2014, 2009, 2016). On this view, 
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reliance is an attitude akin to that which some philosophers call acceptance (Bratman 
1992; Cohen 1989), where to accept a proposition is “to have or to adopt a policy of 
deeming, positing, or postulating that p, i.e. of including that proposition or rule among 
one’s premises for deciding what to do or think in a particular context, whether or not 
one feels it to be true that p,” (Cohen 1989 : p.368). This is synonymous with Holton’s 
‘planning on the supposition that’ p. As such, we can call the view of reliance adopted by 
Hawley, Holton and Alonso the acceptance view of reliance. 
 
Acceptance that p is an attitude of taking-it-for-granted that p. It involves treating certain 
states of affairs as fixed, within a plan. Taking it for granted that someone will act certainly 
seems to be a feature of relying on someone to act. When Merkel relies on Trump to 
bring her antacids, it seems right to say that she takes it for granted that he will bring her 
antacids. If acceptance suffices for reliance, this is all that Merkel’s reliance on Trump 
consists in. 
 
But there is a crucial way in which acceptance can’t be sufficient for reliance. This is 
because we can accept things in contexts where it would be inappropriate to say we rely 
on those things. That’s because we accept certain things we are trying to militate against, 
in order to reduce the possibility they hinder our goals. For instance, Bratman sets out an 
example of acceptance, that involves militating against going over budget in a 
construction project (1992 : p.6). By proceeding on the basis that costs for individual 
aspects of the project will be at the top of their estimates, we ensure we don’t go over our 
total budget. But, we wouldn’t say we thereby rely on spending at the top of our estimates. 
So, acceptance is not sufficient for reliance.  
 
More obvious counterexamples can be raised: I might accept that I will be mugged if I 
walk home too late at night, thereby ensuring I take steps to reduce the possibility of 
being mugged (e.g. going home earlier, or via a different route). I don’t rely on being 
mugged, though. Similarly, the planning department of a major city may accept that a 
hurricane is likely to hit at some point in future, and so take steps to build in defences for 
their city. But it isn’t true that the city council is relying on a hurricane hitting the city. 
That’s because reliance on something requires more than just acceptance. Acceptance 
may be necessary, but it is arguably not sufficient for reliance on something. What else is 
required is that that the premise we accept must be thereby what our aims come to depend 
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upon.18 This explains why Merkel does not rely on Trump, when her having tablets does 
not depend on Trump bringing them (even if she prefers to have tablets). It also explains 
why it is not the case that we aim to spend over budget, that I aim to get mugged, that 
the city aims to be hit by a hurricane. 
 
Reliance on something is a possible consequence of acceptance. We must sometimes 
accept certain things which we need to be the case, in the face of uncertainty over whether 
they are, in order to bring about what we are aiming at. This is a feature of many of the 
standard cases of reliance, particular those in the vein of ‘relying on a rope’ to hold our 
weight, when ascending/descending a cliff (a typical example, found in e.g. (Alonso 2014 
: pp.1–2; Black 2004 : p.272; Holton 1994 : p.68)). We accept that the rope will hold our 
weight, in the sense of proceeding on the premise that it will, even if we are uncertain 
that it will. But it is not the case that acceptance of something is sufficient for reliance on 
it. Acceptance of things in order to militate against them demonstrates this. 
 
We have further good reasons to hold firm to our intuition that reliance does require 
practical dependence, contra the acceptance view of reliance. I will go through these in 
turn. 
 
There is a quick response to the objection that NON-REL is not satisfied in the example 
cases. We can say that, if Antacid Tablets is not a case of non-reliance, then it must be a 
case of reliance. But if it is a case of reliance rather than non-reliance, it is not clear what 
then does count as non-reliance. Our categories of reliance and non-reliance thus seem to 
demand elusive standards. And again, if we try to deny that NON-REL is satisfied in 
what appears to be a typical case of non-reliance, this raises the threat of distrust being 
made impossible on the Commitment account. If a highly plausible instance of non-
reliance is not an instance of non-reliance, but the opposite, we’re left wondering what 
could meet the standards of non-reliance, and thus, on the Commitment account, distrust. 
 
Now, I discuss a case that Hawley offers, which is intended to illustrate how reliance 
needn’t imply practical dependence: 
 
                                                      
18 For authors endorsing this position, see also (Marušić 2017; Smith 2010). 
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…relying on someone to do something needn’t mean putting your fate in their 
hands. You can rely upon me to bring enough food for everyone at the picnic 
whilst nevertheless bringing plenty of food yourself, because you don’t want to 
seem ungenerous: you’re acting on the supposition that I will bring lots of food, 
and indeed this partly explains the large quantities you bring along. Thus reliance 
in this sense needn’t imply risk or vulnerability. (Hawley 2014 : p.4) 
 
 
The main problem with the picnic example is that it is quite quickly described, so it isn’t 
clear how it shows that reliance needn’t entail practical dependence. I think the example 
can be responded to, though. Call the one who relies while bringing enough food ‘Xavier’, 
and the one being relied upon to bring enough food ‘Yolanda’. We should ask in what 
sense Xavier does rely on Yolanda to bring lots of food, if Xavier brings enough food for 
everyone?  
 
Imagine how the picnic case plays out, if Yolanda fails to bring enough food for everyone, 
despite Xavier doing so anyway. Suppose Xavier admonishes Yolanda for not bringing 
enough food, by saying ‘I was relying on you to bring food for everyone’. If Xavier 
brought enough food for everyone though, Yolanda could rightly respond ‘but you 
brought food for everyone anyway’. If it’s plausible that Yolanda’s response serves as a 
way of countering or undermining Xavier’s admonishment, this suggests our concept of 
reliance involves practical dependence. Of course, if Yolanda had promised Xavier that 
she would bring food regardless, then simply pointing out that no harm was done won’t 
be enough; Xavier could rightly admonish Yolanda for failing to uphold a promise. But 
then, something Xavier wanted – Yolanda upholding her promise – was dependent on 
Yolanda doing something: upholding her promise. 
 
It could be that Xavier wants everyone going to the picnic, to themselves bring sufficient 
food for everyone at the picnic. So Xavier brings food for (Xavier, Yolanda, Zadie), and 
so does Yolanda, and so does Zadie. If that is the case, then the example does still involve 
practical dependence. That’s because what Xavier wants is dependent on Yolanda and 
Zadie following through on certain actions. 
 
The claim that reliance doesn’t involve practical dependence is not well supported by 
reflecting on the literature. The typical examples in the literature, of X relying on Y to φ, 
without exception (besides the purported picnic case) involve cases where X’s goal 
depends on Y’s φ’ing. Holton’s drama class example involves X having the goal to fall, 
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but not fall to the floor, thus hurting herself. So, X relies on others to catch her, as X 
cannot satisfy both goals at once, unless others intervene. Baier’s ‘Kant’s neighbours’ case 
is one where the neighbours’ timekeeping depends on Kant’s walking; they risk having 
their plans go awry in case Kant goes for his walk at a different time. 
 
Many authors explicitly appeal to practical dependence as a feature of reliance. Baier for 
instance compares her trust as reliance, with other forms of practical dependence on 
other’s actions: 
 
Trust which is reliance on another’s good will, perhaps minimal good will, 
contrasts with the forms of reliance on others’ reactions and attitudes which are 
shown by the comedian, the advertiser, the blackmailer, the kidnapper-
extortioner, and the terrorist, who all depend on particular attitudes and reactions 
of others for the success of their actions. (Baier 1986 : pp.234–235) [emphases added] 
 
 
Black proposes an account of reliance that requires a condition to be met such that, for 
A to rely on B φ’ing, A must have a goal that is realised if and only if B φ’s (Black 2004 : 
p.271).19 Smith’s account of reliance is that we rely on states of affairs, when those states 
of affairs are necessary conditions for the success of our plans (Smith 2010 : p.146). 
Railton’s characterisation of reliance has it as a primitive mental process, that occurs prior 
to representational judgement states like belief, which is involved in goal directed activity. 
Among the examples he gives is of an infant, learning to walk. He suggests that, “It is 
perfectly natural to say that she now tacitly relies upon her sense of balance to keep her 
upright while she focuses on the task of propelling herself toward her goal” (Railton 2014 
: p.124). This is an intuitive case of reliance; it involves an object of sorts (sense of 
balance) playing a necessary role in helping the infant the achieve a goal (walking). If the 
sense of balance falters, then the walking does too. The infant relies on her sense of 
balance, in virtue of being practically dependent on it. 
                                                      
19 Black’s ‘goal dependence’ condition is too demanding, due to the ‘if and only if’ 
requirement. It isn’t necessary that Y’s φ’ing wholly determines whether X achieves some 
goal, in order for X to rely on Y to φ. For instance, in the example that Black uses to 
illustrate his account, MacDonald is holding a rope for Jones, who is at the bottom of a 
cliff, while the tide is coming in. The action Jones is relying on MacDonald for - 
‘holding the rope’ - is not sufficient for Jones to achieve his goal of scaling the cliff and 
so avoiding drowning. This is because Jones also needs to climb the rope to avoid 
drowning. Y’s φ’ing can be a necessary condition for the success of X’s goal; it needn’t 
be a sufficient one. 
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Hawley herself is among those who explain example cases of reliance by appealing to 
practical dependence. This includes the case of relying on your daughter’s friend to pick 
her up from the party, where Hawley invokes practical dependence to cement the fact 
that you are reliant on the friend. She says: 
 
Suppose you rely upon the friend to keep this promise: you drink several glasses 
of wine, making it impossible for you to safely drive and fetch your daughter 
yourself. (Hawley 2014 : p.11) 
 
Hawley also appeals to practical dependence when describing how we come to rely on 
another to provide us lunch:  
 
I rely on you to provide my lunch: I anticipate that you will do so, and I don’t 
make alternative arrangements. (Hawley 2014 : p.2). 
 
If practical dependence is not necessary to reliance, then pointing out that you drink 
several glasses of wine is irrelevant to whether you are reliant on the friend. It would also 
be irrelevant that we don’t make alternative arrangements for lunch, to the fact that we 
rely on someone else to provide it (compare with the picnic example). But it is hard to 
know what the alternative explanation would be for your reliance on the friend, if not as 
a matter of something you want (having your daughter returned safely) be now dependent 
on the friend’s following through on her acting. Your dependence is cemented by your 
actions rendering you unable to intervene yourself. 
 
These are not the only instances where Hawley invokes practical dependence 
underpinning reliance. In an example of not relying on your colleagues to buy you 
champagne, she equates deciding not to rely on someone to φ, with taking care of the 
matter yourself, thus defeating your practical dependence on another: 
 
Likewise, deciding not to rely upon someone to whom you take a participant 
stance—deciding to buy your own champagne—need not mean distrusting that 
person. (2014 : pp.7–8) 
 
When discussing Jones’ (2004 : p.6) account of trust, as “accepted vulnerability to another 
person’s power over something one cares about”, Hawley also equates vulnerability with 
reliance: 
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I will take it that the notions of accepted vulnerability plus foregoing the attempt 
to reduce such vulnerability capture roughly the notion of reliance. (2014 : p.8) 
 
 
If reliance doesn’t entail practical dependence, though, then why would vulnerability 
(equated with risk in Hawley’s explanation of the picnic case) and foregoing reducing 
vulnerability capture reliance? It only could if risk was a necessary feature of reliance. 
 
There is a more fundamental problem with Hawley’s suggestion that reliance needn’t 
involve risk or practical dependence. This is because the intuition motivating REL+ in 
the first place seems to require that it does. As such, if we deny that reliance involves risk, 
then REL+ fails to get off the ground.  
 
Recall the intuition that trust is not mere reliance on others. This is on the basis that 
reliance allows us to be merely frustrated, whereas trust allows us to be betrayed. In either 
case, reliance on others is connected to frustration of goals and our responses to that, 
whether that is in terms of mere poorly chosen reliance, or interpersonal harm from those 
who let down our reliance. This presupposes risk of some form. For that connection 
between reliance and frustration to exist, reliance must entail practical dependence. 
 
If it wasn’t the case that reliance was connected to practical dependence, we wouldn’t be 
warranted in supposing that the comparison between mere disappointed reliance and 
betrayed trust, reveals anything about the nature of trust. Trust involves risk of betrayal, 
where betrayal is interpersonally important disappointment. But if reliance needn’t involve 
risk of a disappointed goal, then we would have no reason to suppose trust was grounded 
in reliance. The practical dependence involved in reliance thus seems required to motivate 
REL+. 
 
Practical dependence also seems to account for how it can be an imposition to trust others 
to do certain things, and so how we incur responsibilities in being trusted. We should 
wish to avoid relying on those who don’t invite our reliance, because we don’t want to 
blame them in case our plans fail. The imposition of trust is a point that Hawley places 
much emphasis on in the Commitment account (2014 : p.7).  
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If we choose to give up practical dependence as a necessary feature of reliance, then 
reliance seems to be just a prediction or presupposition that something will happen. But 
again, consider how reliance can be disappointed or frustrated when what we rely on 
happening doesn’t take place. That reliance can be disappointed presupposes that 
something we wanted has now fallen through, or is at risk of falling through, not just that 
something we predicted has not happened. A prediction can be wrong, and we can be 
relieved sometimes by predictions being proven wrong. On the other hand, my reliance 
can be disappointed, but it makes no sense to say my reliance can be relieved. It can be 
fulfilled, of course, but fulfilment relates to satisfaction. If it were true that reliance was 
simply a presupposition that something will happen, then we could say that I rely on 
suffering recurring bouts of migraines in the storm season, or that I rely on being mugged 
if I walk home alone late at night. But I don’t rely on these things. I wouldn’t be 
disappointed or frustrated in any respect if my migraines didn’t happen one year, or if I 
got home safe. I would be relieved. 
 
Even if Hawley is right that reliance doesn’t entail risk, we would have good reason to 
come up with another concept that did characterise how we can be dependent on certain 
things for the success of our goals, or pursuing our wants. Due to our natures as practical, 
goal-directed agents, it’s simply useful that we have a concept to describe how, when we 
aim at and pursue certain states of affairs, we presume certain conditions hold steady, and 
thereby put ourselves at practical risk from those conditions changing. We might as well 
suppose that reliance is that concept. 
 
4.7.3 NON-REL is too underspecified / is an activity 
 
Another way of responding to the example cases is to suggest that we ought to have given 
a narrower definition of non-reliance than the one NON-REL puts forward. The one 
NON-REL gives is the absence of reliance. A more robust analysis of non-reliance might 
be put forward, along the lines of an interpretation of non-reliance that Hawley gives at 
one point, as consisting in avoiding reliance: 
 
Let’s understand nonreliance as a refusal to accept vulnerability, and/or a 
continuing attempt to reduce such vulnerability. (Hawley 2014 : p.8) 
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This response is also akin to denying a feature of the active/stative trust account I’ve 
given above. It says that there is such a thing as distrust on the ‘activity’ layer of the trust 
stance. That’s because non-reliance is a kind of activity, in being a kind of avoidance 
activity. 
 
In respect of the thought that non-reliance and thus distrust can be an activity: what 
motivated construing reliance trust as an activity in its own right was the observation that 
we can rely, even when we are uncertain or wary of another. Reliance is not tethered to 
an attitude of assurance of another. It is a different category of mental phenomena; part 
of action, rather than an inner dispositional state, or feeling. Avoidance actions we 
interpret as avoidance on the basis that they are accompanied with, and motivated by, 
wariness.20 As such, the ‘avoidance analysis’ of non-reliance collapses into imputing 
wariness to distrusters, and thus appealing to stative distrust. 
 
4.7.4 Distrust is not wariness 
 
I have argued that distrust is only obviously present in the Trump/Merkel example cases 
when Merkel has an attitude of wariness about Trump. As such, distrust involves in some 
sense anticipating negative motives from Trump. Hawley though argues against a 
construal of distrust as involving negative expectations about another’s motives. She 
argues this when considering whether Jones’ (1996) account of trust could in principle be 
extended to cover distrust. 
 
For reference, Jones’ (1996) account of trust is the following: 
 
Trust is an attitude of optimism that the goodwill and competence of another will 
extend to cover the domain of our interaction with her, together with the 
expectation that the one trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the thought 
that we are counting on her. The attitude of optimism is to be cashed out not 
primarily in terms of beliefs about the other's trustworthiness, but rather - in 
accordance with certain contemporary accounts of the emotions - in terms of a 
distinctive, and affectively loaded, way of seeing the one trusted. This way of seeing 
the other, with its constitutive patterns of attention and tendencies of 
interpretation, explains the willingness of trusters to let those trusted get 
dangerously near the things they care about. (1996 : p.4) 
                                                      
20 Excepting avoidance for reasons related to not wishing to impose on another, or give 
them responsibility over something. 
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Jones’ (1996) account of trust contains the elements of the account I have set out above 
in section 4.5.4, with a distinction between stative assurance trust, and active reliance 
trust. My ‘assurance trust’ arguably picks out the attitude that Jones refers to as an attitude 
of optimism/an affectively loaded way of seeing the one trusted. Active reliance trust isn’t 
explicitly isolated by Jones, but is alluded to, when she refers the attitude of optimism as 
being about how the trustee will regard our ‘counting on’ her. Furthermore, optimism 
involves a positive disposition/willingness to count on another (/let another get near to 
something cared about); corresponding to the thought that assurance makes us willing to 
rely. Where my account differs from Jones’ is in how I stipulate ‘counting on’ is itself a 
type of trust, which can be present absent the attitude of optimism: we can trust in spite 
of our distrust. Despite this, the broad outline of Jones’ ‘Affective Optimism’ account is 
one I am sympathetic to. 
 
Hawley suggests however that Jones’ Affective Optimism account falls down when we 
attempt to extend it in accounting for distrust. This is because it would require supposing 
that, in distrusting another, we hold negative expectations of another’s motives, by 
imputing to her ill will against us. She argues first that anticipating another has ill will 
toward us, or will attempt to frustrate our interests, is not necessary for distrust of her. 
This is because someone who lies and cheats can be distrusted, yet needn’t bear ill will 
toward others, and doesn’t care about another’s interests (2014 : p.6). 
 
It is right that someone who lacks concern for others/has no sympathy for others, would 
not necessarily bear ill will toward others, in a particular circumstance.21 If exploiting 
another by lying or cheating happens to be the best means to obtaining what one wants, 
this doesn’t necessarily mean that one ‘has it in for’ the other.  
 
The question is whether this point puts into question the claim that distrust is wariness 
of another’s motives. It doesn’t, because wariness of another needn’t involve supposing 
that another genuinely bears us ill will, in the sense of wishing us harm or ‘having it in’ 
                                                      
21 Though callousness often goes hand in hand with being vengeful/grudge-bearing. 
Callous people still have wants, and when others get in the way of pursuing those wants, 
or attempt to frustrate them, ill will can result. Selfishness unchecked by sympathy for 
others can lead to long term ill will.  
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for us. Wariness just requires that we are on guard, anticipating that another will attempt 
to take advantage of us, or cause us harm in some way. Distrust is the anticipation of such 
actions. Being wary of another is compatible with feeling that she has callous disregard 
for us. In fact, wariness toward people like this is an especially appropriate attitude to 
have. That’s because lacking concern/sympathy for others will open the possibility of 
acting in exploitative ways against others, that would otherwise be closed off by the 
possession of a conscience. In the eyes of those who lack concern for others, people 
present as opportunities to exploit for instrumental gain. 
 
4.7.5 Qualifying wariness 
It is also worth mentioning that Hawley argues that anticipating negative motives from 
another is not sufficient for distrust. Considering this point will help clarify what I mean 
by wariness. She uses the following example: 
  
Suppose that a deeply honourable person campaigns to have me imprisoned for 
my crimes. I cannot rely on this person to help me, moreover I know that she bears 
me ill-will and is actively trying to frustrate my goals. But my attitude to her needn’t 
amount to distrust, for she is straightforward and honest in her campaigning. 
(Hawley 2014 : p.6) 
 
We can note that the example involves adopting the mind-set of a criminal, who 
recognizes that she is on the wrong side of the law, yet recognizes virtues in others like 
honourability, which go hand in hand with trustworthiness. If the criminal regards the 
person who campaigns to have her imprisoned as doing so in a straightforward way, not 
resorting to underhand tactics, then it is right to say that that subject wouldn’t distrust 
the campaigner. I would argue that neither, then, is the criminal wary of the campaigner. 
The criminal would no doubt be monitoring the campaigner’s progress and the extent to 
which the campaigner, as Jones puts it, is ‘dangerously near’ the things the criminal cares 
about (e.g. her own ill-gotten gains). But the criminal’s monitoring/keeping track of the 
campaigner is not sufficient for wariness. Wariness involves something closer to paranoia. 
It involves the attitude that the other is doing things beyond your awareness, not making 
her specific intentions apparent. While someone can make clear her dislike of you, if she 
also makes her intentions and courses of action against you open knowledge, and plays 
by the known rules, then you won’t be wary of her. What she is doing won’t be a matter 
of trust for you: she is already telling you that she is acting against you, and is doing so in 
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your full view. As such you can have no sense that she is manoeuvring against you beyond 
your awareness. 
 
It is worth noting that this point about wariness, is related to why the Commitment 
account was so intuitive. COMMIT being satisfied transforms an interaction we have 
with another, into one where we are open to being misled, toyed with, let down, but also 
helped. By anchoring the anticipatory attitudes of the trust stance around the locus of 
commitment, we isolate the type of situation where another can mislead us, and 
manoeuvre against us beyond our awareness, exploiting our false sense of security. 
Playing by the rules and campaigning openly doesn’t constitute hidden manoeuvring. 
Wariness of another involves a feeling that she can’t be pinned down, that she is not as 
she may present herself outwardly, that her actions may be hidden and come at your 
expense. When you are wary of another, you are anticipating, but have yet to have 
confirmation of, actions at your expense. Commitments, in being related to promises, 
involve assurances to the effect that no such actions are forthcoming. Yet when we 
distrust another – are wary of her – we treat those assurances with suspicion, as deployed 
as a smokescreen. I’ll elaborate on this picture of distrust in chapter 7 (section 7.7). 
 
4.8 Summing up 
The argument from distrust illustrates that REL+ is not true. It also illustrates how REL+ 
is not true; it takes reliance to be the only form of trust. But this is just trust in an active 
sense. There is also trust in a stative assurance sense. Distrust is only a stative attitude, 
standing in opposition to assurance, and we see this in our repeat failure to pin distrust 
to non-reliance. 
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5 Reliance 
Why has the active/stative distinction not been recognized by those authors sympathetic 
to REL+? The most plausible reason is that, following Baier, many authors take the claim 
that to trust is to rely, but not merely to rely, as an axiom of trust analysis. This fails to 
recognise that there is a form of trust that isn’t based in reliance, but in assurance. Reliance 
is something we do, and we can be more inclined to rely on those we assuredly trust.  
 
In this chapter, I defend an account of reliance, as an activity. This makes reliance a 
distinct phenomenon from stative predictive attitudes. As such, this forms part of a 
defence of the ‘active/stative’ distinction, in my account of the trust stance. 
 
In the first section, I raise a point about different ways we can negate certain attitudes, 
that illustrates why it is wrong to suppose that non-reliance could ground distrust. In the 
second section, I argue that acceptance cannot serve as a predictive attitude. This means 
that reliance, construed as a form of acceptance, doesn’t ground the anticipatory attitude 
of trust. In the third section, I discuss Smith’s (2010) account of reliance, and argue that 
it faces several problems. In the last section I use these problems, in combination with 
those noted about the acceptance view, to defend a new account of reliance, that I call 
the role placement view. 
 
5.1 Negating reliance and negating predictive attitudes 
In this section I raise a point of comparison between reliance and predictive attitudes, 
that sheds light on why reliance is not such an attitude, and so why it was ill-suited to 
ground the anticipatory element of the trust stance. This meant REL+ succumbed to the 
argument from uncertainty and argument from distrust. 
 
The difference between reliance and predictive attitudes can be glimpsed in how we are 
able to negate the presence of positive predictive attitudes (so; belief, trust, assurance, 
confidence), in a way we cannot negate reliance. With the predictive attitudes, we can 
negate the presence of the positive using the prefix ‘non-’, giving us non-trust, non-belief, 
non-confidence and non-assurance. This is the same with reliance; we can negate the 
presence of reliance using ‘non-’, as we saw in section 2.3. The use of the prefix ‘non-’ 
simply serves to indicate the absence of the attitude. 
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However, reporting the absence of those positive predictive attitudes (so; non-belief, 
non-trust, non-assurance and non-confidence) is not yet to report the presence of a negative 
predictive attitude. We can report the presence of a negative predictive attitude using the 
prefixes ‘dis’ and ‘un-’.  
 
We can negate trust and belief with both ‘dis’ and ‘non-’. Distrust and disbelief pick out 
a negative predictive attitude, whereas non-trust and non-belief pick out the absence of 
the positive predictive attitude. We can do the same with assurance and confidence, but 
with ‘un-’ instead of ‘dis’. Here we have un-assurance and non-assurance, un-confidence 
and non-confidence. In the case of each of these predictive attitudes, the prefixes ‘un-’ or 
‘dis’ serve to indicate that a different sort of negation is at issue from ‘non-’. It’s not just 
that the presence of the positive attitude is being negated, but that the subject has a 
negative prediction. In the case of disbelieving that p, distrusting another, being unassured 
or being unconfident, the subject anticipates the negative, rather than not anticipating the 
positive. 
 
Reliance cannot be negated in these two different ways. We can negate the presence of 
reliance with ‘non-’, but we can’t pick out any corresponding negative attitude by adding 
an ‘un-’ or ‘dis’ prefix. There is no attitude corresponding to unreliance or disreliance, 
and these terms fail to refer to any attitude that exists. If there were such a thing as 
disreliance, then we would understand this as something distinct from just the absence of 
reliance. Ayer notes that different prefixes used for negating are useful to distinguish 
between different kinds of ‘lacking’: 
 
Prefixes like 'un-' and 'in-' count in English, in many instances, as negative signs; 
but to say, for example, of someone that he is ungenerous is not to negate what 
is expressed by saying of him that he is generous. If it is false that he is 
ungenerous, it does not follow that he is generous: he may be neither the one nor 
the other but something between the two. […] What these and other such 
examples show is that, while the presence in an English sentence of what is 
counted as a negative sign does often have the effect of negating the statement 
which is expressed by the remainder of the sentence, this is not always so. To 
assume that negative signs served only to reverse the truth-values of the 
statements which were expressed by the sentences into which they were 
introduced would be to overlook some niceties of actual usage. (1952 : p.801). 
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The predictive attitudes are, like the predicate ‘generosity’ in Ayer’s example, amenable 
to different sorts of negation. Reliance, however, isn’t. This indicates that reliance isn’t a 
predictive attitude, because in the case of the predictive attitudes, we are able to take a 
positive (optimistic) or negative (pessimistic) stance toward some possibility. In other 
words, we can take a stance that some event will or will not occur, or that something is 
or isn’t true. And, the presence of the negative attitude is distinct from just the absence 
of the positive attitude. So, when we negate the presence of predictive attitudes, we need 
to be able to further distinguish between the absence of the positive, and the presence of 
the negative.  
 
The ‘dis’ and ‘un-’ prefixes help us pick out the presence of the negative, in cases where 
simply reporting that we ‘don’t believe p’ or ‘don’t trust her’ would be ambiguous. In belief 
reports for example, when we report that “Angela doesn’t believe that Borneo is a large 
island of the Malay Archipelago”, this could mean that Angela has no such belief about 
Borneo (perhaps she is not even aware of Borneo or Malay, or what an archipelago is). 
Alternatively, it could mean that Angela disbelieves that Borneo is a large island of the Malay 
Archipelago. 
 
Similarly, when we report that “Angela doesn’t trust Boris to feed her cat”, in the sense 
that she isn’t assured Boris will or would feed her cat, we face the same possibility of this 
meaning different things. It could mean that Angela lacks a trust stance attitude about 
this, or that she distrusts Boris in this respect (e.g. she might say of Boris “I don’t trust 
him when it comes to looking after my cat”, containing the implication that she has some 
wariness about him). 
 
We can’t negate Angela’s reliance on Boris in the same way we can negate her trust of 
him. If we report that Angela is not relying on Boris to feed her cat, then we just report 
that Angela is not doing something: relying on Boris to feed her cat. Unlike the equivalent 
‘non-’ negations with the predictive attitudes, this doesn’t leave open the possibility that 
Angela also disrelies or unrelies on Boris; that she in some sense ‘negatively relies’ on him. 
That’s because there is no such thing as a negative reliance attitude. It may be that “Angela 
is not relying on Boris to feed her cat” implies that she is no longer assured Boris is 
capable or responsible around her cat, when previously she was assured of this. But notice 
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that this is to seek an explanation for the fact of her not relying, not asking whether she 
disrelies. 
 
This sheds light on why REL+ fails. The fact that reliance doesn’t admit of ‘dis-‘ or ‘un-‘ 
type negation should indicate that it is unlike the predictive attitudes. it should come as 
no surprise that distrust couldn’t be grounded in non-reliance. An attitude like disreliance 
– a corresponding negative version of reliance, rather than the absence of it – would have 
been needed to ground distrust. However, there is no such attitude, and this is because 
reliance is not a predictive attitude. 
 
5.2 The acceptance view and anticipation 
Authors tend to treat reliance as an anticipatory/predictive attitude, or they run it together 
with anticipation/prediction of reliance being fulfilled. Pettit for instance suggests that 
trust can be a form of confidence, and that all forms of trust are forms of reliance (1995 
: p.204). Hawley takes trust and distrust to be reliance and non-reliance respectively, and 
suggests that, “trust involves anticipation of action” (2014 : p.7) while “distrust involves 
an expectation of unfulfilled commitment” (2014 : p.1). This section will reinforce a point 
made in the previous section and in the prior chapter, that even if we endorse a common 
understanding of reliance on another to φ, as akin to taking it for granted that she will φ, 
this doesn’t entail anticipating that she will φ. We can rely on her to φ while anticipating 
that she won’t. Reliance is not an anticipatory attitude. 
 
As I discussed in 4.7.2, the view of reliance that Holton puts forward is as an attitude akin 
to the acceptance of a proposition. This is in the sense of acceptance as per e.g. (Bratman 
1992; Cohen 1989; Engel 1998, 1999). To accept p is to take it for granted that p is true, 
in some context. For example, when we rely on the rope to hold our weight, we take it 
for granted that it will. Thereby, we can rely on it to ascend/descend some obstacle. 
 
I argued in 4.7.2 that acceptance is insufficient for reliance. This is on the basis that 
acceptance doesn’t entail risk, or practical dependence on the thing relied on. What 
differentiates reliance from acceptance here is that reliance entails practical dependence 
on something. Despite this, I take it that acceptance is similar to reliance, but is not the 
same thing as reliance. It is similar because there is a sense in which relying on someone 
  111 
to φ involves treating it as settled that she will φ, which is also a feature of acceptance. 
But, importantly, treating the matter of her φ’ing as settled doesn’t entail actually 
anticipating that she will φ. We saw this was true in the No Other Option case of the 
previous chapter. Merkel in some sense treated the matter of Trump bringing the antacids 
as settled, by proceeding to act on the basis that he would bring the antacids. However, 
she actually felt a sense of impending disappointment about this. 
 
Still, we might be sympathetic to the acceptance view of reliance in particular, and argue 
that surely to accept that p is to anticipate that p is true. But, even if we are sympathetic to 
the acceptance view of reliance, acceptance that p doesn’t entail anticipating p, or any 
positive prediction that p is true. In fact, acceptance is much like reliance in being a type 
of activity. 
 
For one, it is not necessary that we have a positive predictive expectation that p is true in 
order for us to accept p. Examples adapted from Kaplan (1981) can help illustrate this 
point. Kaplan argues that there is no minimal threshold of confidence that p is true, that 
is necessary for us to accept p. For instance, we can, deep down, think that some project 
we are pursuing is highly likely to include many problems, perhaps even to fail. 
Nonetheless, we can press on regardless, by proceeding as though the flaws are not 
present. As an example, I may be anticipating that there are a fair number of points in 
this thesis on which I am mistaken or have defended poorly. Nonetheless, I do not 
proceed as though these points are mistaken or defended poorly; I treat them as settled, 
and treat each one as though they were true and well defended. Thus, it isn’t necessary 
that I have a positive prediction that p is true, in order to accept that p is true.  
 
Examples with raised stakes make this point even clearer. When I am trapped at the 
bottom of a cliff with the tide coming in, I must accept that the flimsy looking rope 
offered to me by my friend at the top of the cliff will hold my weight and proceed to 
climb it, even though in normal circumstances I would not bank on it doing so. Practical 
incentives will determine whether we should accept some proposition, because 
acceptance itself is a kind of doing, which we undertake for some end. It is not an attitude 
of positive anticipation. 
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That reliance is a form of activity is glimpsed in how those endorsing the acceptance view 
of reliance tend to make remarks that indicate it also involves activity. For example, 
Hawley describes reliance as “acting on the supposition that” (2014 : p.4). Holton 
remarks, “so I can decide to act on the supposition that you will catch me. That is to 
decide to rely on you.” (1994 : p.69). Other authors also offer accounts of reliance that 
take it to be an activity; I drew attention to these in sections 4.6 and 4.7.2.  
 
5.3 Smith’s ‘plan-theoretic’ account 
Nonetheless, two prominent accounts of reliance – Smith’s (2010) and Alonso’s (2014) –
treat it as an attitude that operates within plans. On these accounts, reliance is an attitude 
we adopt toward propositions, within plans that we form prior to action. These are plans 
construed in the Bratman (1987) sense of branching structures of intentions, that we 
formulate when figuring out how to proceed in working towards some goal. This seems 
to make reliance something that is only open to relatively cognitively sophisticated agents, 
who can adopt representational attitudes with propositional content about states of the 
world, and to undertake complex planning. 
 
However, I argue that this sort of ‘plan-theoretic’ view of reliance is mistaken, because 
reliance is found within and requires activity, rather than just planning to act. We only 
rely on things once proceed to execute plans/undertake goal-driven activity. 
Furthermore, goal-driven activity is something that relatively cognitively simple agents 
can undertake. So, they can rely. Reliance needn’t require sophisticated propositional 
planning, it is found in the flow of activity. 
 
In this section I will discuss Smith’s (2010) account of reliance, in order to motivate two 
closely related points. One is that reliance is a product of our goal-directed activity, not a 
product of a prior plan. Another is that reliance is often upon things in the world, and not 
toward representational contents. I’ll argue that Smith’s account encounters several 
problems, which show that our concept of reliance is a product of how we pursue goals, 
not what our plans for pursuing them are. 
 
I discuss Smith’s account, rather than Alonso’s. This is because Alonso’s is an acceptance 
view, and these have already been shown to be lacking, because they do not explain the 
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practical dependence involved in reliance (defended in section 4.7.2). Smith’s, however, 
does take seriously the thought that reliance involves practical dependence. As such, it is 
preferable to an acceptance view. 
 
5.3.1 Smith’s account of reliance 
 
Here I summarise Smith’s account of  reliance. Smith puts forward the view that we rely 
on states of  affairs obtaining, within plans we have. The account is built from two 
conditions, which I have labelled [Success Depends] and [Intentions Excluded], to help 
sum up the intuitions behind each: 
 
[Success Depends]: E obtaining is necessary for the successful realisation of  A’s plan 
[Intentions Excluded]: A is not intending to realise E   
(2010 : pp.144–146) 
 
The account then sets out what it is for A to rely upon the obtaining of a state of affairs 
E. [Success Depends] is intended to capture how reliance involves practical dependence. 
We can use one of Smith’s examples to illustrate how it does this. In order to rely on the 
library being open late, intuition suggests that you must have a plan, the success of which 
depends upon the library being open late. For instance, it may be that you have just 
realised at this late hour that you need to return a book by today’s closing to avoid a fine. 
As such the goal you have – avoiding the fine – is hinging on the library being open late. 
[Success Depends] is poised to capture this intuition. 
 
However, [Success Depends] by itself generates too many cases of reliance. When we 
have some plan to achieve a goal, there are typically many actions that we intend to 
perform in bringing that goal about. These actions being performed, or sub-intentions 
being executed, will also qualify as states of affairs that we recognise as needing to obtain 
for our goal to be realised. They are the states of affairs whereby we perform those actions. 
However it is counter-intuitive that we rely on those parts of our plans that we intend to 
bring about ourselves, even if these are also technically necessary for the success of our 
plan. 
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Consider this point in respect of the library example. If I plan to avoid the fine for the 
late library book by going to the library late and returning the book, the states of affairs 
that are generated by [Success Depends] will also include states of affairs whereby I 
perform certain actions. For instance, I will have to somehow get to the library, using 
some mode of transport. Once there, I will have to physically deposit the book. However, 
it would be odd to say that, in intending to get to the library, I’m relying on the state of 
affairs obtaining whereby I use some mode of transport. It is also odd to say that I’m 
relying the state of affairs obtaining whereby I physically deposit the book. Suggesting 
that I do, seems to generate a certain alienation from my own actions, because now I rely 
on it being the case that I do certain things. But typically, unless we have some reason to 
think we are disconnected from our actions (e.g. through a lapse of memory or loss of 
executive control over our actions), we don’t rely on ourselves doing certain things. So, 
in isolation, [Success Depends] creates too many instances of reliance. What we rely upon 
seems to be a matter of those things that are not up to us; that are beyond our own 
actions, and that we have ceded control over. 
 
Ceding control to what we rely on is a feature of many of the example cases of reliance 
in the literature, and those we have considered in discussing cases of trust. For instance, 
in relying on another person to perform some action, we cede control to that person to 
perform that action. Kant’s neighbours ceded control over their timekeeping to Kant’s 
routine habits. As such, we have reason to think that [Success Depends], by itself, will 
generate too many cases of reliance. There is a way in which reliance must involve control 
being ceded to the thing relied on, such that our goal being brought about depends on 
things beyond ourselves and/or our actions actually playing a role in bringing that goal 
about. 
 
Thus, [Intentions Excluded] is intended to narrow down the states of affairs we rely upon, 
to only those that are matters on which we have ceded control over. [Intentions 
Excluded] allows us to rule out those states of affairs, that [Success Depends] otherwise 
encompasses, that we are intending to bring about in our plan. For instance, above we 
identified that alienation from my own actions appeared to result were I to say that I rely 
on myself e.g. depositing the book in order to avoid the fine. Depositing the book is an 
action I intend to perform, not one that I rely on happening. If we relied upon those states 
of affairs whereby we perform certain actions, we imply that we are not in control of 
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those actions. By ruling out these states of affairs, our account of reliance returns only 
those cases where we have ceded control over whether a state of affairs obtains. This 
aligns more closely with our intuitions concerning reliance. Overall then, Smith’s account 
of reliance appears to be well motivated, and explains our intuitions. 
 
5.3.2 Internal & External reliance 
Smith draws a crucial distinction between two types of  reliance (2010 : pp.144–146). The 
distinction lies in whether the subject is aware of  whether a state of  affairs satisfies the 
two conditions at the heart of  the account: [Success Depends] and [Intentions Excluded]. 
 
One of  these types of  reliance is when a subject A regards [Success Depends] and 
[Intentions Excluded] as true, such that A has a propositional attitude representing a state 
of  affairs E. This is when A internally relies upon E.22 The other type of reliance is 
instanced when [Success Depends] and [Intentions Excluded] just are true of a state of 
affairs. This is when A externally relies upon E: externally, because it is beyond A’s 
awareness of what she is relying upon. 
 
What we have then is two types of reliance. One of these is an internal form that consists 
in our attitude toward a state of affairs in our plan, that we regard as meeting [Success 
Depends] and [Intentions Excluded]. Another consists in our standing in relation to a 
state of affairs; one that actually meets [Success Depends] and [Intentions Excluded]. 
 
Smith uses the internal/external reliance distinction to account for the possibility that we 
can be relying on states of  affairs without realising that we are. We can use the library 
example again to illustrate the intuition motivating this.23 Suppose that, in my plan to get 
                                                      
22 ‘A internally relies on E’ is elliptical for ‘A has a reliance attitude toward a proposition 
p that represents E such that it satisfies [Success Depends] and [Intentions Excluded]’. 
23 Smith’s own case is one where a woman named Mary, who knows nothing about 
aeronautical engineering, relies on the ‘stationary valve plate’ of a plane she plans to take 
from Los Angeles to New York. I avoid using this example because, based on a 
distinction between the concepts of relying on something and depending on it, that I 
argue for in chapter 6, this could qualify as a case of Mary depending on the 
plane/valve plate, rather than relying on it. That’s because the valve plate working 
becomes of non-instrumental concern for Mary: she fundamentally needs it to work, 
rather than needs it just for a goal she is pursuing, as (presumably) the plane will crash 
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to the library, I internally rely on my car’s functioning properly, because I regard the state 
of  affairs whereby my car functions properly as satisfying [Success Depends] and 
[Intentions Excluded]. But it is also the case that I don’t know very much about what it 
is for a car to function properly. In reality, for my car to function properly, the fuel injector 
needs to supply the engine cylinders with fuel, which is then subject to combustion. Let’s 
call this state of  affairs <Fuel-inject>. It is thus true of <Fuel-inject> that it is a necessary 
state of  affairs for my plan to be realised, and also one I do not intend to realise myself. 
Thus, <Fuel-inject> in fact satisfies both [Success Depends] and [Intentions Excluded], 
and I am externally relying on the fuel injector working. This is regardless of  whether I 
know what a fuel injector is, or what role it plays in the car’s engine functioning properly. 
Once I have a plan to take my car to the library, I am externally relying on those conditions 
that satisfy [Success Depends] and [Intentions Excluded], whether I regard those 
conditions as such. 
 
We can suppose that internal reliance should ‘track’ external reliance, if  we are properly 
attuned to what conditions satisfy [Success Depends] and [Intentions Excluded]. Suppose 
that I read about the inner workings of  car engines and come to learn about fuel injection. 
I will then not only be externally relying on <Fuel-inject>, but also internally. 
 
The claim that we can externally rely on certain states of  affairs can seem puzzling. It 
might be that we sometimes refer to ourselves as having been relying on certain things 
we didn’t realise we were relying on. It can be plausible to say that I didn’t realise I was 
relying on <Fuel-inject>, before I learned about fuel injectors. We might also refer to 
ourselves as having been unknowingly relying, in cases of  mistaken identity. These are 
cases where we don’t realise that we are relying on X as opposed to Y. Suppose, for 
example, that Matt takes it he has been relying on his employee Chris for the weekly 
financial reports, so has been internally relying on Chris. Instead of  Chris, though, 
another employee – Nick – has been completing the weekly financial reports for Matt, 
because Chris is too lazy. I think it is plausible that there is a sense in which Matt relies 
on Nick completing the financial reports, rather than Chris doing so, and the 
internal/external reliance distinction may be helpful here. 
 
                                                      
without it working. The library example I give illustrates the same point Smith wishes to 
make, without this complication. 
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A problem with external reliance however is that it arguably makes reliance too 
‘promiscuous’. In other words, we discover that there are many more things we are relying 
on than seems intuitive. Some of  these discovered reliances may be plausible, as in the 
above fuel injector and mistaken identity cases.  But others are much less plausible. 
Internal reliance ought to track external reliance, because by reflecting on our plans, we 
thereby come to regard ourselves as externally relying on things. Regarding ourselves as 
externally relying on things, is to internally rely on them. This has the consequence that 
we also internally rely on many more things than we should suppose, if  we (accurately) 
recognise we are externally relying on them. 
 
In the next section I set out different types of case that result from this ‘promiscuity’ 
problem. The objection ultimately seems to result in it being true that we are relying on 
an infinite number of states of affairs in our plans. This makes Smith’s account 
unattractive, since it is inappropriate or implausible to say that we rely on so many states 
of affairs in a mundane plan to e.g. do some food shopping. However, I will then argue 
in the next section (5.3.4) that the promiscuity objection leads to a dilemma for Smith’s 
account. The dilemma shows that Smith’s account is either incomplete, or that it makes 
reliance impossible. 
 
5.3.3 Promiscuity: past, background, negative states of affairs 
The promiscuity problem facing Smith’s account is that an innumerable amount of  states 
of  affairs in fact satisfy [Success Depends] and [Intentions Excluded], beyond what seems 
plausible. One type of  state of  affairs that does is certain past states of  affairs.  
 
It isn’t stipulated in Smith’s account that E must be a state of  affairs that is yet to be 
realised. As such, we could suppose that past states of  affairs that satisfy both [Success 
Depends] and [Intentions Excluded] are also what we externally (and so potentially 
internally) rely on. These can also be states of  affairs that are both necessary for our goals, 
and ones that, being already settled/fixed (having happened in the past), we cannot intend 
to realise ourselves. We could argue therefore that we rely on states of  affairs obtaining 
such as <our having been born> and <that we performed all the necessary past actions 
to enable this goal to be pursued>, within our plans, since these are also states of affairs 
that necessarily need to obtain, for particular goals to be realised. It may therefore turn 
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out that, in all our plans, we are each relying on the state of affairs <that our parents met> 
(hereafter: <Parents-met>), among an infinite number of other past states of affairs that 
had to obtain in the past, in order for our plan to be realised in future. This problem 
arises because, for us to figure in the goals we intend to bring about, then these long-past 
states of affairs, that enabled us to exist, had to obtain. They had to obtain, for us to be 
parts of the states of affairs we are trying to realise, in our plans.  
 
This result, that we rely on infinite past states affairs, is counter-intuitive. It would be an 
odd result of our account of reliance that, given some mundane intention to e.g. do some 
food shopping, we would be reporting accurately were we to say “I’m relying on having 
been born”, as part of that food shop. 
 
We may wish to appeal to the internal/external distinction to explain why we don’t rely 
on these past states of affairs. While it is true that we externally rely on them, we perhaps 
don’t have the cognitive capacity to pay attention to many of the states of affairs we do 
rely on externally. So, we don’t rely on these internally. But, the issue presented by these 
past states of affairs (and the further ‘promiscuous’ types discussed below) is not resolved 
by appealing to cognitive capacity to hold all the states of affairs we rely on, in awareness. 
Once we have noted that these past states of affairs satisfy [Success Depends] and 
[Intentions Excluded], then we should come to rely on them internally, no matter whether 
we forget that we do. 
 
For example, Matt can be relying on Chris to fill in the financial reports, without paying 
attention to this at every instant. It can be true of Matt that he is relying on Chris, even 
when he puts this to the back of his mind, and focuses on other aspects of running his 
business. And, once Matt is made aware of the fact that he relies on <Parents-met>, in 
running his business, this will permeate through to all his plans. This is because internal 
reliance tracks external reliance. The internal/external distinction will therefore not help 
us rule these past states of affairs out as reliances. Once we recognise such past states of 
affairs as both necessary and unable-to-intend, we come to rely on them internally as well 
as externally. That we don’t think of ourselves as relying on such past states of affairs in 
our plans, though, requires some explanation, which Smith’s account doesn’t give. 
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It might be thought that we can resolve this promiscuity issue by just stipulating that the 
states of affairs we can rely on are ones that are yet to be realized. As such, we could make 
it so that we read [Success Depends] in a certain way. [Success Depends] as it stands is 
“E obtaining is necessary for the successful realisation of  A’s plan”. Now, we could 
stipulate that for ‘E obtaining’, we restrict our account to states of  affairs that haven’t 
already obtained. We therefore limit candidate states of  affairs we rely on to those that 
may obtain in future. 
 
The difficulty with this suggestion is that it will rule out too many states of affairs that we 
can otherwise rely on. We can rely on certain states of affairs having obtained in the past, 
when those are states of affairs that remain to be seen as having been realised. It can 
therefore be true that we are relying on states of affairs having obtained in the past, albeit 
those that we are both unsure as to whether they occurred, and that our plan depends 
upon (i.e. they satisfy [Success Depends] and [Intentions Excluded]). For example:  
 
Hidden key 
 
John is on the train, returning to his flat after visiting his parents in another part 
of the country, but he has left his keys back at his parents’ home. He forewarns 
his flatmate Elis that he has left his keys at his parents’ home, and sends Elis a 
message asking him to hide their spare key just outside the door. John needs Elis 
to do this before Elis goes off to work, as by the time John arrives back, Elis 
won’t be able to let him in until much later. Elis says he will leave the key in the 
agreed spot. He then tells John that he’s about to head off to work so won’t be 
contactable. Once John arrives back at the flat, Elis is at work, and he has to rely 
on Elis having left their spare in the agreed hiding place. 
 
The Hidden Key case contains a state of affairs that we can call <Key-left>, i.e. Elis 
having left the key before he went off to work. This is a state of affairs that had to obtain 
in the past, which is necessary for the successful bringing about of John’s plan, and which 
John cannot intend to realise himself. It is therefore like the state of affairs ‘having been 
born’ (<Been-born>) in being a past state of affairs that satisfies [Success Depends] and 
[Intentions Excluded]. Yet, <Key-left> is unlike <Been-born>, because our intuitions 
strongly suggest that John relies on <Key-left>, but not <Been-born>, in his plan. So, 
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our suggestion that we should restrict the states of affairs at issue in [Success Depends] 
to states of affairs that may obtain in the future, as a way of avoiding the consequence 
that we rely on states of affairs like <Been-born> in all our plans, would be unhelpful: it 
would rule out too much. That’s because it would rule out states of affairs like <Key-
left>, that we can plausibly rely on in our current plans, despite their having obtained in 
the past. 
 
We might be tempted to suggest, of the Hidden Key case, that <Key-left> differs from 
states of affairs like <Been-born>, in that John is currently relying on the lasting effect 
of <Key-left>. That’s because John’s plan to get inside the home not only implicates 
<Key-left> as a state of affairs he relies on, but it also implicates the persisting effects of 
<Key-left>. This is because John needs it to be the case that <Key-left> hasn’t since 
been ‘overwritten’ by further events, such as a magpie finding the key and taking it back 
to its nest. 
 
The thought here is that we can treat events like <Key-left> and <Been-born> 
differently, such that there is some way we can refine Smith’s conditions for reliance. This 
is to avoid the result that <Been-born> is a state of affairs we are relying on, in all of our 
plans. However, pointing out that we rely on the persisting effects of <Key-left> will not 
help us rule out <Been-born> as a state of affairs we rely on. This is because the 
continuing lasting effects of <Been-born> also satisfy [Success Depends] and [Intentions 
Excluded]. All our plans depend upon, not just <Been-born>, but the lasting effect of 
<Been-born>; being alive and out in the world, able to pursue our plans. So, this 
suggestion will not help us narrow down, within the framework of Smith’s account, what 
makes <Key-left>, but not <Been-born>, a ripe candidate state of affairs for reliance. 
Just ruling out states of affairs that obtained in the past as viable candidates, will do away 
with ones we can plausibly rely on, like <Key-left>. 
 
The point just made, about lasting effects of past states of affairs being relied upon, helps 
to indicate a further category of states of affairs, that pose a promiscuity problem for 
Smith’s account. I’ll refer to these as ‘background’ states of affairs. Consider that there 
will be an infinite amount of fine-grained physical conditions that have to be in place, for 
us to be able to pursue any of our plans. This will include very fundamental states of 
affairs that have to persist, such as <that current physical laws of nature continue to 
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hold>. If physical laws were to change such that e.g. atoms could no longer form bonds 
and molecules, then our plans would not be able to be realised. The plans we pursue in 
everyday life are also dependent upon the continuing availability of food and water 
(necessary for the lasting effects of <Been-born> to continue being sustained), and these 
depend upon many background biochemical processes. These processes represent states 
of affairs that must be realised for our plans to be successful, and that we do not intend 
to realise ourselves (because in most cases we cannot). As a result, we externally rely on 
these states of affairs in all our plans. Then, once we recognise this fact, we internally rely 
on them too, in all our plans. Again, as with past states of affairs such as <Been-born>, 
it seems implausible that we are relying on such background states of affairs, in every one 
of our plans. 
  
The kind of ‘background’ states of affairs discussed in the previous section are further 
multiplied, once we consider the possibility of ‘negative’ states of affairs that have to 
continue to obtain. For example, for any plan we have, we rely on it being the case that a 
disabling illness doesn’t take hold of us, at each instant of time within that plan. Within 
our plans, there are an infinite number of ‘not being the case that’ states of affairs that 
will meet [Success Depends] and [Intentions Excluded]. Yet, intuitively, these are not 
things that we rely on, in our plans. Smith’s account lacks an explanation of why such a 
narrow selection of states of affairs, that otherwise meet the conditions for reliance, are 
the privileged selection that strike a chord with our intuitions. 
 
5.3.4 Luck cases: a dilemma for Smith’s account 
An additional category of promiscuous reliances affects Smith’s account. This is the 
category of ‘lucky’ states of affairs. What do I mean by lucky states of affairs? Consider 
the following variant of the Hidden Key case:  
 
Elis forgets 
 
John takes it that Elis leaving the key for him is necessary for being able to get 
back  into the flat. Elis does put the spare key in his back pocket on his way out 
of the flat, with the intention of placing it in the hiding place before he goes to 
work. After locking the door, however, Elis forgets to leave the key in the hiding 
  122 
place. He takes it with him. But then, through a random sequence of events, the 
key finds its way back to the exact hiding spot just in time for John to find it. The 
random sequence of events is this: Elis gets halfway to work, and the key falls out 
of his back pocket. At that time, a magpie that nests near to Elis & John’s flat 
happens to be looking for food, right where the key falls out of Elis’ pocket; a 
location that is 4 miles from the flat. The magpie picks up the key to return to the 
nest. However, it falls out of the magpie’s nest, and lands on the pavement on the 
street. A passing child kicks the key, and it lands in the hiding spot, ready for John 
to find it. John does find it, and enters his flat. 
 
Each step in the convoluted causal history following Elis’ putting the key in his back 
pocket, appears to count as a state of affairs that satisfies [Success Depends] and 
[Intentions Excluded]. Each step is, after all, in fact necessary for John to be able to enter 
his flat, and John could not intend to bring each step about himself. However, it is 
implausible that such ‘lucky’ states of affairs could be ones that John is externally relying 
on, within his plan to get home. We don’t tend to consider random lucky events as 
possibilities, when determining what we are relying upon, in our plans. But then Smith’s 
account of reliance must be wrong-footed, because it leads to implausible reliances. 
 
Perhaps we could simply bite the bullet, and suggest that these states of affairs – Elis 
dropping the key, the magpie bringing it back, it falling out of the nest, the child kicking 
it – are all externally relied upon. They meet the requirements posed by [Success Depends] 
and [Intentions Excluded], after all. If we wish to bite the bullet, though, a more 
fundamental problem with Smith’s account arises. This is the problem that, if we wish to 
argue that lucky states of affairs can be necessary for goal realisation, we are led to 
conclude that there are arguably no states of affairs we can rely on, because we can’t take 
any to be necessary for goal realisation. 
 
Consider why we would initially identify a particular state of affairs like Elis leaving the 
key for John <Key-left> as necessary for John to enter his flat. We do so because we 
tacitly rule out random lucky alternatives, as salient possible contingencies. In other 
words, we suppose that <Key-left> is necessary, because we rule out the possibility that 
Elis will drop the key, that the magpie will bring it back, that it will fall out of the nest, 
and that there will be a child to kick it back into place. Yet, if we bite the bullet on cases 
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like Elis forgets, we admit that we can be wrong to rule these random lucky alternatives 
out. It’s possible, after all, that they could be the states of affairs that bring about our 
plan. But then, there is a crucial concession to random possibilities. Once we consider 
any one particular sequence of lucky events as a salient possibility, we open the door to 
considering an endless number of others. This undermines our ability to identify one such 
sequence of states of affairs as necessary for goal realisation. Thus, there no states of affairs 
we can rightly regard as meeting [Success Depends]. As such, we don’t externally rely on 
any states of affairs. Because internal reliance ought to track external reliance, then if we 
are accurately reflecting on our plans, we should recognise that we rely on nothing. If we 
do regard ourselves as relying on anything, this is an error. 
 
So, the luck cases present a dilemma for Smith’s account. If we deny that they are 
reliances, then Smith’s account must be implausible and incomplete. If we try to accept 
that they are reliances, we make a concession to random lucky possibilities. But if we do 
that, we are no longer warranted in calling any particular state of affairs necessary for our 
goal to be brought about. The possibility of any state of affairs meeting [Success Depends] 
is therefore undermined, and thus the possibility of external reliance, and accurate internal 
reliance. 
 
This dilemma arises because Smith’s account holds that reliance is ultimately a relation 
between an agent and a state of affairs. The state of affairs is one that is necessary for the 
realisation of the agent’s goal (and which satisfies [Intentions Excluded]). Notice, 
however, that the states of affairs we identify as necessary for the agent’s goal, needn’t be 
those we identify as necessary for the success of the agent’s own actions, which are directed 
toward that goal. There is a difference between the states of affairs that are necessary for 
the agent’s end goal (that her actions are directed toward) to be successfully realised, and 
those that are necessary for the agent’s goal-directed activity being fruitful. In the Elis forgets 
case, John’s activity (i.e. asking Elis to leave the key) doesn’t go toward achieving his goal. 
Rather, luck does, so the random states of affairs that occur through luck are necessary 
for John’s goal being successfully realised. John’s activities toward achieving his goal are 
ineffective in bringing about his goal. Yet this doesn’t matter because the random lucky 
events of Elis forgets transpire. 
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This points to the underlying problem with Smith’s account. What John relies on, on 
Smith’s account, isn’t a question of what John does toward his goal. At first glance, it 
appears to be that what John relies on, on Smith’s account, is a matter of what John does. 
But, that is because we approach particular example cases with assumptions that certain 
possibilities, like those in Elis forgets, are not salient. We go into the Elis forgets case with 
a working schema for what events are likely to occur; what events will follow what. Then, 
when we present the possibility of lucky events realising a goal, regardless of what the 
agent pursuing that goal does, we show our inability to legislate over which states of 
affairs will turn out to be the ones that were necessary, for the agent’s goal being realised. 
The floodgates are thus opened to no particular state of affairs being necessary, because 
we now have no principled reason to say that e.g. the child kicking the key into the hiding 
place was necessary, vs. e.g. a cat playing with the key and flinging it into the hiding place, 
or even the door to the flat unlocking itself before John arrives back, triggered by a strong 
gust of wind and a design flaw. 
 
The problem lies in making John’s own goal-directed activity irrelevant to what he is 
relying on. I take it that we are more inclined to say that John was relying on Elis to leave 
the key, as opposed to that John was relying on the lucky states of affairs. I also presume 
we are not mistaken about this. I also take it that John is relying on Elis to leave the key, 
regardless of whether luck intervenes. This can only be so if what John relies on is a 
matter of what John’s activity toward his goal consists in. His reliance on Elis’ leaving the 
key can go unfulfilled, yet his goal can be successfully brought about anyway. The 
problem of lucky states of affairs shows that Smith’s account cleaves a gap between 
reliance and the agent’s goal-directed activity. 
  
 
5.4 Reliance as role placement in an activity 
In this section I present my positive account of reliance, which is poised to avoid the 
dilemma affecting Smith’s account, while also respecting the intuition that reliance 
involves practical dependence. It does this by holding that reliance is not an attitude we 
adopt toward states of affairs, within a plan. Rather, reliance is a product of our goal-
directed activity. 
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To illustrate the account, I will use a variation of the ‘library book’ example from above, 
where I aimed to return my book before the library closed, to avoid a fine: 
 
Library break-in 
 
It is now late at night, past the time of the library closing, but I know that to 
avoid the fine I must place the book I have in the returns box, before morning. 
I bring my night-vision goggles and lock-pick, so I can break in to the library. 
Suppose that I regard the library having an open point of entry as necessary for 
me to avoid the fine. I need to deposit the book in the library’s returns box, 
after all. But, I also intend to ensure that the library has an open point of entry, 
by picking a lock. 
 
Reliance is the result of goal-directed activity. Specifically, it involves particular sorts of 
mental processes and corresponding physical processes. Because it springs from the 
process of pursuing goals, whereby we exploit things in the environment around us for 
different practical purposes. As a result, it can take a different sort of object from a state 
of affairs. It can take actual objects (e.g. the lock-pick), people (e.g. an accomplice), 
properties of objects and people (e.g. e.g. the sturdiness of the lock-pick, your 
accomplice’s tenacity), ‘abstract’ objects (e.g. your sense of touch in detecting when a pin 
has been ‘popped’ in the lock) and conditions of the environment (e.g. the cover of 
darkness). The things we rely on are what we are in sensory contact with, at some level. 
 
To help encapsulate the view: we rely based on what objects, people, features of the 
environment, we are in the process of harnessing, for pursuit of our ends, in goal-directed 
activities. We rely on things insofar as we place those things in roles, that serve to further 
the pursuit of our goals. What we rely on is a matter of what we are placing in a role 
toward achieving our goal. We rely on things, to perform roles, toward goals. Reliance 
therefore has a structure: agent-object-role-goal. 
 
‘Harnessing’ and ‘placing’ are not meant literally. By harnessing I don’t mean attaching a 
physical harness to an object, and by placing I don’t mean physically putting an object in 
a particular spatial location (though this is sometimes done in order to place in the 
figurative sense at issue). What I mean is that, by acting in a way such that our own activity 
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toward a goal is informed by the causal inputs of certain things, such that those things 
are primed to contribute to bringing about our goals, then we rely on those things. In 
other words, we make use of objects of reliance. The sense of ‘using’ at issue encompasses 
using from a distance, indirectly, not (necessarily) through directly physical manipulation. 
 
To help explain what I mean: recall how Kant’s neighbours relied on Kant for their 
timekeeping. When they rely on Kant, they harness Kant’s walking. Kant’s walking is a 
feature of their environment that is already going on, available to be made use of. To do 
this - to harness it - all Kant’s neighbours need to do is time monitor for/check for Kant’s 
walking as a trigger for when to undertake their own actions. So, by acting in some sense 
‘around’ Kant’s walking, Kant’s walk informs their own routines. It takes on the role of 
regulating their own activities, in serving their goal of having their own activities be 
properly co-ordinated. By acting in a certain way, they place a regular feature of their 
environment– Kant’s walking – in a role, within their goal-directed activity. 
 
Suppose that we rely on our alarm clock to wake us up in the morning. To rely on it, we 
place it in the role of waking us up, refraining from implementing other measures to wake 
us up, when proceeding to go to bed. Our goal is to wake up with enough time to get 
ready in the morning, so we are not late for work. 
 
So, when we rely on something, we create a role – a gap in the progression toward our 
goal – that an object of reliance, through its properties, is placed to fulfil. In a sense then, 
harnessing/placing means making use of the objects of reliance, by acting around them. 
 
We can use the library break-in case as an additional source of examples. Suppose that I 
am now outside of the library, equipped with my lock-picking kit. In this case, I am in the 
process of looking for a lock I can pick open. This is a complex process, involving 
physical and mental activities. I scan my environment for salient candidate locks and make 
inferences about likely locations of less secure locks. What I am relying on, are all those 
things I am harnessing, that I have placed in a role, in respect of how I am going about 
pursuing my current goal (depositing the book). Things I am harnessing include my 
sensory faculties, my night-vision goggles, and my lock-pick. These are primed and ready 
to be activated in the roles given to them, when required. I also harness the shadows 
outside of the library, to move about unseen. I harness these things by undertaking 
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coordinated, complex movements, that are ‘shaped’ (informed by, directed by) their 
input. I am sensitive to the placement of the things I am harnessing, in respect of there 
being a sensory link between my activity and these things. Placing an object in a role, 
means acting in a coordinated way, so as to be able to make use of the effects that object 
is able to have on the environment. This makes it so the object is ready to causally 
contribute to your goal being realised. 
  
This view of reliance, as an activity of role placement, allows us to articulate what sort of 
phenomenon reliance is, in a way that respects our everyday reliance talk. We can see how 
we can talk about e.g. relying on our bank cards to purchase goods, that we are relying on 
our friend to meet us for lunch, that we are relying on our satnav to get us home. Our 
bank cards are, by how we exploit them, placed in a role of allowing us to access goods 
and services in many domains. Our broader goal-directed activity is to acquire things we 
need. Our friend has a role in ensuring we eat lunch together (something we want to do). 
And, our satnav has the role of giving us instructions on which direction to take when 
driving, with the goal being to arrive at our destination. Even though, in each of these 
cases, we must undertake coordinated goal-directed activity so that these things are 
harnessed in some way, we don’t have to overly ‘mentalise’, what we do in relying on 
those things. Reliance isn’t purely a product of what is in the head, because it is more 
fundamentally a product of how we harness things in goal-directed activity. 
 
The role placement view doesn’t require us to talk in terms of reliance being an attitude 
held toward a proposition, representing a state of affairs. We don’t have to therefore 
suppose that, when I am relying on the night-vision goggles I use during my break-in, I 
am, throughout the break-in, holding a representational attitude toward it being the case that 
the night vision goggles will allow me to see. To rely on the night-vision goggles, I don’t 
need to hold conceptual representations of the night-vision goggles and their relationship 
with my seeing. If I were to be lost in the flow of activity such that I forget entirely that 
I am wearing night-vision goggles, this wouldn’t defeat the fact that I am relying on them 
at that point. Instead, the fact that I am relying on the night-vision goggles simply falls 
out of the way I am pursuing my goal; that I am harnessing the night-vision goggles, 
proceeding in such a way that they are influencing my activity, which is built around and 
shaped by their presence. 
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As Railton (2014) suggests, reliance can be a ‘low-level’, pre-conceptual mental process, 
not at the level of conscious awareness, that can be manifested in relatively cognitively 
unsophisticated agents. The role placement view corresponds with this. All that is 
required for an agent to be able to rely, is that the agent is in sensory contact with things 
in its environment, and able to undertake goal-directed activity, geared toward harnessing 
those things. Railton gives examples of primitive reliance on sensory faculties; an infant 
relying on her sense of balance to walk, and a hamster relying on his sense of touch when 
navigating a passageway in the dark (2014 : p.124). In these cases, it seems natural to say 
that the hamster and infant are relying on these sensory faculties, without holding 
conceptual representations of those faculties. What is true however is that the infant, by 
acting in a way that is informed and directed by the sensory feedback from her sense of 
balance, accords her sense of balance a role in pursuing her activity of walking. The same 
is true of the hamster. 
 
I suggest that the features of these primitive cases, that tempt us to attribute the concept 
‘reliance’ to them, are features replicated in more cognitively sophisticated forms of 
relying. As such there is a common structure underpinning reliance, as a form of activity, 
regardless of how much that activity is informed by high-level conceptual representations. 
For one, the role placement of the hamster’s sense of touch mimics the role placement 
of the lock-pick, as a tool I harness in probing the library’s entrances, and the role 
placement of the shadows that I move within, to avoid being spotted. 
 
An aspect of the sensory link between our activity and the things we rely on, is being 
disposed to ‘look to’, ‘return to’, or ‘appeal to’ what we are harnessing, just in case our 
activity stalls or begins to veer off target. This disposition reflects having placed things in 
practical roles. By ‘looking to’ or ‘returning to’ I mean turning our attention toward the 
thing relied on, when our goal-directed activity stalls or veers off target. It can also involve 
ongoing mental processes of monitoring or checking that the thing relied on remains placed 
in its role. When it isn’t clear why some activity veers off target, we can be disposed to 
check whether this is due to something failing to perform a role. Should that be the case, 
we may attempt to re-engage the relied-on object in performing the role it was placed in. 
 
Suppose, for instance, that I am looking for a lock to pick, making use of my night-vision 
goggles. Should the night-vision goggles glitch, so that I can’t see my way around in the 
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dark, my activity will be disrupted. I will then direct my attention toward the resulting 
lack of input from an object (the night vision goggles) that was playing a role (enhancing 
vision) in enabling me to pursue my goal. I may attempt to get the night-vision goggles 
to work again. That is, if I wish to continue pursuing my goal in the same way I was 
before, by continuing to give that pair of night-vision goggles a role. I may try to press 
on without relying on the night-vision goggles, allowing my eyes to adjust to the darkness. 
My non-reliance on the night-vision goggles will be a matter of my activity no longer 
affording the night-vision goggles a role, because I am pursuing my goal without using 
them. 
 
It’s possible that we attempt to re-engage the relied-on object by trying to continue in the 
same way as before. We might do this when our car starts to falter; we try to carry on 
driving toward our destination. Similarly, when Railton’s hamster is relying on its sense 
of touch to navigate a maze in the dark, the hamster is paying attention to the sensory 
feedback from its feet and whiskers. This feedback informs the hamster’s ability to make 
progress. Should it lose sensation from its whiskers, the hamster will be much less 
capable, probably at a loss. It will likely try to proceed in the same way, but it will be doing 
so through a habitual routine of actions, that are normally informed by anticipated input 
from its whiskers. Because of the loss of this input, its actions will be thrown off target 
and misjudged. After a time of attempting to proceed in a way that is geared around the 
input from whiskers, and being continually thrown off, the hamster will learn to attempt 
to disengage the input from its whiskers, and may try to harness other means of 
navigating. To no longer be relying on its whiskers, the hamster will have to adjust how 
it proceeds in activity, so that a practical role for input from its whiskers is no longer a 
required part of that activity.24 
 
                                                      
24 I’ve said previously that reliance isn’t an anticipatory attitude. Yet I have mentioned 
that reliance involves anticipating inputs from objects. But there is an important 
distinction at issue, in terms of what is anticipated. To rely on X to φ, we have to 
anticipate the possibility of X φ’ing. Minimal levels of anticipation make reliance possible. 
To rely on X to φ, we have to anticipate the possibility that X can perform the role of 
φ’ing. But the level of anticipation required can be minimal: we don’t need to anticipate 
that X will perform that role, just that it could. As our pessimism about X’s being able to 
φ increases, we will begin to increasingly monitor it, and will likely remove it from the 
role. Once we anticipate that X positively cannot perform the role, we are unable to rely 
on it. 
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This disposition to ‘return to’ or appeal to the object of reliance is also present when we 
are relying on people to do things. Suppose that Justina is relying on her colleague Cam 
to warn any of Justina’s clients that appear at her office today, that she is unable to hold 
any meetings today, as she has too heavy a workload. When Justina’s clients keep 
appearing at her office, she will look to Cam and attempt to re-engage her in that role of 
warning clients of her unavailability (by, e.g., asking her whether she has been doing this, 
and if not, to ask her please remember to do it). That’s because Justina has placed Cam 
in the role of warning clients, so that she can meet her workload. When this activity begins 
to be disrupted by clients, she looks to Cam. 
 
The object-role-goal structure of reliance also explains how we can avoid relying solely 
on particular objects. We can place objects in such a way that the role being fulfilled 
doesn’t rest on a particular object performing that role. That’s because we can implement 
fail-safes, that are placed to fulfil a role, should one object fail to perform the role. For 
example, suppose that when you are writing a long document, you need to be able to save 
your work. As such, you rely on something to store your work. Now, suppose you have 
a system that creates two backup copies of your writing, on two different storage devices, 
on a rolling basis. When you save a copy of your current document to your own hard-
drive, it also simultaneously uploads to a cloud storage drive. As a result, there isn’t one 
particular drive that is placed to fulfil the role of saving your work. We therefore wouldn’t 
say that you’re relying solely on the physical drive to save your work, or the cloud drive. 
You do rely on the overall system to save your work, but not a particular drive within that 
system. That’s because there are two devices placed in that role. 
 
So it can be with relying on people. Suppose Justina, in addition to telling Cam that she 
cannot see any clients today, also tells Ruth. As such, Justina has placed both Cam and 
Ruth in the role of warning her clients of her unavailability. She doesn’t solely rely on 
either Cam or Ruth to perform that role, but she relies on at least one of them to perform 
that role. 
 
5.4.1 States of affairs on the role placement view 
 
The role placement view also allows that we rely on states of affairs à la  
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 the propositional reliance of acceptance and Smith’s internal/external reliance. I suggest 
that what we can do, in the flow of activity, is rely on ‘potentials’; possibilities of enabling 
conditions for our goals, being made actual/realised.25 
 
We can rely on there being certain conditions of the environment (e.g. there being a lock to 
pick), or some particular object being some way (e.g. the last lock I find being amenable 
to picking). This can be because, when we anticipate the possibility of something being so, 
that would enable us to progress toward our goal, what we can do is place that potential 
in a practical role. We do that by acting in such a way that, if that condition is satisfied, 
then our goal will be furthered. This still means that reliance is a product of our activity, 
rather than as a proposition or state of affairs within a plan. The activity is just shaped 
around the potential for that condition of the environment being so. 
 
For instance, when I am in the process of looking for a locked window or door, I am 
seeking out a potential opening; one that I can make into an actual opening, using my 
lock-pick. What I am doing is looking for a feature of the local environment – a locked 
window or door that can be opened – to play a role in bringing about my goal. As such, 
I am relying on there being a locked window or door that can be opened, because this 
potential is what I have placed in a practical role, based on how I am pursuing my goal 
of getting in. This sort of reliance is picked out when we say that we rely on ‘there being’ 
such-and-such, or ‘<an object> being’ such-and-such. Reliance on potentials also follows 
the same shape as the role placement/harnessing model. These potentials are what we 
anticipate as, at some minimal level, possibly holding. We needn’t be assured to any 
particular extent that these potentials/enabling conditions are in place, in order to rely on 
them being in place. We could also anticipate them not holding, yet still rely on them being 
in place. That’s because, to rely on them, we just need to be acting in a way that means 
we place an enabling condition in a practical role, that will need to be activated at some 
point, if our goal is to be carried off. 
 
We have an enabling condition in the library break-in case: I am relying on there being a 
lock I can pick. That’s because, based on how I am proceeding toward my goal, in looking 
for locks to pick, I am looking for a lock to fulfil the practical role of a lock I can pick. 
                                                      
25 As in the Hidden Key case from before, these can be conditions that remain to be seen 
as holding, even if they are the product of past events. 
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That role is there, just as a result how I am currently seeking to gain entry. This doesn’t 
mean I am relying on a particular lock being able to be opened. That’s because, in the 
process of seeking one, I am relying on the potential for there being one. Once I have 
tried all the locks but one, I am relying on that final lock being the one I can open. 
 
The possibility of reliance on potentials requires that I refine my stipulation that we are 
in sensory contact with those things we rely on, because it can be that we aren’t yet in 
sensory contact with what we are relying on. It can be that we haven’t yet had the thing 
we are relying on, actually make a causal contribution. Yet we can infer the future 
possibility of that potential being brought about. What reliance on potentials amounts to 
is proceeding in activity in such a way that a gap is created – a role to be fulfilled – that 
we judge the potential will fulfil, once it is actualised. This involves minimal level of 
anticipation of the potential: it involves anticipation of the possibility of that potential, 
being actual. When we are judging things accurately, our goal-directed activity will be 
pulled off, because that potential, when realised, will be able to causally contribute to our 
goal. That’s due to our having created a role for it. We can act in a way that creates the 
possibility of future sensory contact with that potential we are relying on, without yet 
having sensory contact with that potential. 
 
5.4.2 Accounting for intuitions & problems in other accounts 
 
The role placement view accounts for the intuition underpinning the acceptance view, 
that relying involves ‘taking it for granted’ that some object will do something, or that 
some state of affairs will be the case. On the role placement view, though, ‘taking it for 
granted’ or ‘accepting’ falls out of a mode of goal-directed activity, rather than requiring 
a subject to have a mental attitude of assuming a state of affairs obtains. When we rely 
on a rope to ascend a cliff, for instance, we proceed in a mode of acting, such that the 
rope plays a practical role in our pursuit of our goal to ascend the cliff. Our mode of 
acting involves using the rope, to ascend the cliff. Taking it for granted that the rope will 
perform this role, in this sense, doesn’t have to be particularly cognitively elaborate. It 
isn’t a matter of our representing a state of affairs, in a propositional attitude (i.e. ‘relying 
upon it being the case that the rope holds our weight throughout the ascent’), that we 
assume holds, before proceeding to climb. Taking it for granted, instead, falls out of how 
we act. We can climb the rope in a panic. Once we reach the top, step back and reflect 
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on what role the rope was playing, by how we’d acted, we can describe what we were 
doing in terms of having taken it for granted that the rope will allow us to ascend the cliff. 
Just climbing the rope can occur prior to this propositional, reflective, plan-theoretic 
‘taking it for granted’ attitude. And, climbing the rope, no matter how hesitant we are, is 
how we rely on it. 
 
The role placement view also respects the intuition that reliance involves practical 
dependence (defended in 4.7.2). Reliance involves placing objects in roles, so that they 
are primed to contribute to furthering some goal. When we rely on things, we rely on 
them actually performing those roles. Our goal-directed activity being fruitful, then, 
depends on those things performing those roles. This point also accounts for how ‘taking 
it for granted’ isn’t enough for reliance. For example, the city planner takes it for granted 
that the town will at some point be hit by a hurricane. Taking this for granted doesn’t 
entail reliance on being hit by a hurricane. That’s because reliance requires harnessing 
things, possibilities, in the pursuit of our ends, so that they contribute to furthering our 
goals. The city planner doesn’t harness the hurricane for some end; she takes steps to 
mitigate the impact of the possible hurricane on the city. 
 
The role placement view may also help explain why external reliance, in Smith’s account, 
could be attractive, when considering certain types of case. External reliance was invoked 
to make sense of cases where we e.g. might say we are relying on the car’s fuel injector, 
as part of relying on the car to function properly. By relying on the car to work, so 
performing the role of getting us from A to B, the fuel-injector is a component part of 
this working. The fuel injector itself has a role in the functioning of the engine, and thus 
the car. The role placement view sheds light on why we may have had this intuition. By 
placing the car in that practical role, the fuel injector is in a sense also part of that role, by 
being a part of the object playing that role. 
 
However, the role placement view also explains the intuition that there is something not 
quite right in saying that a person who has no knowledge of the car’s inner workings is 
relying on the fuel injector. This is because the person who has no knowledge of the car’s 
inner workings is not placing the fuel injector per se in a practical role, even if she places 
the car in a practical role. She doesn’t place the fuel injector in a role because her goal-
directed activity is not sensitive to, informed by, determined by, the fuel injector. Should 
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the car break down, she will be at a loss as to what to do next. She will not return to the 
fuel injector or attempt to engage with it, because she won’t know what it is. Role 
placement requires a sensory link to those things we place in roles, and an aspect of that 
is the disposition to look to whether those things have retained their placement, should 
our goal-directed activity hit a complication.  
 
External reliance was also supposed to explain how we can be relying on particular objects 
in mistaken identity cases. One way the role placement view can shed light on such cases 
is as follows. It may be that, for example, Matt takes it that the employee he is relying on 
for the financial reports, is called Chris. But in fact, this employee is called Nick. So, even 
though Matt may attach the name ‘Chris’ to the employee he looks to for the financial 
reports, the actual name of this employee is not as relevant as to Matt’s reliance, as to 
which person he has actually placed in the role of delivering the financial reports (where 
role placement in this case also takes on a literal sense, within the workplace context). 
That’s because, essential to reliance, is the practical activity structure of harnessed object-
role-goal. What object has been placed in the role is more important than what term the 
agent uses to refer to that object. We’re warranted in saying that Matt relies on Nick, 
rather than Chris, because Matt looks to Nick for those reports; Chris is a different 
employee altogether.26 Matt is just mistaken about what the object he relies on is called. 
This mistake may of course lead, in the long run, to difficulties in keeping the actual 
employee he relies on – Nick – effectively placed in that role. That’s because the name 
Matt uses to refer to that employee will potentially lead to confusion from others, about 
who needs to do the financial reports. Chris may start filling in the financial reports, 
hearing that Matt is counting on him, and Nick may presume he’s been removed from 
that task, but not been told directly, so step back. 
 
The role placement view also avoids the complications of Smith’s view, that reliance 
seems to be extremely promiscuous. In terms of past states of affairs like ‘having been 
born’ (<Been-born>), the role placement view can account for why this is not a condition 
we are relying upon for the pursuit of a goal. That’s because we don’t, through our 
activity, place the potential for <Been-born> being true in a practical role in bringing 
                                                      
26 If Matt says “I rely on Chris for my financial reports”, my intuition is that he has said 
something false, because he actually relies on Nick. In Matt’s statement, ‘Chris’ still 
serves to pick out Chris, rather than Nick.  
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about our goals. Rather, the possibility of our having goals in the first place is premised 
on our having been born. <Been-born> (and its continuing effects) are conditions that 
enable the possibility of the sort of goal-directed activity that reliance springs from. 
Furthermore, the role placement view is also able to explain why we can rely on certain 
past states of affairs, like those in cases like Hidden key. In that case, John relies on Elis to 
have left the key to their flat in the agreed hiding place. These are cases where we create 
a role in our current goal-directed activity, for a past state of affairs being realised. Elis 
leaving the key has a role to play, based on how John proceeds toward his aim of getting 
back into the flat. 
 
The role placement view also accounts for our intuitions that suggesting background 
states of affairs, like ‘photosynthesis continuing to occur’, and ‘the Earth continuing to 
revolve around the Sun’, are not obviously relied upon. These potentials are not typically 
given a practical role – an opening to fulfil – in our activity. Instead, they underpin the 
possibility of our activity as a whole, as a background condition of all of it. Unless we 
harness photosynthesis or the Earth’s continual travel around the Sun for some particular 
goal we are pursuing, then there is something not quite about saying we rely on these 
things. 
 
‘Negative’ states of affairs, such as ‘not being struck by a debilitating illness’, can be 
potentials we are relying on. That is so, if we are at some level disposed to check or 
monitor for the these negative potentials being overridden, such that the condition we 
wish to avoid comes about, in some activity we are pursuing. Someone with a fear of 
being unwell in public may, in leaving the house to go food shopping, be monitoring and 
checking for indications that she is about to be unwell, throughout her shop. In doing 
this, she is checking that what she is relying on – not being ill, or being well – remains 
fulfilling the role it has. Similarly, in the Library break-in case, I am relying on the lock-pick 
not breaking, if I’m disposed to monitor that this condition remains fulfilled. 
 
The dilemma presented by ‘lucky’ states of affairs for Smith’s account doesn’t threaten 
the role placement view. That dilemma resulted because Smith’s account allowed that 
reliance was not a matter of what activity the agent pursues toward her plan. The role 
placement view avoids this by ensuring that reliance is grounded in our goal-directed 
activity. It is a matter of what things we harness, by giving them practical roles in pursuit 
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of our goals. As such, whether lucky circumstances befall us in carrying out our plans is 
irrelevant to what we were relying on, even if those lucky circumstances turn out to be 
necessary for our goal being realised. 
 
 
5.4.3 Progressive and habitual reliance 
 
The role placement view, in holding that reliance is borne from activity, also helps explain 
an important feature of our reliance talk. What it explains is how we can refer to reliance 
in both the progressive and habitual aspect. Recall the discussion of verb aspect from section 
4.5.2. Reliance is an activity. This makes it unlike assurance, which is a state. Because it is 
an activity, we report our reliance using the progressive aspect. This is also how we report 
activities that are unfolding. Just as we say that we are running, that we are writing a book, 
we can say we are relying on our satnav to guide us to the destination. Here, the 
progressive verb form indicates that we are undertaking a kind of activity. 
 
Of course, we don’t always report that we are relying. We sometimes say we rely. This may 
indicate that reliance can also be a state. However, because reliance is a form of activity, 
this verb form doesn’t serve to indicate a mental state. Rather, it indicates a habit: it is 
taking the habitual aspect. Just as we can say we run, or that we write books, we can say 
we rely on our satnav to guide us. By using the stative form, we report a feature of our 
broader activities over time; a kind of habit or regularity. When we say ‘I rely on my 
satnav’, we use the habitual aspect to report that the satnav regularly takes on a role, as 
part of our broader activity over time. 
 
That said, ‘I rely on my satnav’ can also be read using the simple present tense. This would 
report that I am do something in the moment, but conveying a sense of instantaneous 
time, rather than a sense of time unfolding (as though I am reporting on my activity more 
detachedly; ‘outside’ of time). To distinguish the habitual from the simple present, we can 
bring out the habitual aspect using ‘regularity’ indicating adverbs such as ‘often’, 
‘sometimes’. For example, ‘I sometimes rely on my satnav to guide me’ would convey the 
habitual. That said, when we use the simple present, in ‘I rely on my satnav’, this still 
reports an activity. In addition, our ability to report reliance using both progressive and 
habitual aspects should reflect that reliance is a form of activity. 
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Smith’s account construes reliance as an attitude found in a plan, as do acceptance views. 
These views of reliance are thus supposed to construe reliance as a mental state, because 
plans are construed as mental states. It might be argued that these views still explain how 
the progressive and habitual is used in our reliance talk, without invoking the claim that 
reliance is an activity, rather than a mental state. That’s because we can also report our 
intentions and plans using the progressive aspect. We can say, for example, that we are 
intending to go to the doctors tomorrow, or planning on visiting our friend soon. Because 
such expressions are commonplace, the argument can be made that, because we can 
report intentions and plans using the progressive, and these are mental states, then the 
progressive being used to report reliance needn’t indicate that an activity is going on. 
Thus, it seems that use of the progressive is compatible with reliance being a state, rather 
than an activity. 
 
However, we can argue that, when we are reporting truthfully that we are intending to 
read that book, or planning on visiting that friend, this does serve to indicate that we are 
engaged in form of activity. By using the progressive aspect to describe our intention, we 
report we are now in process of pursuing our goal, in regulating our activities in line with 
future achievement of that goal. This needn’t mean we are actively pursuing the goal, by 
undertaking actions directly toward that goal. We may be passively pursuing it, perhaps 
still figuring out the steps to take. For instance, I needn’t be in the process of driving to 
the doctors, or booking the train tickets to see my friend. We can be passively pursuing a 
goal, but still be pursuing it. We might be waiting for certain events to unfold. Waiting 
typically involves mental activities of monitoring for passing of time, looking for 
particular ‘windows of opportunity’ to open, in which particular actions can then have an 
effect in bringing us closer to our goal. When I am intending to go to the doctors 
tomorrow, active pursual of the goal will involve taking certain steps, like setting an alarm 
now to wake me up in time for the opening of the surgery, so I can book an appointment 
for the same day. I will also keep track of my other activities so that they are compatible 
with me waking up in time, e.g. not drinking too much alcohol tonight, which would 
make me more likely to sleep through or ignore the alarm. This is, at least, if I am 
reporting accurately that I am intending to go to the doctors tomorrow. 
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In effect, then, that we can report our intentions and plans using the progressive doesn’t 
serve to undermine my claim that reliance is a form of activity. That’s because we have 
reason to suppose that, when we use the progressive to report an intention or plan, we 
are reporting that we are in the process of pursuing some goal, in the sense of taking steps 
toward it, and refraining from activity that would be incompatible with it.  
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6 Dependence 
In this brief  chapter, I draw a distinction between the concepts of  reliance on things and 
dependence on things, when applied to agents as subjects. This distinction will become 
more important in chapter 8, as I outline what the interpersonal import of  the trust stance 
consists in. The interpersonal import of  the trust stance, I argue, stems from 
interpersonal dependence, not just interpersonal reliance.  
 
My proposal in this chapter summarised: The kind of  dependence at issue in reliance is 
due to an agent’s choice to pursue a goal in some way. Relied-on things are of  instrumental 
need, so of  instrumental concern to the agent. A more basic sense of  dependence applies 
to things the agent needs non-instrumentally. So, having those things is of  non-
instrumental concern for the agent, rather than of  concern because they play a practical 
role in the activity she is undertaking. 
 
I thus suggest that there is a distinction between the sense of  dependence that is at issue 
in reliance, and being dependent on things more generally. While reliance involves 
practical dependence on something, that is by your own activity. It is dependence by virtue 
of  what you are trying to do, and how you go about doing it. Being dependent upon 
something, however, describes a more pressing relation. It isn’t by virtue of  some 
particular activity that you depend on that object performing some role. Instead of  your 
activity being dependent on that object, it’s the case that you are dependent on it. 
Dependence on an object involves a much deeper concern for procuring that object and 
having it accessible. That object’s presence is not just of  instrumental concern, but of  a 
deeper constitutive concern – a non-instrumental concern – based on the kind of  thing 
you are. Again, this distinction will be used in the account of  interpersonal import of  the 
trust stance, presented in chapter 8. 
 
6.1 Rely / depend 
Many authors use the concepts of  reliance and dependence interchangeably. In the trust 
literature, Baier (1986) for example, suggests that trust, “seems to be reliance on 
[another’s] good will toward one,” (1986 : p.234), and later says that, “when I trust 
another, I depend on her good will toward me.” (1986 : p.235). Baier’s phrasing suggests 
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that reliance on another’s goodwill is not a distinct phenomenon from dependence on 
another’s goodwill. Mäkelä and Townley (2013 : p.viii) discuss trust in terms of both 
reliance and dependence, using these terms interchangeably. Tummolini et al. (2012 : 
p.590) describe reliance on another in terms of being dependent on another’s action. 
McCraw is explicit in taking the concepts to be equivalent, when he says “I see no real 
substantial difference here between relying on someone and depending on someone. 
Thus, I shall take reliance and dependence to be equivalent.” (McCraw 2015 : p.4). 
 
This seems permissible. When we reflect on some cases of reliance, it can seem plausible 
to also describe these in terms of dependence. Consider the primitive reliance cases that 
Railton (2014) discusses, where a hamster relies on its sense of touch to navigate a maze, 
and where an infant relies on its sense of balance to walk (Railton 2014 : p.124). We could 
possibly say that the hamster depends on its sense of touch, and the infant depends on 
the sense of balance, without drastically altering what is meant. Similarly, when we say 
that nowadays most rely on their smartphones, we could also say that most depend on 
their smartphones. 
 
In this chapter I defend a conceptual distinction between reliance and dependence. 
However, I don’t intend to offer a set of  conditions that stipulate whether it is correct or 
not to use ‘rely’ or ‘depend’ in a particular context. My proposal is instead to outline a 
distinction between a core sense of  reliance and a core sense of  dependence, when 
applied to agents. It can be that in everyday language we often use each term 
interchangeably to pick out these concepts. What is important is that there is a difference 
between core usages of  the two concepts. I also think everyday language often does 
reflect this difference, with differing connotations associated with use of  either term. 
Reliance is a concept that operates in the domain of  our goal-directed activities. Such 
activities are self-determined, and we rely on things when we harness them in pursuit of  
doing things. Dependence, however, is a concept that operates in the domain of  our core 
functioning, regardless of  what activity or goal we choose to pursue. What we depend 
upon tends to determine what goals we pursue, while reliance is the result of  how we choose 
to pursue those goals. 
 
6.2 Successful activities / proper functioning 
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I’ve argued that reliance has a certain structure: agent-object-role-goal. When we rely on 
some object, that object plays a practical role for us, in some goal-directed activity. When 
we depend on some object, however, the ‘role-goal’ part of  the structure is ‘internalised’; 
brought  within the constitution or functioning of  the agent itself. As such, the ‘role’ part 
is no longer a matter of  contributing to a goal-directed activity; we don’t talk about what 
we depend on in relation to a goal. That’s because the thing we depend on is not needed 
in relation to a particular form of  activity we have decided to pursue. Instead, it is needed 
for our functioning as the kind of  thing that we are. 
 
Dependence, therefore, is closer to home than reliance. I take it that this is reflected in 
the weightier relationship evoked in saying that X depends on Y, compared to saying that 
X relies on Y. Consider the connotations in saying X depends on alcohol, versus the 
connotations in saying X relies on alcohol. Alcohol dependence is a condition that affects 
our functioning. Dependence on alcohol implies that an agent structures her activities, 
and ultimately her life, around the procurement of  alcohol. Alcohol dependence gives 
rise to felt needs, due to internal biological and psychological reward structures being 
affected. That gives rise to an impulse for alcohol drinking, driving the felt need for 
alcohol. This impulse will then determine what sorts of  goals we pursue, and how we 
pursue them. We will structure our activities around the presence of  alcohol, and avoid 
activities where alcohol won’t be present. Activities that don’t involve alcohol may not 
even be salient to us, due to how central the continued presence of  alcohol is to our daily 
functioning. 
 
On the other hand, we needn’t imply this kind of  relationship with alcohol in saying we 
are relying on alcohol. For instance, we can be relying on alcohol in the progressive sense, 
so for a current goal. This would mean that we are placing alcohol in a practical role in 
our current activity. Perhaps we are at a social gathering and need something to help allay 
our anxiety. In that case, we could place alcohol in that role, as a way of  getting us through 
that gathering. Now, alcohol is helping us to achieve our goal of  getting through the 
gathering without continual feelings of  anxiety. Thus, we are relying on it.  
 
That we are relying on alcohol to get us through the gathering, needn’t mean that we are 
dependent upon alcohol more generally. That’s because this is one activity we are 
choosing to pursue, and choosing to harness alcohol within it. It’s still up to us whether 
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we choose to pursue that activity, and how we choose to pursue it. We can choose to use 
alcohol to help us get through it, or to ride out the feelings of  anxiety, or just to not go 
to the gathering. Relying on something falls out of  how we conduct some activity, where 
pursuing that activity is up to us. 
 
Something relied upon can turn into something we depend upon, though. This can be a 
gradual process. Recall that reliance can also admit of the habitual aspect. Now, we take 
a broader overview of what we do, and how we do it. When we say that we rely on alcohol 
in the habitual sense, this could mean that we attend many gatherings, and tend to use 
alcohol as a way of getting through these gatherings. Depending on how many gatherings 
we attend, this role could become deeply embedded in our life. Now, it would be more 
difficult for us to simply choose to no longer attend gatherings. If we have no other means 
of getting through these gatherings than by using alcohol, our relationship with alcohol 
begins to become less take-it-or-leave-it.27 
 
However, in such a case it still isn’t clear yet whether it is the alcohol or gatherings that 
we are dependent upon. It may be that the need for social connection is more pressing, 
and our use of alcohol is a by-product. On the other hand, it could be that our continued 
use of alcohol has begun to restructure our inner functioning, such that we are now in 
possession of a felt need for alcohol. As a result, we can start to seek out activities related 
to alcohol. Now, it’s the gatherings we can take or leave; what’s crucial is that we have 
some excuse for alcohol. As such, the felt need for alcohol drives what activities we 
pursue. This is where we begin to depend on alcohol, rather than rely on it. 
 
6.3 Needs & concerns: instrumental & non-instrumental (fundamental) 
These thoughts indicate that we can also shed light on the reliance/dependence 
distinction in using a distinction between two senses of  ‘need’.28 A basic sense of  X 
                                                      
27 I take it that, in the case of alcohol, the continuous form ‘relying’ can also sometimes 
report the habitual. When asked ‘how are you doing these days’, and we say that we’re 
‘relying on alcohol’, we mean to suggest something worrying; implying a relationship 
with alcohol that could be approaching dependence. 
28 I’m only concerned with the concept of felt need. We can also need things in an 
external sense, beyond our awareness. Someone whose sense of thirst is absent still has 
a need of water. In normal functioning, our felt needs will be reliable indicators of our 
actual biological needs. Also, what we actually need can sometimes be not what we feel as 
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needing Y is that, without Y, X would suffer some sort of  harm, or loss (Wiggins and 
Dermen 1987 : p.63; Wonderly 2016 : p.228). X needing Y is distinct from simply X’s 
desiring Y. I can desire to cook a meal for my friends, because I would enjoy doing so. 
Desiring to cook a meal for my friends, however, doesn’t entail I need to cook for them. I 
may simply be excited by the idea of  cooking, suffering no harm or loss if  I don’t. 
Invoking the concept of  need, however, casts the issue of  cooking a meal for my friends, 
as a pressing concern for me. 
 
Given that the concept of  need operates in the logical space surrounding reliance and 
dependence, the concept of  ‘concern’ is also brought into play here. Concern is a concept 
describing a matter of  felt importance; an import that is associated with needing 
something. Concern is associated with what matters to us. When I need to cook a meal 
for my friends, this isn’t a mere desire, because the matter of  cooking a meal takes on a 
kind of  pressing concern for me. That I cook a meal has a characteristic emotional weight 
or import to me, beyond the feeling that it would be good or pleasant to do so. So, I need 
to cook a meal, and the matter of  cooking a meal takes on a characteristic concern. It 
matters to me that I cook a meal. 
 
Needs can be both instrumental and non-instrumental (Thomson 1987 : pp.6–7; Wiggins 
1991 : pp.9–10). Because concern is intertwined with need, this means that I can also 
have instrumental and non-instrumental concerns for things. When a need is instrumental, 
it is necessary for some broader goal or activity to be successfully carried out. For 
instance, I could need to cook a meal for my friends, as part of  completing a court-
ordered alcohol dependence recovery program, one that requires me to express gratitude 
to people in my life. The matter of  cooking a meal for my friends becomes of  
instrumental concern to me. Were it that I didn’t need to pursue the goal of  expressing 
gratitude, based on court orders (and cooking a meal were not the identified means to 
pursuing this goal), it would not be a matter of  concern to me. I probably wouldn’t do it.  
 
When it is of  instrumental concern for me that I cook a meal for my friends, this does 
not have the weight of  importance were it be of  non-instrumental concern for me that I 
do it. When it is of  mere instrumental concern that I cook, it gains some import by proxy, 
                                                      
though we need. It can be that we actually need to stop drinking, rather than to have 
another drink. 
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from a more pressing matter; the goal being achieved. Having a non-instrumental need for 
something, on the other hand, affects us more keenly. I will also call non-instrumental 
needs ‘fundamental’ needs. 
 
Fundamental needs are those we have, regardless of  what activities we choose to pursue. 
This means we can’t simply stop needing them, by abandoning pursuing some activity. 
Fundamental needs will still be pressing, regardless of  what activities we choose to 
pursue. They will in fact tend to determine what activities we choose to pursue, because 
of  how pressingly they are felt. For instance, suppose I instead have a fundamental need 
to cook a meal for my friends. I feel that, if  I don’t, I will be extremely upset and anxious, 
where this isn’t due to some goal being put at risk by failing to cook. Failing to cook the 
meal would in itself  cause me emotional disturbance, not because I feel a goal slipping out 
of  my reach, but because it simply matters to me that I do. What is slipping out of  reach 
is a scenario more amorphous than a specific goal; it is something like ‘my being happy 
and functioning’. The matter of  me cooking has its own importance or resonance, not 
due to some further end it serves having importance. I simply need to do it, to remain 
content and settled, or for the feeling of  relief  it will bring. 
 
6.4 Need & concern routed in reliance & dependence 
Reliance and instrumental need are not equivalent concepts. Nor are dependence and 
fundamental need. However, they are closely related. In this section I will elaborate upon 
how they are related. I will also elaborate on how non-instrumental/fundamental needs 
and instrumental needs are related. I suggest that instrumental needs are needs-by-proxy. 
They gain the status of  need, by serving to satisfy some fundamental need. 
 
Through relying on things, we come to instrumentally need them. The thing we rely on - 
that we need to perform some role - thus becomes a matter of  instrumental concern for 
us. We need the thing we rely on, in whatever respect we rely on it. However, not all 
instrumental needs are things we thereby rely on, because we can instrumentally need to 
perform actions ourselves. As we’ve seen when discussing the [Intentions Excluded] 
condition of  Smith’s account of  reliance (section 5.3.2), reliance involves needing 
something outside of  ourselves to perform some role: whatever we cede control to, to 
take care of  an aspect of  our activity. The ‘cooking for friends’ example though is one of  
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instrumentally needing to carry out an action for myself. I don’t thereby rely on myself  
to perform this action, unless I am alienated from my own actions for some reason. That 
said, I will be relying on the cooking of  the meal as a means to achieving the end I have 
in mind, insofar as the cooking takes on practical role in bringing about my end. There 
will also be, in cooking for my friends, things I am relying on while pursuing that end. I 
will rely on the cooker to cook, insofar as this has been given a role in my activity, directed 
toward my goal. As such, the cooker working becomes a matter of  instrumental need, 
and so instrumental concern. 
 
Just as reliance and instrumental need are not equivalent, nor are dependence and 
fundamental need. Though I can have a fundamental need to cook a meal for my friends, 
I do not, strictly speaking, depend on me cooking a meal for my friends. Just as reliance 
involves instrumental need for things outside of  ourselves, dependence involves 
fundamental need for things outside of  ourselves. Gaining and maintaining access to the 
things we depend upon, becomes a matter of  non-instrumental concern for us. 
 
When I fundamentally need to cook a meal for my friends this is because I have some 
sort of  dependence, that cooking the meal would serve to satisfy. In this case, let’s 
stipulate that I fundamentally need others’ approval. I have a fundamental need for it, 
because my ability to function normally requires that I have approval. I am upset and 
unsettled without it. As such, I am dependent on other’s approval. I am not relying on it, 
because it doesn’t play a practical role in something I am trying to achieve. It is just 
something I need for my continued functioning, or wellbeing. Cooking a meal is 
something I fixate on as a fundamental need, and so is of  fundamental concern, because 
it feeds this dependence. 
 
How are fundamental and instrumental needs related to one another? I suggest that part 
of  the answer to this lies in how fundamental need for something overlays meaning, 
import, and emotional salience upon situations we are in. When I fundamentally need to 
cook a meal for my friends, this determines what I am concerned about in my current 
situation, and what I am concerned about happening in the near future. The non-
instrumental concern stemming from my fundamental need to cook thereby becomes 
routed through different identified possible means to satisfy that need. This routing, when 
it passes through an identified means, generates an instrumental need.  
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Instrumental needs are needs-by-proxy. When, for example, I have a fundamental need 
to cook for my friends, cooking becomes a matter of  concern. I instrumentally need the 
cooker to work, because my non-instrumental concern to cook the meal is routed through 
this, as an identified means. When we have a fundamental need for something, 
instrumental needs are generated, based on our identifying possible ways of  fulfilling that 
fundamental need. That gives an overlay of  import on the situation. Then, certain salient 
possibilities, such as the cooker failing to switch on, my friends being late, will possess 
import, by virtue of  having the potential to obstruct me in cooking for my friends. Our 
concern is in procuring that fundamental need, and matters that threaten that also become 
matters of  concern. 
 
I have said that my fundamental need to cook isn’t strictly speaking what I am dependent 
upon. That’s because my fundamental need to cook in fact stems from a deeper 
fundamental need for other’s approval. That drives me to identify opportunities to gain 
approval. The goal of  cooking a meal, that I fixate on, is simply a product of  that deeper 
fundamental need, identifying some means to being satisfied. 
 
Fundamental needs can serve some purpose, despite being non-instrumental. But, the 
concern that results from a fundamental need is much more pressing than that for an 
instrumental need. That’s because fundamental needs serve, not some practical purpose, 
but some more basic core purpose. Fundamental needs are those that flow from the realm 
of  basic biological functioning, and thus evolutionary advantage. As such, the concern 
generated from a fundamental need points us in the direction of  pursuing an outcome 
that will typically be beneficial to us in a more basic homeostatic sense. For example, the 
characteristic impulse to drink when thirsty is the product of  our inner wiring, and the 
functional role of  that impulse is set down in basic biology. The impulse being reliably 
sensitive to dehydration allows us to maintain an inner equilibrium, maintaining biological 
structures and processes that constitute us. 
 
Similarly, the logic of  our emotional wiring serves a more basic functional role, that has 
evolved to keep us safe. For example, fear and wariness keep us safe from threats. In the 
example where I have a fundamental need to cook for my friends, this is because the act 
of  cooking for my friends has immanent emotional salience. It has this immanent 
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emotional salience because of  what purpose cooking for my friends would serve, in 
restoring an equilibrium in my emotional balance. This may reflect an unconscious 
association between cooking a meal and preventing something terrible from happening 
to me, such as being abandoned by my friends. That reflects the operation of  underlying 
emotion schema which has been roughly hewn through evolutionary predispositions, 
then fine-tuned by experience. That schema has a role in keeping me safe; avoiding 
threats, and keeping me in proximity of  sources of  safety and nourishment. 
 
So, even fundamental needs are, in some sense, instrumental. Fulfilling them serves the 
purpose of  satisfying them and restoring a sense of  contentment. But this is due to 
serving some larger evolutionary or biological function. Many fundamental needs: food, 
water, oxygen, keep us alive. Others contribute to our emotional and physical wellbeing. 
That they do so is due to those roughly hewn evolutionary predispositions we are 
furnished with, and which experience sets to work on shaping and rerouting.  
 
However, fundamental needs and instrumental needs are distinct in terms of  the concern 
associated with them. The concern that comes from a fundamental need is distinct from 
the kind of  concern felt for an instrumental need. What we can’t do with a fundamental 
need is directly lose it, by choosing a different means to achieving some goal, or 
abandoning pursuing some goal altogether. We have limited choice over needing it, in 
having it matter to us. 
 
Here again then is the essential difference between being reliant on something and being 
dependent upon it. When we are reliant upon something, it is instrumentally needed as 
part of  a goal we are pursuing. We may not need to pursue that goal, or need to pursue it 
in the way we are doing so. On the other hand, when we are dependent upon something, 
it is fundamentally needed because of  the kind of  thing we are, not because of  the kind 
of  activities we pursue. 
 
This account of  dependence on something, as involving a non-instrumental concern for 
it, will be put to use in chapter 8, in defending my account of  the interpersonal import 
of  matters of  trust. 
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7 The trust stance: the rolling schema 
In this chapter I refocus attention again on the trust stance attitudes, and flesh out the 
account of the trust stance outlined so far. So far I have defended a distinction between 
the active and stative senses of trust, and suggested that the ‘stative’ layer consists of 
attitudes of assurance (stative trust), uncertainty, and wariness (distrust). In this chapter I 
elaborate on the stative layer, and ultimately motivate an account of the stative layer, that 
I will sketch out in the last section of the chapter. I call this account the rolling schema 
model. 
 
To build toward the rolling schema model, I first discuss the difference between the 
active/stative distinction defended in chapter 4, and the closely related distinction of two-
place/three-place trust (as raised in sections 1.2 and 1.3). I argue in sections 7.1 and 7.2 
that the active/stative distinction is often confused for the two-place/three-place 
distinction, and set out how they are different. 
 
This directs our attention toward an unusual feature of the stative trust stance. This is the 
way in which prior stative trust stance attitudes ‘colour’ our perceptions of interactions 
with others. I defend this perception colouring quality in section 7.3. The thought behind 
this is that attitudes of the trust stance give us an overlay of interpretative/anticipatory 
information, about what another is doing, in a way that bleeds from one domain of 
interaction to another. Following this, I take a closer look at what the stative attitudes, in 
their perception colouring, appear to be about: namely, how another is likely to act, in a 
situation of vulnerability (as raised in section 1.7). 
 
In section 2.2.3 and also in section 4.7.5, when discussing the nature of distrust as an 
attitude of wariness, I explained why the Commitment account was highly intuitive. This 
related to the point, raised in section 1.7, that being ‘vulnerable’ (in an everyday sense of 
the term) to another’s actions, is not enough to have a matter of trust with her. It isn’t 
enough to just be aware that another can ‘get’ to you, via a situational vulnerability, for 
you to treat her doing so as a matter of trust. That’s because the anticipatory attitude you 
adopt toward her, in that respect, can lack the interpersonal import of the trust stance. 
You can anticipate that she will attempt to get to you, even be fearful or worried that she 
will. But, it won’t matter in the way characteristic of the trust stance. This import was 
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what the Commitment account appeared to identify. It identified what transforms a 
situation from one of mere prediction, to interpersonal import.  
 
However, in this chapter, in section 7.6.2, I will argue that there must be something more 
basic than concept of commitment underpinning matters of trust. I’ll raise cases where 
we appear to be able to have that interpersonal import, that put pressure on the concept 
of commitment. These are cases where it would stretch the concept out of recognition to 
suppose that a commitment was at issue. Rather, there is something more basic than 
commitment: a concern about another being able to be pinned down. In the next chapter 
I will defend an account of what that concern consists in. 
  
 
7.1 Active/stative & the voluntariness problem 
In this section, I set out how the active/stative trust distinction resolves a question, 
concerning to what extent we can voluntarily trust another. Holton (1994) suggests that 
the two/three-place distinction can explain why trust appears to be voluntary sometimes 
but not at other times. I’ll argue that in fact the active/stative distinction explains why 
trust appears to be voluntary and non-voluntary at different times: active trust is 
voluntary, but stative trust isn’t. In the next section I argue that the active/stative 
distinction cuts across the two-place/three-place distinction. 
 
My proposal to resolve the question over whether we can voluntarily trust – i.e. whether 
we can take someone up on her request, when she says “trust me on this” –  is as follows. 
The circumstances in which we can choose to trust are those where we can simply decide 
to rely on others, e.g. rely on others to catch us in the drama class ‘trust circle’ (Holton 
1994). We can proceed to trustingly rely, because we can, all other things being equal, 
control how we act, and reliance is a mode of acting (see section 4.7.2 and chapter 5). 
However, there are circumstances in which we can’t choose to trust, are those where we 
can’t choose to be assured, e.g. that we will be caught by those in the trust circle. So in 
one sense, we can decide to trust. But in another sense, we can’t. That’s because of the 
ambiguity inherent in ‘trust’: it can mean an act – relying, accepting vulnerability, putting 
ourselves in a situation of vulnerability - and a state of assurance about the situation that 
results from that act – the actual state of being vulnerable. 
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REL+ does not have the active/stative distinction. But, it answers the question of how it 
is that we can decide to trust others in some circumstances, by pointing out that we can 
decide to rely. The problem that REL+ encounters is that there are circumstances where 
we can’t decide to trust others, or where reliance seems to be insufficient for the type of 
trust at issue. 
 
Such a problem case is found in Baker (1987), where the trust of a friend who has been 
accused of a crime is at issue. Let’s call the accused Millie, and her friend Andrea. Millie 
asks Andrea whether she trusts her that she is innocent. It would be fair to say that active 
reliance trust here isn’t enough for the type of trust that Millie asks of Andrea. A friend 
accused of a crime wouldn’t want her friend to just rely on her being innocent; where that 
innocence is in some sense remaining to be seen. It remains to be seen, of course, when 
we rely on those in the trust circle to catch us, whether they will in fact catch us. What a 
friend wants to know is that we believe her; that there is no doubt in our mind about her 
having not committed the crime, and of her good character. The kind of trust Millie wants 
from Andrea is trust in the assurance sense. Anything less than assurance from Andrea 
would suggest that Andrea was uncertain or wary of Millie, or that Andrea suspects Millie 
should perhaps doubt her own memory. Without Andrea’s assurance, then, Millie’s own 
assurance of her innocence might be shaken. Millie may begin to doubt herself, and this 
would hinder her own ability to cope with the situation. Active reliance trust in this case 
is not sufficient for Millie’s needs. The kind of trust she wants from Andrea is that which 
Andrea cannot give voluntarily. That’s where stative assurance trust can be appealed to. 
 
Sometimes of course, active reliance trust is all that can be asked for. Compare Millie and 
Andrea’s situation with that between a couple dealing with infidelity. Suppose Xavier has 
cheated on his partner Yolanda. Xavier asks for a second chance from Yolanda, and 
Yolanda grants this. Active reliance trust is what she can grant. It cannot be assurance 
trust; his betrayal has seen to that. But with Yolanda’s active reliance trust, it is up to 
Xavier to continually demonstrate that he is someone she can now be assured of. Xavier 
can’t demand that assurance; it has to be earned through repeated demonstration of being 
worthy of assurance. 
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Compare this with what the accused friend Millie is asking of Andrea. The level of 
assurance Millie and Xavier are entitled to demand from their respective other are not 
equivalent. Millie, insofar as Andrea is her friend, is warranted in presuming that there is 
a background of assurance of one another, and so seeks confirmation of Andrea’s 
assurance trust of her. Xavier on the other hand, cannot ask Yolanda to be genuinely 
assured of him. He can ask for a second chance to prove himself worthy of Yolanda’s 
assurance, by asking her to once again put herself in the position where she is vulnerable 
to him, by actively trusting him.  
 
As such, we can see the usefulness of the active/stative trust distinction in making sense 
of the voluntariness of trust. In some scenarios, we can only ask for active trust from 
another – something that can be voluntarily given. Assurance trust though is earned, and 
not able to be given voluntarily.29 We can to some extent ‘control’ our stative attitudes, 
since it is possible to choose to not act on the urge to check or verify that comes from 
being unsure or wary of another. However, we can’t choose to not have the feeling that 
something is amiss. 
  
Because REL+ can only take ‘trust’ to mean active reliance trust, it has a difficulty making 
sense of what Millie can ask of Andrea. Holton’s own solution to Baker’s problem case, 
in trying to remain steadfast to REL+, involves invoking a causal link between relying on 
the friend to be knowledgeable and sincere, and thereby coming to believe what she says. 
He suggests that, by relying on the friend to be knowledgeable and sincere, “the belief 
[that she is innocent] follows from the reliance in the sense that I would be failing to act 
on the supposition that she speaks knowledgeably and sincerely if I did not believe what 
she said” (Holton 1994 : p.74).  
                                                      
29 Demanding or requiring assurance trust from another can, when taken to an extreme, 
amount to a form of abuse, since it amounts to asking another to ignore the compass 
that helps her navigate potentially dangerous or harmful situations. ‘Gaslighting’ takes 
this to the extreme, as form of emotional abuse, where the doubts one has are 
dismissed by another as being the result of one’s own poor judgement or faulty senses. 
If this is taken seriously by the unassured party, it eventually leads to a loss of assurance 
trust in her own senses, thus being unable to feel assured about what is real, and a 
paralysis concerning how to proceed and what to rely on sets in. No doubt in some 
cases our stative trust stance dispositions - levels of assurance or wariness about others 
in different situations - are unreliable guides to actual threats, prone to disproportionate 
responses. But often that can also be due to experience priming us to expect certain 
kinds of behavior from others (section 7.7 offers an account of why). 
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However, this solution involves some equivocation between two different senses of 
‘belief’. The sense of belief (indicated by ‘believe’) in the second half of the sentence, is 
not the sense of belief that involves assurance that someone is telling the truth, and so 
being convinced that what she says is true. It is the sense of ‘believe’ found in a more 
colloquial everyday sense of choosing to believe someone, which actually means to accept 
what another says, by proceeding to act on its basis. This is not the sense of belief as an 
attitude of being convinced that p is true. Andrea would fail to act on the supposition that 
Millie is speaking knowledgeably and sincerely if she did not choose to believe Millie in 
the colloquial sense. Andrea wouldn’t fail to act on the supposition that Millie is speaking 
knowledgeably and sincerely if Andrea failed to be convinced. Simply choosing to be 
convinced that p is something we can’t do, and I take it that the active/stative trust 
distinction helps shed light on why we needn’t suppose we can be voluntarily convinced.30 
Instead, I suggest that what we can choose to do is to suspend checking whether what 
another has said is true; to refrain from acting on our sense of being unsure. Andrea may 
do this, while keeping her actual doubts hidden from Millie, for her sake. 
 
As such I take it that the active/stative trust distinction resolves the puzzle over how 
sometimes trust seems voluntarily able to be given but sometimes not, that REL+ cannot 
satisfactorily resolve. We can decide to actively reliance trust, but not to statively 
assurance trust. 
 
7.2 Active/stative vs. two-place/three-place 
Holton suggests that the reason for any confusion over whether we can decide to trust is 
because we fail to recognise a distinction between two-place and three-place trust. To 
trust another in a two-place sense is, Holton tells us, to have what he calls a trusting 
relationship with another. Three-place trust on the other hand is to trust someone in a 
                                                      
30 For discussion concerning whether we can decide to believe, see e.g. (Bennett 1990) 
and (Hieronymi 2006). (Ginet 2001) gives an account of  what can constitute deciding to 
believe p where this consists in you counting on it being the case that p. To do this is to stake 
things – ends that you have - on p being the case. In other words, to decide to believe p is 
to continue to act as though p is true, where doing so puts one’s goals or plans at risk. 
Here we have a definition of  deciding to believe that seems to just be deciding to rely on 
p’s truth. This corresponds to deciding to actively trust another. 
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specific situation, with some action. We can’t choose to have a trusting relationship, but we 
can choose to trust someone in a specific situation, i.e. the drama class trust circle. Holton 
says: 
 
I have treated trust as a three-place relation holding between two people and an 
action. Contrast this with a two-place relation like friendship or hatred: if I am 
really your friend, I am your friend simpliciter. I am not your friend for bus 
driving, or for clothes buying, or whatever. Nevertheless, it seems that there is 
often a two-place relation that stands behind cases of trust. I have a background 
relationship of trust with some people; and it is in virtue of this that I would trust 
them to do a whole range of things for which they have not yet proven their 
trustworthiness. Can I choose to have such a relationship? Surely not. Compare 
the case of friendship. I choose my friends; but I cannot choose to be a close 
friend of yours straight-off. I can choose to start along the path that will lead to 
that relationship; and I can control, to some extent, how quickly we move along 
it. However, close friendships are things which develop over time. Similarly with 
trusting relationships. If you and I trust each other in various ways over time, and 
our trust is not betrayed, we will be likely to build a trusting relationship. That is 
not to say that there will be some particular thing that I will trust you to do. Rather 
it is to say that I will in general be more ready to trust you: partly because I am 
confident that you will not betray that trust, and partly because, having trusted 
you before, further trust becomes appropriate. A trusting relationship makes a 
greater range of trust available to me. As with a close friendship, so with a trusting 
relationship: I cannot simply decide to have one. But that does not mean that I 
cannot sometimes decide to trust. (1994 : pp.70–71) 
 
Holton’s suggestion, then, is that we cannot will ourselves to have a trusting relationship, 
while we can decide to trust someone in a specific respect. He supposes that this is what 
leads to confusion over whether trust can be willed or not. 
 
It isn’t clear if this explanation is supposed to shed light on the accused friend case, 
though. Presumably, Holton doesn’t intend to use it to shed light on why there was 
confusion over whether Andrea could voluntarily trust Millie’s innocence, since Holton 
argues Andrea can in fact voluntarily trust Millie that that she is innocent, in that case. 
That being said, we could still ask whether the problem in the accused friend case is 
resolved by pointing out that Andrea cannot voluntarily choose to have a two-place 
trusting relationship with Millie, but can choose to trust her in a specific respect. Clearly, 
this isn’t what the problem is. Andrea and Millie are already friends, and we can presume 
already have a trusting relationship. The problem is that, in the circumstances, Andrea’s 
stative assurance trust of Millie in a particular respect - her innocence - is shaken by the 
accusations against Millie. She can’t voluntarily trust Millie in this particular respect, 
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because she can’t voluntarily be assured. But this assurance is the type of trust that Millie 
wants from Andrea. The two-place/three-place distinction does not do any work in 
resolving why Andrea cannot voluntarily trust Millie. 
 
Here, I will set out how the active/stative distinction is not the same as two-place/three-
place. In other words, active/stative and two-place/three-place come apart. Pointing this 
out helps us to further unpack the nature of the trust stance. 
 
We can assurance trust another in both a two-place and a three-place sense. Millie can 
two-place trust Andrea in a stative assurance sense, where this describes how she generally 
feels about Andrea. Millie is assured of Andrea, in a general sense. Millie can also two-
place trust Andrea in an active sense: Millie trusts Andrea, in the sense that there are many 
domains of interaction in which Millie habitually relies on Andrea. Her activities are, in 
some sense, enmeshed with Andrea’s. 
 
We can also see three-place trust being cleaved along the lines of the active/stative 
distinction.  Let’s hone in on one of the particular domains of interaction between Millie 
and Andrea: Millie relies on Andrea to bring her toiletries while she is incarcerated. She 
thus three-place trusts Andrea, in an active sense. However, it also happens that Millie is 
assured that Andrea will bring her toiletries. She doesn’t feel any sense of uncertainty over 
this. So, she also three-place trusts Andrea to bring her toiletries in a stative assurance 
sense. Figure 7 (below) illustrates how, I suggest, the active/stative and two-place/three-
place distinction cut across one another. 
 
Holton’s suggestion is that the puzzle over whether trust is voluntary can be resolved if 
we notice that we can’t decide to trust in a two-place sense, but can in a three-place sense. 
However, we can deny this claim. We can decide to two-place trust another in an active 
sense. In fact, if we can decide to trust in a three-place sense, we can also decide to trust 
over a broad range of things. It is just rare that we do. Normally, we are not inclined to 
do so; our willingness to is tempered by not knowing a person well, and so not yet feeling 
assured about the other person in a two-place sense.31 But, if circumstances require it, we 
can decide to actively trust in a two-place sense. The example below will illustrate this. 
 
                                                      
31 Section 7.7 defends an account of why this can be so. 
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Figure 7: Active/stative & Two-place/Three-place trust 
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her to/while she relies on 
her to 
 
 
Wilderness stranger 
 
Belinda has fallen while out hiking in a wilderness, loses her memory, and finds 
herself alone. A stranger calling himself Kevin, also out hiking in the wilderness, 
finds her in a state of some distress. Kevin tells her he will help her get back to 
the nearest town where they can go to a hospital and police station, so that an 
appeal can be put out. Belinda’s head is foggy, she is frail and requires a lot of 
assistance in hiking back, a trek that will take several days. This requires her to 
repeatedly rely on Kevin for help over a broad domain of interactions; 
manoeuvring around obstacles, help in setting up her tent and camping gear. 
Belinda’s state of confusion means she feels continually unassured and guarded, 
but she recognizes that she has to trust Kevin in the sense of actively rely on him 
for a large range of things. She is forced, in some sense, to adopt a state of 
childlike dependence on him: she follows him, and needs him, for her survival. 
 
This example is one where we can decide to actively trust in a two-place sense (Belinda 
could, after all, choose to go off on her own). Belinda trusts Kevin, by following him, and 
allowing him to lead her back to a place of safety. Belinda actively two-place trusts him: 
she allows herself to be led by Kevin across many domains. Yet, she doesn’t two-place 
statively/assuredly trust him. If anything, she is uncertain of Kevin. 
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I take it this is also roughly what Yolanda’s active trust of Xavier will consist in, after 
Xavier cheats on her, should she give him a second chance. Yolanda would proceed to 
let him back into her life, in many of the domains of interaction that she and he previously 
were engaged. She actively two-place trusts him, but there will now be underlying feelings 
of uncertainty in each domain. It won’t be one single three-place domain of interaction 
in which she chooses to rely on him once again, but it will clearly be difficult for her to 
be open in these domains of interaction, due to the lack of two-place stative trust.  
 
We might wish to deny that the Wilderness stranger case represents active two-place trust, 
because it can be given a three-place reading, e.g. Belinda chooses to actively trust Kevin 
to look after her. But, we can counter this response. If we argue that it isn’t an example of 
active two-place trust, on the basis that it can be given a three-place reading, this threatens 
to make any sort of two-place trust elliptical for three-place. That’s because, presumably, 
all candidate cases of two-place trust (“Millie trusts Andrea”) can be given a very generic 
three-place reading, by way of giving a very generic characterization of the sort of concern 
we have, in trusting others (“Millie trusts Andrea to be loyal”). 
 
The kind of situation encountered in Wilderness stranger is rare in adult life. We often don’t 
need to rely on people in such a broad range of domains, all at once. We rarely need the 
level of assistance that Belinda does, because as able-bodied adults privileged with high 
levels of physical and cognitive capability, we often don’t need assistance looking after 
ourselves. We also aren’t inclined to trust people who we don’t already feel two-place 
assurance of (à la Horsburgh’s ‘I’d trust him with my life’ from section 1.3), in situations 
like Belinda’s, that would leave us so able to be taken advantage of. However, when we 
find ourselves in a situations where we approach something resembling a child-like level 
of dependence on others, we are forced to actively trust in a number of domains. 
 
In normal circumstances, broad two-place assurance of another lags behind our assurance 
in particular domains of interaction. Trusting relationships involve both active trust over 
a broad range of domains, and assurance in those domains. But, such relationships are 
built based on active trust in specific domains being fulfilled, gradually, tentatively, over 
time.32 This is possible because fulfilled trust in one domain gets the ball rolling on more 
                                                      
32 In section 8.4 I raise the example of individuals with William’s Syndrome, who are 
trusting-by-default of new people, due to a strong drive for social approach. Such 
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general assurance of another. Three-place stative trust of another – assurance of her in 
one domain – bleeds into further domains. 
 
7.3 Perception colouring 
This cross-domain bleeding results from a key characteristic of the trust stance, that 
determines what three-place attitudes we have. Trust or distrust of another on some 
specific matter is typically the result of our two-place trust stance toward her. It thus isn’t 
the case that the two-place stance we have is a product of what three-place attitudes we 
have toward her: the two-place tends to determine the three-place. The claim I defend 
here is that a two-place trust stance colours our perception of another and her actions, so 
that we three-place trust or distrust her on specific matters as a result. 
 
By ‘colours’, I mean that the trust stance interprets what another is likely to do, or is 
currently doing. We understand what another is doing in some specific situation, or is 
likely to do in some possible situation, in light of a general trust stance attitude we already 
hold toward her. For example, when we say of someone, “I’d trust him with my life”, we 
report that, presented with almost any given situation, we will three-place trust him with 
specific actions. Because it is in respect of any given situation, I don’t need to have already 
thought of every possible situation and arrived at a three-place attitude about him. Prior 
general trust of him means I already interpret his actions in novel situations in a positive 
light. And, I would be assured of him, under any new domain of interaction. So, I am 
reporting that, should I find myself in a situation of extreme risk or vulnerability, I would 
trust him in the specific respects that the situation demanded I trust him. My trust of him 
colours my perception of what motives he has in current interactions, and in future ones. 
I will take what he says as truthful. I will interpret his advice, guidance, and offers to 
perform certain actions, as genuine attempts to help me toward my desired end, rather 
than attempts to undermine me. 
 
This interpretive or perception colouring quality of the trust stance is what gives the trust 
stance attitudes a characteristic stubbornness. Assurances from those you already distrust 
are not going to be instantly effective, because the assurances can be interpreted as further 
                                                      
individuals (typically children) readily, for example, jump into cars with strangers, 
without any fear of danger (Spiegel 2010). 
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attempts to mislead you. When we already two-place trust another though, such 
assurances will typically be unnecessary, barring contexts where her competence is in 
question. Similarly, when we already two-place trust another, any evidence of possible 
untrustworthiness is less readily integrated than if we already two-place distrust her. When 
we already two-place trust another, the possibility that she has hidden motives, such that 
she intends to undermine us in some particular situation, simply isn’t salient, and can be 
unthinkable. That thought either doesn’t enter our minds, or when it does, we dismiss it. 
We presume that there are no unseen machinations or violations she has concealed from 
us.33 
 
This perception colouring feature also determines what counts as evidence of another’s 
trustworthiness. When we already distrust another, we interpret her particular actions and 
verbal assurances as masking ulterior motives and actions. What she does is interpreted 
in light of our prior two-place distrust toward her, so that a promise to help you can be 
taken as insincere, or as another indicator of her untrustworthiness.  
 
A recent real-world example of the perception colouring quality of the trust stance, in 
interpreting actions, can be seen in the backfiring of Facebook’s attempt to clamp down 
on the spreading of ‘fake news’ over its network (Cellan-Jones 2017).34 Facebook’s 
original measure for clamping down on fake news articles was to attach a ‘red flag’ icon 
to links that were to non-verified, dubious, or misleading news sources. While this was 
intended to warn users that the link they were about to follow was untrustworthy in 
comparison to mainstream news sources, the red flag measure backfired. This is because 
users who were already inclined to look at such misleading news articles only did so, 
because they already two-place distrusted the mainstream news media and social media 
platforms. As a result, they interpreted the red flag marker when attached to particular 
articles, as a further attempt to quash a dissenting truthful view. In light of the users two-
place distrust of the mainstream news media and social media platforms, the actions by 
the social media platform, that ought to have been taken as indicators of the platform’s 
trustworthiness, were taken as further evidence of its untrustworthiness. While these 
                                                      
33 In light of this, we can see why Millie would be upset if Andrea didn’t completely 
believe her that she was innocent. If Andrea truly did two-place assurance trust her, 
then any accusations or countervailing evidence against her innocence would surely be 
interpreted as mistaken. 
34 Articles containing fabricated or misleading claims but presented as genuine.  
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actions were intended to help guide users to trustworthy news sources, these actions were 
interpreted as a further attempt to hide the truth. Their existing two-place trust stance 
attitudes coloured their perceptions of Facebook’s actions. 
 
The perception colouring quality of the trust stance attitudes, influences how we interpret 
past, present and possible future actions of others, in terms of their motives. The two-
place trust stance is not just present-looking and forward-looking, but also backward 
looking. Past actions, previously seen as signs of trustworthiness, are coloured in light of 
untrustworthiness uncovered in the present. When two-place distrust another, we are 
inclined to think she has already undertaken actions against our interests, or is in the 
process of doing so, or would do/intends to do so in the future. As such, two-place trust 
stance attitudes don’t simply influence our interpretation of what another is doing, but also 
what she has done. An article on video evidence of American police killing black citizens, 
offers a useful metaphor for how our prior two-place trust stance attitudes colour or 
perceptions of others past, present, and future actions: 
 
To the officers who back an expansion of body-camera use, the growing pains 
are worth the still-unknown cost. To Joe Gamaldi, the Houston union vice 
president, the greatest benefit of cameras lies in their potential to exonerate 
officers in an era when more people are distrusting of the official police narrative. 
“I believe that video will clear them more than not,” he said. His view is rooted 
in the philosophy that cops don’t lie as often as all the publicized videos suggest, 
that the public sees most of the bad but little of the good, that there isn’t much 
more iceberg hidden beneath the dark water. “How big you think the iceberg is depends 
on how much you trust them,” said professor Stoughton. “If you don’t trust the police 
at all, you think that that’s a huge iceberg and we only see a little bit of it. If you 
tend to strongly trust the police, even if we’re not seeing all of it, we’re seeing 
most of it.” The truth emerges only as the water continues to recede. We don’t 
know what we haven’t seen. (Samaha 2017) [emphasis added] 
 
The ‘iceberg’ metaphor deployed here is powerful one, in helping illustrate the perception 
colouring quality of the trust stance attitudes. Depending on how much we trust the 
American police, we will anticipate the number of offences committed by them 
differently. When we trust another, we think well of her, and don’t anticipate that she is 
concealing matters of concern from us. She is perceived as being open to us, and we’ll be 
assured that any actions that we aren’t able to glimpse, are not going to be detrimental to 
our wellbeing (or the wellbeing of those we care about). They will be innocent actions. 
We also, as a result, interpret what she is currently doing in some situation, in a positive 
light. On the other hand, when we distrust another, we anticipate concealment of matters 
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of concern from us (there is iceberg hidden below the surface). We also interpret what 
she is currently doing as scheming, against our interests. 
  
Lagerspetz (2015 : pp.82–83) and Jones (2013) both recognise the significance of the 
perception colouring quality of the trust stance attitudes in this respect. Lagerspetz takes 
this to indicate that trust lies at the heart of human reasoning, rather than being a 
specialised variety of it: 
 
Trust guides our perception of the facts: it ‘reveals itself in patterns in the agent’s 
interpretations of reasons’, for example in the fact that we tend to interpret 
information as evidence in favour of a person we trust. This is an important point, 
because it suggests an idea of trust as something enmeshed in our cognitive 
pursuits, not something additional and separable from them. (2015 : p.83) 
 
 
I suggest this point can shed light on the trust stance in the following way. Without the 
possibility of general two-place (and one-place) trust stance attitudes, there would 
typically be no way of making sense of why we have some specific three-place trust stance 
attitude toward another. That’s because the specific three-place trust attitude we adopt 
toward another in some new domain of interaction with her, is typically determined by 
the two-place stative trust stance attitude we already have toward her. For example, if we 
already two-place distrust the police, we interpret what the police are currently doing in 
issuing a press release, claiming to be conducting an internal investigation of charges of 
brutality, as presenting a front that allows them to conceal and hide their manoeuvring. 
On the other hand, if we two-place assurance trust the police, we take this at face value. 
There is no more iceberg hidden beneath the surface of their actions. 
 
Below, in sections 7.6 and 7.7, I will defend what I call a ‘rolling schema’ account of the 
stative trust stance. I defend the rolling schema account, via a look at specific cases of 
prior, retrospective, counterfactual and hypothetical three-place stative trust stances. I use this to 
help explain the relationship between one-place, two-place and three-place trust, and how 
the trust stance involves a perception colouring quality. 
 
7.4 Situational vulnerabilities & ‘entrusting’: the structure of matters of trust 
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Before defending the rolling schema model, I will further unpack a concept I make use 
of in setting it out, that explains what the trust stance attitudes are fundamentally attitudes 
about. This is the notion of a ‘situational’ or ‘situation of’ vulnerability (which I first raised 
in section 1.7). I suggest that the notion of entrusting, defended by Baier, can help us 
here. With the notion of entrusting, we glimpse the basic skeletal structure of a matter of 
trust. In a matter of trust there must be some way in which another can get at us, via a 
situational vulnerability we have. This emotional logic of the trust stance involves 
awareness of this, and a concern about whether another is going to harm us in this respect. 
  
Considering the perception colouring discussion, I will argue that two-place and three-
place assurance trust can occur prior to active reliance (section 7.5 below). Assurance 
trust can also be about the possibility of active reliance (section 7.6 below). This, in 
combination with the preceding discussions of the active/stative and two-place/three-
place distinction, indicates what the stative trust stance is: it is a reading of a situation, 
where we take a stance on how another will act toward us, given a certain situation where 
we are vulnerable to her. This vulnerability we can incur through relying on her to 
perform an action, and so being practically dependent on her action (per the ‘role 
placement’ view of reliance defended in section 5.4). 
 
But we can also incur a situational vulnerability by simply having something we care about 
‘dangerously near’ (Jones 1996 : p.4) or within the ‘striking power’ of others (Baier 1986 
: p.235). And, we can have a stative trust stance toward another, in respect of such 
vulnerability. Consider how we incur such a vulnerability, when another learns an 
embarrassing secret about us, without our having told her. We aren’t thereby actively 
trusting her with that secret, but we can still have a stative trust stance toward her in 
respect of that secret. 
 
As such, the stative trust stance is about a situation of vulnerability, whether or not this 
vulnerability results from active reliance. But, we also needn’t currently be vulnerable. We 
can have a stative trust stance toward another concerning the possibility of being 
vulnerable to her, prior to that situation of vulnerability. Similarly, we can have a stative 
trust stance toward another concerning the possibility of a situation of vulnerability, 
whether or not this takes place. What we can be do is project forward, or imagine a certain 
situation of vulnerability, and have a trust stance attitude about it. I defend this further in 
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section 7.6, in setting out the possibility of trust stance attitudes concerning retrospective, 
counterfactual, and hypothetical situations of vulnerability. 
 
To help unpack the structure of a situational/situation of vulnerability, I will discuss an 
analysis of three-place trust that is distinct from the three-place action or ‘reliance’ model 
typically used so far, where X trusts Y to φ. The alternative model is Baier’s (1986) 
‘entrusting’ model. Considering this will help shed further light on how we ought to 
understand the structure of matters of trust. I suggest that the entrusting model helps us 
gain a higher vantage point on what is at issue in matters of trust and why our trust stance 
attitudes tend to be tied to specific actions. Specifically: we trust others in respect of 
performing specific actions, because those actions have the potential to impact things we 
care about, given some situation where we are vulnerable to how another acts. This also 
explains why, for example, three-place trust is often understood in terms of reliance on 
another; we rely on others in respect of specific actions. That’s because actively trusting 
another by relying on her for something, involves putting ourselves in a situation of 
vulnerability. 
 
Baier (1986 : p.236), rather than tying trust to a specific action, prefers to analyse trust in 
terms of a relation to a specific object or thing, that has been entrusted to another. Thus, 
the model of trust being proposed is that, when we say ‘X trusts Y’, this means ‘X trusts 
Y with some valued thing C’. The valued thing C is something that X cares about, such 
that C’s fate is a matter of concern for X, and which she has placed in the ‘care of’ Y. As 
a result, Y has the capacity to either take care of C, or abuse the power made available to 
her by having access to C. Baier describes this as placing the cared-about thing within the 
‘striking power’ of another, and she intends that the analysis extends to all matters of 
trust. We can call this the ‘entrusting’ model. 
 
The entrusting model clearly fits cases of trust where we physically hand over the things 
we care about to another. For instance, in giving your friend your cat for the weekend, 
you entrust your cat to her care. Your friend can then look after your cat, or harm it, or 
steal it from you, and so on. This seems right. Can the entrusting model extend to more 
standard three-place ‘action’ or reliance trust cases? I suggest that it can. But, we must do 
some work in identifying what the entrusted thing is in such cases. We also must adopt a 
charitable reading of what it is for Y to ‘take care of’ X’s valued thing C. 
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For example, we can ask what it is we are concerned about – what is at risk of the striking 
power of another – in the music journalist example from section 1.2. Plausibly, we can 
say that we are concerned about our limited free time and money not being wasted on 
bad music, insofar as avoiding that is why we’re turning to the music journalist for advice. 
We entrust our aim to find new music, to the music journalist. In doing so, we can be 
misled by her. Our time and resources can thus be wasted on following up her 
recommendations. In the midwife case, also from section 1.2, we are concerned about 
the bodily safety of the mother and baby, and we entrust that to the care of the midwife. 
She has the power to cause drastic harm to both, should she wish.35 
 
Should we prefer the three-place action/reliance model or the entrusting model? I suggest 
that we should take them to be complementary, rather than in competition. However, the 
entrusting model is attractive, because it makes explicit the background structure of 
matters of trust, that the action/reliance model leaves unstated. For example, the 
entrusting model draws our attention toward the vulnerabilities we have to another in 
trust; by virtue of what thing is placed within the striking power of another. Such 
vulnerabilities can be a result of relying on another to perform a role for us (per the role 
placement model of reliance). When we actively trust the music journalist to recommend 
good music, applying the entrusting model to the case highlights how our reliance on the 
journalist gives rise to specific situational vulnerabilities. These include our time and 
money being wasted, and the possibility of hearing bad music (something we’d prefer not 
to happen). These can result from our reliance, as we will be following the directions of 
the music journalist, who is taking on the role of pointing us in the direction of good 
music. In the midwife case, the entrusting model draws our attention toward the power 
that the midwife has over the fate of the mother and baby. The mother and baby are ‘in 
the hands of’ the midwife. 
 
Of course, situational vulnerability is also a feature of the action model. That’s because 
we have our attention drawn toward the action that someone may fail to do when we 
trust her, and thus what our goal is at risk from. ‘Recommending good music’ or 
                                                      
35 Underneath this, I think, is also a concern that the other respects our sense of 
efficacy. We are concerned about not being misled by others, and we prefer to feel 
effective in pursuing our goals. This is a typical feature of testimonial trust. 
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‘delivering the baby’, as actions, are in some sense within another’s ‘striking power’, 
because if these actions are left unperformed, something we want to happen will be 
unrealised. But one of the benefits of the entrusting model is that it illuminates why these 
actions are important to us, when this is a matter of trust. That’s because these are actions 
that serve to ‘take care’ of things that we are concerned about. We are concerned about 
our time not being wasted on listening to terrible records, and we are concerned about 
the bodily safety of the mother and baby. The entrusting model thus points out how, by 
relying, we often incur further vulnerabilities, that are not captured in ‘an action being left 
unperformed’. It is not just the possibility of a goal we wanted being left unrealised, that 
we are vulnerable to. The music journalist has power over whether we spend money, and 
the midwife can now harm the mother and baby. In other words, the entrusting model 
indicates how trustees have the power of action, not just omission. 
 
Baier hints at this point by noting the importance of ‘discretionary powers’ being granted 
to others in matters of trust. She draws attention to the fact that, when we trust another 
to perform some action φ, this is rarely the only action that we trust another to perform 
(1986 : pp.236–237). For instance, when you trust someone to post a letter for you, you 
also trust her to bring it back, rather than simply leave the letter, should the mailbox be 
inaccessible for some reason. Similarly, when you trust your friend to look after your cat 
while you are away, there are a vast range of actions that you don’t explicitly state as being 
trusted to perform, but that you nonetheless would trust your friend to perform. Should 
the cat become gravely ill, you would trust your friend to not simply continue feeding it, 
but to call a vet. By also giving your friend access to your home as part of the cat feeding, 
you trust your friend to not abuse this power and overstep the boundaries of what she is 
trusted to do. The entrusting model draws our attention to how ‘X trusts Y to φ’ is often 
elliptical for some range of actions that X trusts Y to do/refrain from doing, because 
there is presumed recognition, by the one we trust, of the different ways in which we 
make ourselves vulnerable to her actions, by relying on her, or by entrusting an object to 
her. 
 
A deeper point concerning the power of the entrusting model, is that it helps to exhume 
the underlying emotional logic structure, in matters of trust. The entrusted object C is, I 
suggest, akin to what Helm calls, in his account of the structure of emotions, the focus of 
an emotion; a particular object that is important to us (Helm 2009, 2007). The concept 
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of a focus helps articulate how we respond to others based on their actions toward that 
object. An example that Helm uses illustrates this: when you see your car is at risk of 
damage from the children playing a ball game in the street, the focus of your emotion is 
the car itself, while the targets of your worry and anger are the children themselves (Helm 
2014 : p.189). The entrusted object on Baier’s account is what equates to focus of our 
emotion. 
 
As I have already stated, having a situational vulnerability to another is not enough for 
that situation to be transformed into a matter of trust. Along these lines, we can note that 
an entrusted object and the focus of an emotion aren’t equivalent concepts. We wouldn’t 
say, for example, that Helm entrusts his car to the children. This is even though his car is 
the focus of his emotion of worry. His car is simply within harms reach of the children’s 
actions. Entrusting something to another, we can suppose, involves some overture to 
another: it involves active trusting. When we entrust something to another, we rely on 
her to take care of it. We take it there is recognition from her of what we are placing 
within her striking power. This is the point I also made in section 2.2.3 when setting out 
how the Commitment account was highly intuitive as an account of betrayability. There 
is an underlying structure to matters of trust, that also involves taking it that another 
recognises our vulnerability to her. Just finding oneself in a situation where a possession 
or thing we care about is within harm’s reach of another doesn’t suffice for having 
entrusted it to them, and so doesn’t suffice for that being a matter of trust, yet. 
 
We can, for instance, be careless, and not pay attention to what we are leaving within 
harms reach of another. We might thoughtlessly leave our bike unlocked outside of the 
shop. This doesn’t mean we entrust our bike to the care of those outside of the shop. 
Compare thoughtlessly leaving our bike unlocked with asking the person outside of the 
shop if he would be able to mind our bike for 5 minutes, because we have forgotten to 
bring our lock. There, we have a case of entrusting it to him. In both carelessly leaving 
our bike, and entrusting it to another, we would of course be aggrieved should our bike 
be stolen. But when we thoughtlessly leave it unlocked, we wouldn’t take it as a violation 
of trust that has been extended to another. 
 
This situational vulnerability model also extends to explaining how we are vulnerable to 
others in cases of ‘testimonial’ trust; where what is at issue is whether we trust what 
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another tells us (see section 1.5). This was true of the ‘music journalist’ case in the 
previous section. Our time and resources can be at stake in an instance of ‘testimonial’ 
trust; when what is at issue is whether we trust what another tells us. That’s because we 
can be ‘pointed in the wrong direction’; our actions will be directed by what she tells us. 
This can put us in new situations of vulnerability. Depending on what exactly we’re being 
told, it could also be that we’re being guided toward opening ourselves up to a much 
greater harm. The stranger on the street who advises us that the train station is down the 
dingy-looking alleyway may be directing us to a place where we can be robbed. 
 
The conclusion we can draw from this discussion, I suggest, is that the entrusting model 
sheds light on the structure of a situational vulnerability, that are the skeletal structures 
underpinning matters of trust. Such a situation can result from active trust: where we 
actively change our situation so that we are vulnerable to another, in relying on her to act. 
But they can also be passive; features of the situation we find ourselves in i.e. when 
someone learns an embarrassing secret of ours. In section 7.6 I discuss further cases of 
passive situational vulnerabilities, that we take trust stance attitudes toward others in. 
 
7.5 Prior assurance trust as a reason for active trust 
That two-place assurance trust involves perception colouring, means that we can 
already trust another in respect of an possible action, prior to our reliance on her to do 
it. In this section, I show how this constitutes a further point against REL+, which 
cannot allow that trust can occur prior to reliance. Establishing the possibility of prior 
trust, though, helps us flesh out the picture of the stative trust stance being drawn in 
this chapter. The possibility of prior trust will be used in unpacking the ‘rolling schema’ 
model of the trust stance, that I sketch out in the final section of this chapter. 
 
Trust can occur prior to reliance on another. That prior trust can explain why we rely on 
another. The active/stative trust distinction allows for this possibility. We can rely on 
someone because we already trust her, in the sense we can are already assured that she 
will fulfil our reliance on her in some respect. That assurance can explain why we choose 
to rely on her. REL+ cannot account for this. if trust just is reliance, then to say that we 
rely on another because we trust her, is circular. 
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To illustrate the possibility of prior trust, consider Holton’s discussion of his ‘drama class’ 
case. There are three key claims he makes about this case: 
 
(i) We fall because we trust:  
“You let yourself fall because you trust [the others] to catch you” (Holton 
1994 : p.63). 
 
(ii) To rely is to act (fall): 
“I can decide to act on the supposition that you will catch me. That is to 
decide to rely on you.” (1994 : p.69) 
 
(iii) To fall is to trust: 
“If you are like me, there is a moment at which you weigh up whether or not 
to let yourself fall. How does it feel at that moment? It feels as though you 
are deciding whether or not to trust. I think that we should take this feeling 
at face value: there are circumstances in which we can decide to trust.” (1994 
: p.63) 
 
The act of falling is to rely on others to catch you. Then, to rely is to trust, given Holton’s 
view of trust. It follows that when we say, in the first claim, that we fall because we trust, 
this amounts to saying that we trust because we trust. But, if trust simply means ‘reliance’, 
it is circular or trivial to say that we trust another to catch us because we trust another to 
catch us. If we disambiguate between two senses of trust though, the statement that we 
fall because we trust becomes reasonable to make. That’s because prior assurance trust 
can be a reason for your deciding to rely on another to catch you. It’s not necessary that 
trust means the reliance itself. In other words, your trust was prior to your reliance, and 
provides an explanation for why you decided to rely. Of course, this possibility 
contravenes the view that trust just is reliance. 
 
Consider another example: 
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Cat Friends 
 
Ali and Amy choose to rely on their friend Andy to look after their cats for the 
weekend, because they trust him to do this. That is, they trust him to do so in the 
assurance sense. They phone him beforehand to ask if he could take care of the 
cats this weekend. Andy asks why they would choose to rely on him rather than 
a professional cat-sitter, and they respond that it’s because they trust him over a 
cat-sitter.  
 
If we are committed to the view that trust just is reliance, then Amy and Ali’s explanation 
as to why they approach Andy rather than a cat-sitter ought to make no sense as an 
explanation. That’s because it would report that they choose to rely on him because they 
rely on him. But they aren’t relying on Andy to look after the cats before they proceed to 
rely on him. The explanation is that the trust they report is prior to their reliance on him. 
It is their reason for relying on him. This is trust in the sense that they are assured of him, 
and confident in his capability as a cat-sitter. 
 
Could somebody respond that Ali and Amy are already relying on Andy to look after the 
cats, prior to him (possibly) agreeing to look after the cats? This wouldn’t be right. Ali 
and Amy are not yet relying on Andy to look after the cats. At this stage they’re seeing if 
they’re able to rely on Andy (they’re not proceeding on the basis that he will; they’re 
seeing if they can so proceed). They aren’t yet relying on him, because he hasn’t agreed to 
the role of cat-sitter yet. They are already assured of him as a candidate for this potential 
role, but he doesn’t have it yet. Furthermore, the response that they are trustingly relying 
on him already is particularly problematic for the Commitment account, because Andy 
hasn’t yet made a commitment to Ali and Amy to look after the cats this weekend. 
 
Could somebody respond that, in the claim that we rely because we trust, ‘because’ is doing 
the work of identifying a constituent part of that reliance, rather than a reason for it? On 
this suggestion, trust is part of the reliance: it is part of the falling, or the handing over of 
the cats. In other words, it could be identifying the reason why we give the action the 
description of ‘letting yourself fall’/’handing over the cats’, rather than identifying a practical 
reason it is performed. ‘Because’ is sometimes used in this way when setting out why an 
object is one of a type, e.g. ‘this is a triangle because it has interior angles adding up to 
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180°’, or why a state of affairs/event is of a certain type, e.g. “he was poisoned because 
his blood contained cyanide”. 
 
However, this isn’t the usage of ‘because’ in the sentence “You let yourself fall because 
you trust them to catch you”. If we are using ‘because’ to identify a constituent part of 
the action, then ‘you trust them to catch you’, simply doesn’t work as an explanation of 
why the event of letting yourself fall warrants the label ‘letting yourself fall’. It may be 
right in the drama class case that your trusting another to catch is in some sense a part of 
your letting yourself fall, but it can’t work as an explanation of why we are describing what 
you do as ‘letting yourself fall’, rather than something else. Trusting someone else to catch 
you presumably isn’t a constituent part of an act of letting yourself fall, because you can 
let yourself fall in any number of circumstances beyond those of drama class trust 
exercises. 
 
In any case, in the examples of ‘constituent part’ usages of ‘because’, there is a clear 
implication that what is in question is what we say about the object or event at issue, or 
what we label it. “He was poisoned because his blood contained cyanide” is an answer to 
the question of why we should say he was poisoned rather than suffered some other cause 
of death. It is not an explanation of why the poisoner did the poisoning in identifying the 
motive behind it (e.g. “He was poisoned because he needed silencing”). In “You let 
yourself fall because you trust them to catch you”, we are not asking whether we should 
call the event one of letting yourself fall, rather than something else. Instead, we are 
providing an explanation of why you let yourself fall, in terms of the reason why you chose 
to fall, rather than do something else. 
 
An additional passage from Holton cements that we are referring to the reasons why you 
rely on another to catch, rather than the constituent parts of that reliance: 
 
When I let myself fall, and do not put out my hand to save myself, I am relying 
on you to catch me. It could be that that is all I am doing: I might be relying quite 
without trust. I might hate the drama class, and regret the day I enrolled for it. 
[…] I might rely on you to catch me because this is the only way to complete the 
course and get the credit I need. […] More likely, however, if I let myself fall I 
will trust you to catch me. This could be because I think that an atmosphere of 
trust is important for a drama class; and that one way to work towards such an 
atmosphere is to trust you. I could value the relationships that my trust will bring. 
But even if I do not, even if my aim is simply to get through the course, I could 
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still have reason to trust you. You might have explicitly invited my trust; or 
perhaps I think that you have done so implicitly by participating in the game. And, 
given that I already have reason to rely on you, I can think that your invitation to 
trust gives me a reason to take an attitude of trust towards you. [….] Spelling my 
reasons out like this makes them seem calculated. We should not think, however, 
that in general this is so. My reasons might be hidden or unthinking. I might have 
always trusted; perhaps I can imagine no alternative but to go on. (1994 : p.69) 
[emphasis added] 
 
Again, if trust is reliance, how are we to interpret the remark emphasized, that one of 
your reasons for falling and relying on another to catch you, could be that you have always 
trusted the other to catch you? This makes little sense. You can’t have trusted prior to the 
reliance, if trust is reliance itself. With the active reliance and stative assurance trust 
distinction, Holton’s remark is unproblematic. We can just have always been assured. 
 
7.6 The stative rolling schema: retrospective, counterfactual, hypothetical 
The previous section contained cases of trust prior to reliance. In this section I raise cases 
of ‘retrospective’, ‘counterfactual’, and ‘hypothetical’ trust stance attitudes. In addition to 
being problematic for REL+, these will also motivate an account of the stative trust 
stance I call the ‘rolling schema’ model. Our stative trust stance attitudes are products of 
a rolling schema; a mental model we have of how others are likely to act toward us, in 
respect of situational vulnerabilities. It is a schema insofar as it is a mental framework that 
interprets and anticipates another’s actions. It is rolling insofar as how we perceive a 
situation is coloured by our schema, and the schema is continually updated though 
experience of others in different situations. 
 
A retrospective trust stance is one where only ‘after the fact’ we recognise that we have 
been the subject of a situational vulnerability, that another had an opportunity to take 
advantage of. Our trust stance attitude is directed toward this situation. A counterfactual 
trust stance is directed toward a situational vulnerability that could have arisen, had we not 
done something. A hypothetical trust stance is one we take toward an imagined scenario 
where we have some sort of situational vulnerability. 
 
I present an example case that will be used to illustrate the possibility of retrospective, 
counterfactual and hypothetical trust stance attitudes. 
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Offering coat 
 
Maeve has a live-in role supervising undergraduate students in a hall of residence. 
Part of the role requires her to be ‘on-call’ in the hall of residence overnight, ready 
to respond to emergencies. One of the problems she must deal with is students 
taking drugs on site. The university has a zero-tolerance approach to drugs, and 
if she finds any students doing drugs, she must immediately call the security team, 
who will attend the scene and deal with the situation. The students are made aware 
of the rules when they arrive at the beginning of term and are introduced to the 
live-in welfare team. 
 
Maeve is called out around midnight by a student being disturbed by a group of 
other students outside of her window. He claims the group are making a lot of 
noise, and taking drugs. Maeve goes to investigate, finds the small group of 
students taking drugs, and confronts them. They recognise Maeve as a member 
of the welfare team. They know that they are now in trouble, with potential 
consequences extending to fines and possibly being expelled from their course. 
Maeve calls the university security team, who say they are on their way. 
 
Maeve has in previous weeks had to fine and discipline one of the students in this 
group – Leo – who was causing noise at a late hour. Maeve and Leo are therefore 
familiar with one another to some extent. With this new penalty, Leo faces more 
serious consequences for his course. Leo begins to argue with Maeve, claiming 
that Maeve is out to get him and his friends specifically, that she could have given 
them a warning rather than immediately called security. Leo says that he and all 
of the other students distrust Maeve, and asks her what her problem is. Leo is 
clearly agitated and on edge – he is shivering uncontrollably – partly from the 
worry and adrenaline from being caught, partly from the substances he has been 
taking, but also because it is cold outside.  
 
From previous dealings with Leo, Maeve suspects that he and his friends are 
behind many ‘pranks’ other students have suffered, including food being stolen 
and bedroom doors being loudly kicked late at night (before fleeing). Maeve 
thinks that when confronted Leo tends to lie and charm people in authority in 
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order to get away with his bad behaviour, and exploits being a part of a rowdy 
group of friends, to intimidate other students against reporting them (‘snitching’). 
On this occasion, seeing Leo shivering and clearly worried about the 
consequences of being caught taking drugs, Maeve feels sorry for him, so hands 
Leo her coat to keep warm, until the security team get here, which will be around 
5-10 minutes. 
 
I will use this example and variants of it to help illustrate several key argumentative points 
about the trust stance: 
 
(i) The stance can be directed toward retrospective, counterfactual, hypothetical 
situations of vulnerability. 
(ii) The stative trust stance attitudes needn’t be about situations of reliance, 
because situations of vulnerability needn’t be matters of reliance. 
(iii) The stative trust stance attitudes we hold are products of a rolling schema; we 
anticipate what others are likely to do in respect of situational vulnerabilities, 
based on the model we have of their character, abilities, from our experiences 
of them and other people like them. 
 
7.6.1 Retrospective trust stances 
 
Retrospective variant: 
 
After the situation is dealt with by security, Leo gives Maeve her coat back. It is 
only afterward that Maeve realizes her phone, keys and wallet were in the coat 
pockets, while Leo was wearing it. Had Maeve remembered that these were still 
in the coat before giving it to Leo, she absolutely wouldn’t have given Leo the 
coat without removing them first. She distrusts Leo not to the point she thinks 
Leo would attempt to directly attack her, or cause her trouble in way that is in 
plain view (Leo isn’t foolish, or out of control). But Maeve thinks that, had Leo 
thought about it (he was possibly too preoccupied by worry and cold), he would 
have taken the opportunity to toy with Maeve, given how obviously personally 
attacked he felt by her. Leo could simply have lied about taking the keys, wallet 
and phone. 
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I suggest that this is a case of Maeve distrusting Leo, in respect of him having access to 
her keys, wallet and phone (hereafter; ‘her belongings’). As such, this is a specific or ‘three-
place’ distrust. That attitude of distrust, I take it, stems from a deeper two-place attitude 
that Maeve has about Leo, informed by her experiences of him so far. What makes the 
example particularly interesting, and problematic for a theory like REL+, is that is about 
a situational vulnerability that has already happened, that neither Leo nor Maeve herself 
recognized as holding at the time. It is retrospective distrust. 
 
Distrust isn’t the only trust stance attitude that can be ‘retrospective’ like this. The other 
stative attitudes - assurance and uncertainty – can also be held to others regarding 
retrospective situations of vulnerability. Imagine a different case, where Maeve gives her 
coat to her trusted friend Pilar while she is cold, and while it also unknowingly contains 
her belongings. When Pilar gives Maeve her coat back, and Maeve recognizes it had her 
belongings in the pockets, Maeve would not feel the same sense of alarm (and part relief) 
as she felt after getting the coat back from Leo. Instead, she would have a sense of 
assurance trust: a sense of safety or assurance that Pilar had them on her person. It would 
probably be unthinkable for Maeve that her belongings would be at risk, if Pilar had 
them.36 
 
Note that this is a case of retrospective distrust rather than ongoing/lingering distrust. That’s 
because it wasn’t true that Maeve held an attitude of distrust of Leo in respect of having 
possession of her belongings at the time he did. She might never have entertained the 
scenario before it occurred to her that it had taken place. So, this is not a case of Maeve 
having distrusted Leo (or having trusted Pilar). This is a case of Maeve now having an 
attitude of distrust of Leo (and an attitude of assurance of Pilar), albeit in respect of a 
situation that has now already passed. 
 
The Leo and Pilar examples are problematic for REL+. We have a case of a trust stance 
attitude about a situation that has already taken place. That situation is where reliance or 
non-reliance (/avoided reliance, as per the revision considered in section 4.7.3) could have 
occurred. Maeve, had she been aware of the belongings, prior to handing over the coat, 
                                                      
36 We could imagine a further case to illustrate uncertainty from chapter 3: Maeve gives 
the coat to her new colleague Sophie, who she isn’t yet sure about. 
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could have decided to rely on Leo, or Pilar, to look after those belongings. But neither 
Maeve (nor Leo, nor Pilar) were even aware of the presence of those belongings in the 
coat. So, it cannot be that Maeve’s distrust attitude is a product of her reliance/non-
reliance (/avoided reliance) on Leo/Pilar to look after her belongings. The situation in 
which she could have relied or not has now long since passed.37 This is a trust stance attitude 
about a situation where the ‘reliance stance’ does not come into play. It is, rather, about 
a more general situational vulnerability: where another can harm us, or manipulate us, in 
some way. 
 
7.6.2 Putting pressure on the Commitment account 
In this section I highlight how retrospective cases like this put pressure on the 
Commitment account of the trust stance. This establishes a point I will elaborate on in 
the next chapter: that underneath the notion of commitment is a more basic concern we 
have about others in matters of trust, that seems to be hardwired into the trust stance 
attitudes. We are concerned that another takes seriously our situational vulnerability, 
when there is mutual recognition of that vulnerability. 
 
As we’ve seen in sections 2.2.3 and chapter 4, the Commitment account holds that a 
three-place trust/distrust attitude toward another requires a belief that she has made a 
commitment to φ’ing. The Offering coat example however casts doubt on such a belief as a 
necessary component of a trust stance attitude. 
 
There are two features of the case that suggest trust and distrust needn’t presuppose 
commitment. One of these concerns Leo’s attitude toward Maeve. Leo, we can safely say, 
distrusts Maeve. For a start, he feels persecuted by Maeve; that she ‘has it in for him’ and 
his friends. He also suspects that she has a personal problem with him, rather than this 
incident being a case of carrying out the responsibilities of her job role. As such, he takes 
it that she is manoeuvring against him, beyond what he can expect of her from her job 
                                                      
37 Though it is true that Maeve is now not relying on Leo to look after her belongings. 
But this further demonstrates how non-reliance, as we saw in chapter 4, does no work 
in generating the attitude of distrust. Non-reliance on another in some respect is just the 
absence of reliance on her in that respect. It is true that we are at each moment not 
relying on an infinite number of things and people. As such reporting that we don’t rely 
on another in some respect tells us very little about our mental state. 
  175 
role. He might wonder if she has been waiting for an opportunity to catch him taking 
drugs, for example.  
 
If the Commitment account is right, his distrust of her in this case should be in respect 
of a commitment that she has made to him. But arguably Maeve hasn’t made any 
commitment to Leo about the respects in which he distrusts her. If anything, she has 
made the opposite commitments, because at the start of term, it is made clear to all 
students that Maeve’s job is to enforce a zero-tolerance drug policy. Leo doesn’t distrust 
Maeve in respect of that commitment, however. So, the interpersonal salience of Leo’s 
distrust of Maeve cannot be a product of his belief she has made commitments to him to 
e.g. not report him to security. It is a product of some more basic concern about how 
Maeve regards him, that underpins, comes prior to, is more basic than any commitments 
she makes. It is, I suggest, a product of an attitude of wariness about her, that she is 
undertaking hidden manoeuvring that would exploit any situational vulnerabilities he has. 
 
A further feature of the case, that casts doubt on the necessity of commitments featuring 
in matters of trust, concerns Maeve’s distrust of Leo. Maeve distrusts Leo in respect of 
him having access to her belongings. But Leo hasn’t made any commitment to her to not 
take them. Maeve’s distrust of Leo – like his distrust of her – is more basic, and comes 
prior to any commitments he makes. It is, again, an attitude of suspecting that Leo will 
undertake hidden manoeuvring to exploit situational vulnerabilities of his. 
 
We could offer a response to these points on the basis that, as we saw in section 2.2.3, 
Hawley allows that commitment can take a very broad reading, seeing as commitments 
can be conferred by “roles and external circumstances” and “mutual expectation and 
convention” (Hawley 2014 : p.11). Hawley stipulates this when considering the sort of 
case I am discussing here: where we are simply vulnerable to another’s actions, and treat 
her acting as a matter of trust, without the other person appearing to have made a 
commitment to not exploiting that vulnerability. The examples she uses in this respect 
are of trusting your friends not to steal your cutlery, when having them round for dinner, 
and trusting strangers to let you walk unhindered. In these cases, we could try to stipulate 
that there is something like a ‘background commitment’ at issue. As such, we can respond 
that perhaps Leo does have a commitment to not take Maeve’s belongings, if we allow 
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commitments to be incurred by these very broad conditions. By not yet having tried to 
take Maeve’s belongings, Leo incurs a commitment to not doing so. 
 
I think we would be entitled to say that Leo hasn’t made any commitment to Maeve to 
not take the belongings in her coat. I accept that we can suppose the “mutual expectation 
and convention” point allows that we can incur a commitment to another, through a 
process resembling one I discussed in setting out the Commitment account in section 
2.2.3. This was we where we had a process of presumed mutual recognition of what X 
was relying on Y to do.38 This would account for why you can trust your friends to not 
take your cutlery, when they come to your house. The process of mutual recognition 
(perhaps low level and unconscious) that occurs when they see your cutlery, and you see 
them seeing this, and they see you seeing them (etc.), generates the presumed 
commitment that they will not take it. What we have here though is a case that the mutual 
expectation and convention point might not be able to account for. That’s because Leo 
can’t be a party to any process of mutual expectation, in respect of the action at hand. 
Not only is the situation now in the past, but Leo wasn’t aware that the belongings were 
in the coat, and nor at the time, was Maeve. So, that process of mutual recognition can’t 
take place. Nonetheless, Maeve has an actual, present distrust attitude about Leo in 
respect of taking her belongings; she currently is supposing that he would take them, had 
he known about them, and would keep this hidden from her. She finds herself distrusting 
now, not in the past, when the situation held. 
 
What we can argue, I think, is that the perception colouring quality, discussed in section 
7.3, of Maeve’s prior distrust of Leo, means that her distrust attitude fills out new 
scenarios with anticipatory attitudes about what Leo will likely do. So, even though Leo 
hasn’t made a commitment to not take the belongings in her coat, Maeve can anticipate 
that he would, and this can still be a trust stance that she adopts. 
 
The ‘broad commitment’ response also seems unable to account for Leo’s distrust 
attitude toward Maeve. It’s implausible that his attitude is grounded in Maeve having 
                                                      
38 This sort of process is at the heart of Scanlon’s (1990) account of promising, and 
Black’s (2004) discussion of whether obligations can be incurred through reliance. Both 
involve a set of conditions that stipulate an obligation to another to φ can only go 
through when X and Y mutually recognise that Y wants X to φ, and that X is 
encouraging (in some sense) Y to believe that X will φ. 
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made any of the commitments to him, that would explain his distrust of her. She has 
made many of the opposite commitments, in fact. Namely, calling security. 
 
Now, we can consider the response that the commitments that are at issue, are extremely 
general: such as ‘not undertaking hidden manoeuvring’. But I would suggest that this 
commitment just makes explicit the basic form of the distrust/wariness attitude, rather 
than being a background commitment that is at issue in any matter of trust. If this is the 
commitment that Leo takes Maeve to have, and the commitment that Maeve takes Leo 
to have, then it is, in principle, a commitment like any other. But in fact, ‘not undertaking 
hidden manoeuvring’ is the generic structure of any commitment that could turn a new 
domain of interaction, into a matter of trust. ‘Not undertaking hidden manoeuvring’ is 
the generic thing we are concerned about in matters of trust.39 Having to impute this 
commitment in every case where it seems difficult to find a commitment, would suggest 
that there is an underlying concern in matters of trust. Specific commitments are 
crystallised forms of such a concern, applied to specific domains of interaction. Making 
commitments, I suggest, is a method for eliciting this concern, and so turning a new 
domain of interaction into a matter of trust. 
 
We can also put pressure on the commitment account in this scenario, by changing the 
case so that Maeve hands her coat to one of Leo’s friends – Jack – who she hasn’t 
encountered before. It’s implausible to suppose that Jack, who she has just encountered 
for the first time, has a commitment to Maeve to not take her belongings, just by virtue 
of circumstance. I take it that Maeve would, by virtue of Jack’s association with Leo, 
distrust Jack. But it is probably implausible that any generic commitments Leo has to 
Maeve (i.e. ‘not undertaking hidden manoeuvring’) would be transferred to Jack, just by 
association. 
 
We might finally seek to respond that Leo and his friend Jack do have a commitment to 
Maeve, by virtue of the law, or a code of conduct they have signed. But there are several 
issues with this proposal. We can imagine a structurally similar circumstance between 
                                                      
39 Making this just another commitment, as the focus of our trust stance, also doesn’t 
explain why this is the underlying concern at issue in matters of trust. In the next chapter, 
I will set out an account of why it matters to us, in the manner of trust stance attitudes, 
that others aren’t undertaking hidden manoeuvring against us. 
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individuals, where there is no formal law or code of conduct, in a ‘state of nature’. Or, 
where the law or codes of conduct, are widely considered to be barely enforced. The 
requisite attitudes of assurance or wariness over a situational vulnerability would still be 
felt. 
 
Furthermore, the response that Leo and Jack have a commitment to Maeve by virtue of 
the rule of law/code of conduct, rests on a dubious premise. This is the implied premise 
that, prior to the existence of the law or codes of conduct, it can’t have been possible to 
trust/distrust another, in respect of a situation of vulnerability (where any explicit 
commitments had yet to be made). This is highly implausible. It is true that we can find 
ourselves in new types of situations of vulnerability, that the law or our institutions have 
yet to rule on. The law and our codes of conduct are playing catch up with different 
situations we where we can trust and distrust others. 
 
In addition, I’d suggest that Maeve isn’t thinking at the time about the commitments Leo 
or Jack have, by the rule of law. Her concern about what Leo or Jack might do, doesn’t 
stem from a concern that they might break the law or a code of conduct. In ‘live’ 
situations, where things we care about are at risk from another’s actions, the law is often 
far from our minds; we are absorbed in monitoring the situation. It is only later we appeal 
to the law, to redress a wrong done to us. 
 
7.6.3 Counterfactual & hypothetical trust stances 
We can also present a counterfactual variant of the case above. This shows that we can 
have a trust stance attitude in respect of a situational vulnerability that could have arisen. 
Again, this is without any reliance, or commitments. 
  
Counterfactual variant: 
 
After receiving the coat back from Leo, Maeve is struck by the fear that her 
belongings may have been in the pockets when she gave him the coat, so checks 
them. They aren’t there. Thankfully, she realises that her keys and phone are in 
her front jeans pocket, and she left her wallet in her room. 
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Here is a case of Maeve distrusting Leo over a situational vulnerability that didn’t even 
transpire, but could have done, had circumstances been different. Again, we can pose a 
counterpart case where Maeve has the same realisation, after receiving her coat back from 
her friend Pilar. Even though there may be a moment where she is unsure whether her 
belongings were in the coat, upon locating them and reflecting on the possibility that they 
could have been in Pilar’s possession, she will have a sense of assurance about that scenario; 
she will have counterfactual trust of Pilar. 
 
We can also give a case of a trust stance in respect of a hypothetical situation of 
vulnerability. This shows that we can have trust stance attitudes about imagined 
situations: 
 
Hypothetical variant: 
 
Sometime after the drug incident, Maeve is imagining the kinds of thing Leo 
might do in retaliation. She sometimes shares the kitchen facilities with students. 
She wonders about the possibility of Leo or his friend Jack entering the kitchen 
at a time when Maeve has left her cooking unattended. She imagines that they 
would tamper with her cooking, if they knew she wouldn’t be there to see it. 
 
Here again we have a case where Maeve distrusts Leo, in respect of a purely imagined 
circumstance. As such no reliance/non-reliance has yet to occur. It is simply a distrust 
attitude Maeve has about Leo, in respect of what he would do, given some situation. And, 
as with the retrospective and counterfactual cases, we can imagine a corresponding 
hypothetical assurance attitude that Maeve would have about Pilar, in the same situation. 
Maeve would anticipate that Pilar would leave Maeve’s cooking alone, should Pilar find 
it unattended (perhaps even anticipating that Pilar would help, by taking responsibility for 
it, while Maeve was away). 
 
7.7 The rolling schema model 
What is the take-home lesson, from considering these different forms of stative trust 
stance attitude?  I suggest that what they illustrate is that the trust stance attitudes are the 
products of an anticipatory framework we possess, which we apply unconsciously onto 
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different scenarios of situational vulnerability (whether retrospective, current, or 
anticipated). The broad framework is what I call a rolling schema. It is a mental model, 
continually applied and updated based on experience (hence ‘rolling’), that helps us to 
navigate actual, potential, and anticipated situations of vulnerability, in respect of who we 
are possibly vulnerable to. The rolling schema model takes seriously the lessons of the 
previous sections, on the relationship between two-place and three-place trust stances, 
and the perception colouring quality of the trust stance. It also attempts to account for 
these in a systematic way. 
 
The cases of prior/retrospective/counterfactual/hypothetical stative trust stance 
attitudes, considered in the previous sections, are examples of a subject’s (Maeve’s) rolling 
schema being applied to different possible situations of vulnerability with different 
people. We take anticipatory (stative) trust stance attitudes toward people, in respect of 
those situations, based on our rolling schemas for those people. The trust stance attitudes 
that result from our rolling schema, allow us to ‘read’ situations and interpret other’s 
behaviours within them. They influence how willingly we allow ourselves to get ourselves 
into, or remain within, situations of vulnerability. 
 
Our schemas are self-focused. They are about what people are prone to do, in respect of 
things that we are concerned about, in different situations. They encode anticipatory 
information about people’s motives and their abilities, and thus likely actions. 
Information contained within this schema, informs our one-place, two-place, three-place 
trust stance attitudes (see sections 1.2 - 1.4). At the most general or abstracted level, we 
will have a stative trust stance attitude toward people in general, based on our schema for 
how people generally are toward one another, in respect of a generic situation of 
vulnerability. This sort of attitude would constitute a one-place stative trust stance: 
whether we are generally assurance trusting, or distrusting (wary of others). 
 
We can flesh out the schema so that it becomes more fine-grained and specific. One of 
the ways we can do so is by drilling down into the type of person we are considering. We 
develop schemas for types, such as man, woman, white person, child, student, politician, 
and so on. For instance, Maeve’s schema for ‘student’ will be different for her schema 
for ‘university security staff’. We will also develop schemas for types of person in terms 
of their relationship to us, and to others. I take it that we can have schemas for stranger, 
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friend, romantic partner, extended family member, and so on, based on our experiences 
of individuals under those types. 
 
We also develop schemas for specific people, such as your colleague Sophie, the man 
operating the checkout, President Trump. For example, Maeve’s schema for Leo is 
different from her schema for Pilar. She has a different two-place trust stance attitude 
toward each. It’s clear that Maeve, for example, anticipates Leo and Pilar acting differently 
toward her, in respect of ways she could be vulnerable to them. That’s because she has 
different schemas for Leo and Pilar in these respects, informed by her experiences of 
them. These could be experiences of them acting directly toward her, or toward other 
people. Through this, she forms assessments of their character, and motives. For 
instance, Maeve has experienced first-hand Leo acting selfishly and recklessly, and as 
having no fondness for her or people in her position. So, her schema for Leo paints a 
negative picture of him. Applying the schema to situations of vulnerability involving her 
(hypothetical, retrospective, etc.), this determines Maeve’s trust stance toward Leo in 
those situations; she anticipates certain kinds of actions from him, based on his character, 
motives and abilities (she distrusts Leo, as a result, with her belongings). On the other 
hand, Pilar has been a good friend, so her schema for Pilar paints a positive picture of 
her. There are going to be very few situations where Maeve would not presume the best 
of Pilar, unless Pilar begins to act unfavourably toward Maeve. 
 
Maeve also forms assessments of others’ competence and willingness (per section 1.2) in 
certain respects. These assessments then inform the trust stance attitudes she adopts 
toward them, in situations where she could already be vulnerable, or could make herself 
vulnerable to them. Competence and willingness assessments inform what situations of 
vulnerability she puts herself into, in respect of others. For example, Maeve might 
understand people as generally not being competent in some specific matter. Therefore, 
she might then suppose Pilar is not competent in some respect. As such, there are limits 
to what she can trust Pilar in, even when she otherwise trusts Pilar deeply, due to her 
schema for her being so positive in terms of Pilar’s character. 
  
Our general assessments of where people’s competence and motivations lie – our general 
schemas - become particularly relevant in institutional contexts, when trying to arrive at 
policies and procedures for good practice. For instance, in undertaking a complicated 
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structural engineering project, it will be sensible to have checks performed by multiple 
engineers on a set of plans, before those plans are approved. It would be irresponsible to 
solely trust the judgement of one engineer in such a context. This isn’t because we have 
a schema for a specific engineer as having suspect motives, and so worthy of distrust. 
Rather, it is based on our schema for people being liable to error. It’s because our schema 
has it that, given the scenario at issue, the possibility of an error of judgement slipping 
through – the costs of which could be catastrophic - is greatly reduced with more eyes 
covering the same problem. 
 
While schemas can encode competence, they can also encode willingness. This might 
inform how we structure incentives in institutional contexts.40 We know that it is 
laborious for engineers to seek many checks on work they otherwise want approved. 
However, it is catastrophic if this doesn’t happen. So, we take steps to ensure that there 
are incentives in place to ensure that engineers in general, not specific ones, will seek the 
checks needed. 
 
These points concerning competence and willingness are related to why I have earlier 
stated (first in sections 4.7.4 and 4.7.5) that distrust requires wariness of another in terms 
of her motives. When our schema encodes a lack of competence on some matter, this isn’t 
enough yet to distrust. Maeve can fail to trust Pilar on the matter of e.g. fixing her boiler, 
and can feel anxiety about the possibility of relying on her in this domain. A failure to 
trust another doesn’t imply distrust of her, even if it is associated with a feeling of anxiety 
about what would befall us, should we rely, or be in a position requiring her help. What 
Maeve would likely do, in recognising Pilar’s helpful but misplaced desire to help, is close 
off this as avenue on which Pilar is to be given responsibility in future, lest Maeve herself 
be lead to disappointment. This needn’t give rise to the stronger sort of anxiety, suspicion, 
needing to pin down whether Pilar is toying with her, or trying to exploit her, that is 
accompanied by the sense that Pilar is selfishly motivated. If Pilar fails to take seriously 
                                                      
40 I take it that our schemas about people can be influenced by what others tell us. This 
can cause a spiral of selfishness, because hearing that others are selfish puts us on guard. 
If we read, from someone we take seriously as an authority, an account of people or 
specific sorts of people as at root selfish, our schema for people in general may be 
updated in kind, and we may come to treat others accordingly. It can be an effort to 
guard against people’s views getting behind your eyes and reframing how you interpret 
others. 
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what the consequences of Maeve’s reliance on her could be, in some domains where she 
herself is incompetent or liable to be waylaid by other desires, then Maeve may come to 
distrust Pilar. 
 
This leads us to the thought that, when another takes seriously that there are limits to 
which she is, or can be trusted, this will cast her in a positive light. Recognising there are 
limits to what another can three-place trust you in, is in fact a way of encouraging two-
place trust. You demonstrate a seriousness about how much risk another can be subject 
to, through your actions, and other’s schemas about your motives and character will be 
updated. To give another example: you might be assured that you are free of sexually 
transmitted infections, though you haven’t had this verified by a clinician. But for your 
new partner, it may be that she won’t simply take your word for it, because she is aware 
that some infections are symptomless. Also, given that you are not yet entirely familiar 
with one another, the possibility that you will be more inclined to try to simply get what 
you want from the situation, is still a possibility that she can’t yet discount. She is aware 
that there are incentives in place that would lead some people, perhaps not you, to be 
hasty. This needn’t mean she generally distrusts you as a person, of course. But, allaying 
her concerns by having yourself checked by a clinician, would in fact be a way of 
demonstrating your trustworthiness, not just in this matter, but more generally. By 
respecting the limits to which others can or should trust us, we demonstrate that in fact 
we can be trusted on those matters. Our word will come to carry with it a level of 
assurance that we not trying to mislead, and also that we have taken measures to reduce 
the possibility that we have misjudged our own competence and willingness. Thus, we 
assure that there is a slim possibility of negative consequences resulting from trusting us 
on this matter. 
 
Maeve’s specific schemas for Leo and Pilar are updated on the fly by experiences of Leo 
and Pilar, hence they are rolling. Schemas are updated by building associations between 
people and their actions; making inferences of motivations and character. I suggest that 
just as her specific schemas for Leo and Pilar are updated by experiences of them, the 
schemas for the types of person that Leo and Pilar fall under are also influenced and 
updated, based on her experiences with Leo and Pilar. Leo and Pilar are representative of 
certain types of person, and so what they do is representative of what their types of person 
do. 
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The rolling schema model explains how it is that observing the way Y treats a third party 
Z can affect the stative trust stance attitudes we have toward Y. Our feelings about Y will 
change because our schema updates to show what sort of person Y is to other people. 
By observing that Y is that way to that type of person, then our schema for her in terms 
of her character and motivations, and her selflessness/selfishness, is updated. I take it 
that our schema for other people is also updated by how we ourselves act toward others. 
By seeing that we are an example of a person and that we act in a certain way, we recognise 
that people can act this way in some situation. 
 
The schemas for types of people become applied to new individuals we encounter, as we 
judge individuals to fall under those types. We may, as a result, take a two-place trust 
stance toward a certain individual, just after encountering her, purely based on our 
schemas of certain types of person being unconsciously applied to her. For instance, we 
may have a schema that encodes people from a certain town as being generally very giving, 
so we might generally trust these individuals. I take it that this will also be true of the 
schemas we have for ‘relationships’; we apply these to individuals when we discover their 
relationships with other individuals we have a schema for. This is how Maeve arrives at a 
trust stance toward Jack, when encountering him for the first time as a friend of Leo’s. 
She applies the schema for friend and Leo to Jack, and comes to distrust him to some 
extent, as a result. 
 
We also have schemas for certain types of situation, that encode where we are vulnerable 
in those situations. For example, we will have a schema for how we are vulnerable while 
waiting at a cashpoint. When our schema for ‘stranger’ is applied to this situation, we 
arrive at a stative trust stance attitude toward others in a situation of waiting at a 
cashpoint. This becomes finer grained, depending on how we judge a stranger, present in 
that situation, as falling under a certain type of person. 
 
The rolling schema model explains the relationship between the one-place, two-place, 
three-place trust stances, and their perception colouring qualities. We develop schemas 
for types of person, and individual people. These get applied to specific situations, where 
we have a situational vulnerability, that another can take advantage of. We interpret what 
the other is doing in that situation, and what she may or may not be hiding, based on the 
two-place schema for her that we apply unconsciously. That gets applied based on our 
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experiences of her. It is also based on our experiences of the types of person that we have 
schemas for, that we judge her as falling under. So, given a situation where we are at a 
cashpoint with our trusted friend, we will three-place stative/assurance trust her in many 
unconscious ways, such as trusting her in respect of not attempting to sneak a glance at 
our pin number. However, when we are at a cashpoint next to someone we don’t know, 
our trust stance toward that stranger will be informed by our schemas for the types of 
person they fall under. 
 
In the next chapter I will defend an account of the interpersonal import of matters of 
trust – their betrayability – that informs how our assessment of another’s character is at 
issue in the trust stance. I argue that at the heart of matters of trust, we have a non-
instrumental concern about the extent to which others have a non-instrumental concern 
for us, i.e. the extent to which they care about us. I appeal to the notion of interpersonal 
attachment to capture this. The attachment account sheds light on what exactly our rolling 
schema is forming an assessment about, in assessing another’s motives. If her motives, in 
a non-instrumental way, take us into consideration, then we form a positive appraisal of 
her. We come to trust her. 
 
How do we come to form such a positive assessment of another’s motives, and so come 
to trust her? The obvious answer is by specific three-place trusts being repeatedly fulfilled 
in the past. This is a standard answer in the literature on trust. However, I think this 
answer ignores the ‘bigger picture’, i.e. what specific trusts being fulfilled is emblematic 
of. A curious or unexpected way (because it doesn’t appear to be ‘rational’), in which we 
sometimes come to trust others has, I think, been unduly ignored. This is through displays 
of non-instrumental concern, or affection, or – putting it in more basic terms –people 
being nice to us, and looking out for us. This encourages the formation of social bonds 
or attachments to individuals, that underpin two-place trust relationships. The rolling 
schema model is well suited to explain this. Our schema for a person can be revised so 
we see them as non-instrumentally concerned about us, just through acts of care and 
affection. 
 
Consider for example the following case. This comes from an account of a Ugandan 
woman named Eunice, who was taken from her village and held captive by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA: a militia responsible for carrying out many abductions and 
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killings). She was forced to marry a male soldier named Bosco who had also been 
abducted by the LRA, and forced to fight for them. Their initial encounter causes Eunice 
to distrust Bosco. However, Bosco loves Eunice, and wants to make their marriage work, 
so he sets about trying to win her trust: 
 
Eunice tried to escape once but was caught. She and her friend, a young woman 
like herself, had been washing clothes in a stream when they decided to run. 
Rebels stationed high in the trees working as lookouts spotted them. Bosco had 
defended her, prevented her from being killed.  
 
On his forays away from camp, Bosco wanted to be back with Eunice, but he 
sensed her fear around him and set about trying to win her trust. When LRA 
leaders asked Eunice to participate on looting or abduction trips, Bosco would 
lie to them and say that he had ordered her to perform other tasks. She still 
occasionally had to go on those raids, and so he shielded her in battle. During 
food shortages in the camp, he scrounged up water and bread and brought it to 
their tent to surprise her. (Okeowo 2017 : p.25)  
 
What we have in this example are unsolicited expressions of care and affection being used 
to win trust.41 I suggest that the rolling schema model of the trust stance, and attachment 
account of interpersonal import, explains this. Eunice’s schema for Bosco was initially 
one that construed him as selfish, brutal, uncaring. However, as he undertook unsolicited 
acts of affection and protection, he acted in a way that indicated a non-instrumental 
concern for her situational vulnerabilities. Eunice wasn’t relying on him in any of these 
respects, but she was in a situation of vulnerability, and Bosco continually displayed a 
non-instrumental concern about her in those situations. Eunice came to trust Bosco as a 
result, as her understanding of him - her schema - became radically revised. She later grew 
increasingly attached to Bosco and fell in love with him. Their bond deepened to the 
point that they worked together in escaping the LRA; an act that required an extreme 
level of trust and coordination in their joint activity. 
 
To summarise how the rolling schema model underpins the trust stance: how we feel – 
what stative trust stance we have toward a people generally, type of person, specific 
                                                      
41 This suggests that expressions of affection are also a backdoor to persuasion, and thus 
to making someone more inclined to be vulnerable to you. This seems right. Manipulative 
people for instance, understand the power of promises, as a means for soothing others. 
Making a promise displays concern; it implies that you take seriously her need for 
assurance on some matter, that her assurance matters to you, and thus it has the power 
to elicit her assurance. Thus, insincere promises can be deployed as a way of further 
manoeuvring. 
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individuals, either in general situations or specific ones – will be informed by associations 
we build through experience of these types of person/specific people (perhaps direct, or 
via indirect testimony from others). We build certain schemas for certain individuals, or 
types of person, and apply those to schemas we have for types of situation. We come to 
anticipate actions in respect of our situational vulnerabilities, from different types of 
people. 
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8 The interpersonal import of matters of trust: attachment 
In this final chapter I defend an account of the interpersonal import of matters of trust. 
I call this the Attachment account. My suggestion is that at the heart of any matter of 
trust, a non-instrumental concern for secure attachment to others must be at stake, at 
some level. The phenomenon of social attachment is a kind of dependence; we need to 
live alongside others for our emotional and physical wellbeing. In other words, we have, 
by our nature, a non-instrumental concern for others being non-instrumentally concerned 
about us. As such, the account harnesses the concepts I set out in chapter 6: the difference 
between an instrumental concern, and a non-instrumental concern, and the notion of 
dependence upon something. 
 
This explains the betrayability of the trust stance attitudes, because in betrayal we see the 
possibility of being deserted by someone we have some level of attachment to. This 
means that the phenomenon of interpersonal trust, and the trust stance attitudes, revolve 
around our attachment security, at some level. 
 
8.1 Recap: betrayability 
The interpersonal import of matters of trust is glimpsed in the possibility of betrayal. 
Here I will briefly recap the discussion of betrayal and betrayability given so far. In section 
1.7 I discussed the different ways that trust can be disappointed or harmed, in an 
interpersonally significant way. In section 2.2 I discussed how the REL+ literature has 
progressed based on improved accounts of betrayability, and I endorsed Hawley’s 
Commitment account in this respect. I suggested that the Commitment account 
corresponded with an account of betrayal I endorsed in section 1.7: Shklar’s (1984) 
definition of the ‘simple act’ of betrayal: 
 
For a simple act of betrayal, one person should have both intentionally convinced 
another person of his future loyalty and then deliberately rejected him. The latter 
then, not surprisingly, feels betrayed. (Shklar 1984 : pp.140–141) 
 
Betrayal, I suggested in section 1.7, was the flag-bearer for a family of related harms we 
can suffer in matters of trust. It is through the possibility of betrayal that we glimpse how 
matters of trust carry an importance to us, beyond the possibility of loss or gain resulting 
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from another’s actions. Betrayal is standardly appealed to in the literature to characterise 
the interpersonal import of matters of trust. I suggest that if we are to seek an account of 
the interpersonal import, we must seek an account of betrayability.  
 
We also need one that that solves problems the Commitment account seemed to face in 
7.6.2. There it seemed the concept of commitment was unable to explain cases where we 
have a trust stance attitude toward another in respect of some passive situational 
vulnerability. In these cases, the commitment we need to attribute amounts to the generic 
form of what the assurance or wariness attitude is about, i.e. that the other is not 
concealing actions against our interests. We don’t yet, though, have any account of why 
another doing this against us, should matter to us, in the way that gives rise to 
betrayability. In effect, we need an account that fills in the gaps in the Commitment 
account and Shklar’s definition, that explains why ‘convincing another person of his 
future loyalty and then deliberately rejecting him’, matters to us in the way that it then 
causes us to feel betrayed, as opposed to simply frustrated. For this, we need to look more 
closely at what matters to people, that explains why we can feel the vivid interpersonally 
oriented feelings of betrayal, and associated harms. 
  
8.2 ‘Right kind of motive’ views 
To motivate the attachment account I first consider accounts of interpersonal import that 
attribute it to a concern about another’s motives. I argue that these accounts fail, because 
they allow that concern to be an instrumental concern. This establishes a key 
argumentative point in favour of the attachment account: matters of trust must involve a 
non-instrumental concern about another’s motives. This was seen in reflecting on the 
con-artist case, and the contrast ‘Flatmate’ cases considered in section 1.6. 
 
The interpersonal import of a matter of trust is typically explained by appealing to the 
possibility of betrayal in a matter of trust. Without the possibility of betrayal, the matter 
is one of mere prediction or anticipation of another performing an instrumentally 
beneficial/detrimental act. The intuition that trust is distinct in terms of betrayability was 
thus the motivation behind Baier’s ‘Goodwill’ account from section 2.2.1. The Goodwill 
account told us that the interpersonal import of matters of trust – betrayability – stemmed 
from the fact that when we trust, we rely on another’s goodwill toward us. The underlying 
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thought behind this account was that matters of trust involve a concern about another’s 
motives, in some way. This seemed at first glance to explain what was different about 
Kant’s neighbours’ reliance on Kant when they trusted him to walk, as opposed to merely 
relied on him walking. 
 
The Goodwill account isn’t the only account of trust that attributes betrayability to a 
concern about another’s motive. Jones’ ‘Affective Optimism’ account (section 4.7.4) 
involves a concern that the other is “favourably moved by the thought that we are 
counting on her,” (1996 : p.4). In other words, when we trust another, we take it that she 
is positively moved by the fact of our counting on (/relying on) her. We attribute to her 
a positive motive, such that a concern about that motive is part of the trust attitude. 
Similarly, if we recall Hardin’s ‘Encapsulated/shared interest’ view (section 1.8), his 
account tells us that trust involves a presumption that “it is in [the trustee’s] interest to 
maintain our relationship,” (1998 : p.12). Even though Hardin doesn’t suppose this 
attribution of a motive lends any normative significance to trust, we can treat it as a type 
of ‘motive’ account, like the Goodwill and Jones’ Affective Optimism accounts.42 
 
8.3 The con-artist & (non-)instrumental concern over motives 
The issue with ‘right kind of motive’ accounts is that they suffer from an objection that 
Holton raises against Baier’s ‘Goodwill’ account. This was the con-artist case, from 
section 2.2.1. What the con-artist case showed was that reliance on another’s goodwill 
toward one, as the motive for her action, was insufficient for trusting her. That’s because 
a con-artist could possess this attitude, and a con-artist precisely doesn’t trust you to act. 
 
I suggest that the deeper reason why the con-artist objection proves fatal for ‘right kind 
of motive’ views, is that a con-artist has an instrumental concern about the motives of his 
mark. Even if the con-artist has a situational vulnerability toward his mark, in that he is 
                                                      
42 I am here cherry-picking from the Affective Optimism account. Based on how Jones 
construes optimism as an “affectively loaded way of seeing the one trusted,” (1996 : 
p.4), the Affective Optimism arguably can escape the con-artist objection; a con-artist 
doesn’t have an affectively loaded way of seeing his mark. I also presume that the 
‘affectively loaded way of seeing the one trusted’ and concern that the other is 
‘favourably moved by the thought that we are counting on her’, that Jones refers to, are 
circling the account I set out below. 
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liable to lose out on time, resources, and may be caught out, he doesn’t have the right 
kind of concern about the motive of his mark, for it to be a matter of trust. This is why 
Jones’ and Hardin’s accounts also suffer from the same counterexample. It is of 
instrumental importance to the con-artist that his mark has favourable attitudes toward 
him, because those favourable attitudes are playing a practical role (as per the role 
placement view of reliance in 5.4) in motivating the mark to do useful things for the con-
artist (e.g., handing over the bank details). 
 
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 set out the difference between instrumental and non-instrumental 
concerns. When we have a non-instrumental concern for something, this is because it 
matters for our wellbeing, and we are liable to suffer emotional distress without it. The 
con-artist, though, has an instrumental concern that your motive toward him is 
favourable. Your motive toward him, as manifest in whether you do hand over your 
money, doesn’t matter in relating to a basic need that others are favourable toward him. 
Matters of trust, though, invoke such a need. We are liable to suffer emotional distress – 
feelings of betrayal – where that distress stems from the fact that the other doesn’t appear 
to care, or be concerned, about us. It is important to us, in a non-instrumental way, that we 
matter to the other.43 
 
Recall the discussions, from section 1.7, of Jackson’s (2000) and Shklar’s (1984) accounts 
of betrayal. Both accounts supported the thought that what another does, in a matter of 
trust, matters to us, from a concern about desertion. The possibility of being deceived 
matters to us, not simply because we have an instrumental need for others to be truthful 
and to perform beneficial actions. Rather, we a non-instrumental concern that others are 
true to us; that they do not abandon us, or convince us of their loyalty, in order to reap 
some instrumental benefit. We want to matter non-instrumentally, to the other person.  
 
Remarks from Shklar paint the non-instrumental need in vivid colours: “whenever our 
friends desert us that unquenchable uneasiness wells up in us, and we, however 
momentarily, are infants again,” (1984 : p.140), and, “the greatest of childhood anxieties, 
the fear of abandonment,” is stirred up in betrayals; “In quitting a bonded group, an 
                                                      
43 A con-artist may be distressed if the mark doesn’t hand over the bank details, but not 
because this indicates the mark doesn’t care. It will more likely be because it is of import, 
for his own needs, that he gets access to some money. 
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equally primeval fear is stirred: of the failure to distinguish kin and stranger, the latter 
almost always called “enemy” as well. To reject a blood relationship for a new and alien 
association, or for none at all, is to deny the most elementary of social ties.” (1984 : p.139). 
An account of the interpersonal import of the trust stance must explain why others’ 
actions elicit this sort of concern in situations of vulnerability. 
 
8.4 Interpersonal attachment 
To explain that non-instrumental concern, I appeal to a concept that comes from 
developmental psychology: attachment. The concept of attachment is outlined by Bowlby 
(1969, 1973, 1980) and Ainsworth (1969) to characterise the emotional bond that children 
and caregivers form, such that the continued presence of the caregiver is a matter of 
emotional wellbeing for the child. 
 
Bowlby’s studies of attachment centred on an scenario called the ‘strange situation’. The 
strange situation involves observation of a child playing in a room, in close proximity to 
her caregiver. The caregiver then leaves the room, and a stranger enters. The caregiver 
then re-enters the room. From observing different ways children respond to the caregiver 
upon re-entering, Bowlby and Ainsworth theorise that the child’s way of responding 
manifests different methods of securing the continued proximity of the caregiver and/or 
of coping with her felt need for her caregiver. In most cases (in healthy, or secure styles) 
this involves approaching the caregiver for reassurance, to secure continued proximity in 
future. 
 
Underpinning each style of attachment is the same core phenomenon of emotional 
dependence on the caregiver. When a child is attached to a caregiver, she is emotionally 
dependent on her caregiver’s ongoing presence and proximity, at the level of a basic need. 
She needs the caregiver to be present, as a matter of felt security. Ainsworth describes 
how this need manifests in distress when the caregiver leaves, and the ensuing behaviours 
to secure the continued proximity of the caregiver: 
 
To attract his mother to him, he can signal through crying, smiling, babbling or 
calling, through gestures such as raising his arms, and through a variety of other 
behaviors. As soon as he is mobile he can regulate proximity by approaching or 
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following his mother, and he can achieve contact by climbing up on her and can 
maintain contact by clinging. (1969 : p.1003) 
 
Approach behavior may be activated either by distance […] or by alarm. Alarm is 
an intense activator and is likely to evoke very rapid locomotion, in contrast to 
the leisurely approach likely under less intense circumstances. Furthermore, as the 
activating conditions become more intense, different forms of behaviors may be 
elicited. The alarmed child may scream in addition to approaching. […] Whereas 
low-intensity behavior may be terminated merely by sight or sound of the mother 
- or by some kind of reassurance that she is nearby or likely soon to return - high-
intensity behavior has close physical contact with the mother as its set-goal. (1969 
: p.1004) 
 
The concept of attachment from developmental psychology can shed light on the 
concern underpinning matters of trust, from childhood to adulthood. A persisting need 
to form attachments to other people and a wider group, gives rise to the interpersonal 
import seen in betrayability. There are clear echoes of the reactions of the child to 
abandonment by her caregiver, within the interpersonally focused reactions experienced 
in disappointed trust, as adults. Betrayal and abandonment, as Shklar and Jackson’s 
illustrations point out, have the threat of desertion as their focus. I take it that this is 
because matters of trust, at their most basic level, hinge on our underlying need for 
continued proximity to others.44 This stems from an attachment concern that the majority 
of us have, as a feature of our psychology and functioning. 
 
My account of the interpersonal element of matters of trust and the trust stance then is 
the ‘Attachment’ account. The proposal is that for another’s action to be matter of trust 
for us, it is necessary that our attachment concern is (indirectly) able to be 
impacted/shaken by another’s action toward us, in respect of a situational vulnerability. 
If our attachment concern is not able to be impacted/shaken in how another acts toward 
us in respect of a situational vulnerability, then her acting is not a matter of trust for us. 
The trust stance attitudes have as their focus (à la Helm’s notion, discussed in section 7.4) 
those things (e.g. our cat, the money in our bank account) and goals (e.g. the book being 
returned to the library) that we are concerned about, that are within the ‘striking power’ 
of another’s actions, in active or passive situational vulnerabilities. But the trust stance 
attitudes have as their deep focus our non-instrumental need to have others non-
                                                      
44 Recall Dasgupta’s appeal to the enforcement agency of ‘society itself’, and the threat 
of social ostracism resulting from shame, from section 1.8. These are only truly threats 
when we have a felt need to belong. 
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instrumentally concerned about us; to belong to a group, and to maintain proximity to 
those individuals within the group we have close relationships with. That need stems from 
our underlying non-instrumental concern for secure attachments.  
 
When another fulfils our active trust, or helps us in situations of passive vulnerability, 
that can amount to an expression of non-instrumental concern for us, via things we are 
concerned about.45 This was seen in the example case of Eunice and Bosco from section 
7.7. When we are helped despite not relying on another, we can, if there are no ulterior 
motives detected, come to statively trust her. When our trust is let down, or betrayed, this 
gives rise to the characteristic feelings of desertion, and leads to distrust. Our need to 
belong, for others to stay in proximity, such that we non-instrumentally matter to them, 
is made pressing. As a result of the betrayal, we are shown that we do not matter to 
another. We are abandoned, used instrumentally, taken advantage of. As such, situational 
vulnerabilities are windows of vulnerability, to a deeper attachment concern we possess. 
 
The concept of attachment I am using has its root in the concept outlined by Bowlby and 
Ainsworth to characterise the emotional bond between child and caregiver. However, I 
am applying the concept of attachment more broadly to describe the ongoing felt need 
for the presence of other people, and for assurance of their non-instrumental concern 
about us, that persists throughout life.46 In this respect, this more general concept of 
attachment takes its core meaning from the phenomenon outlined in Bowlby and 
Ainsworth’s Attachment theory. But, it is adapted to characterise a broader phenomenon 
of social dependence, that has its roots in the bond between child and caregiver. So, 
attachment is derived from the concept that describes the emotional bond between a 
child and caregiver, but applies to matters of trust more generally. Matters of 
                                                      
45 I presume that being helped or having active trust fulfilled won’t amount to a display 
of non-instrumental concern for us, if it’s the result of self-interested motives. If we 
detect this, then we won’t come to statively trust the one who helped (via a rolling 
schema as outlined in 7.7). Consider a case where we fall down in the street, and are 
helped up by a passerby. When we see that the passerby is a celebrity, who proceeds to 
admonish his trailing camera crew for missing the incident, then we won’t take this act 
as kindly helping us, as much as helping boost his profile. 
46 The exception may be those with psychopathic traits, who have a largely instrumental 
concern about contact with other people (Kelly 2015b, 2015a, 2015c). I suggest this 
would be connected to why so few psychopaths can treat interactions with others as 
matters of trust, and why interactions with psychopaths are marked by manipulation 
and exploitation. Their motivations are more aligned with those of the agents described 
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (section 1.8). 
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interpersonal trust in the adult world, in the various of domains of interaction we have, 
are, in a sense, Bowlby’s ‘strange situation’, writ large. 
 
Wonderly (2016) puts forward a philosophical account of attachment, that nicely 
captures the essence of the concept. Wonderly outlines “security-based attachment” as 
a rich “mode of mattering”. She suggests “that the relevant form of attachment involves 
a felt need for its object and particular relationship between the object and the attached 
agent’s sense of security.” Furthermore, this is a distinct attitude “from the more 
philosophically familiar notion of caring.” (2016 : p.223). Wonderly summarises the core 
concept as follows: 
 
In this form of attachment, the agent experiences a particular object as a felt 
need, such that her senses of well-being and general competence suffer without 
it. Unlike caring, this attitude is largely self-focused and marked by an integral 
connection between its object and the agent’s felt security. (2016 : p.224) 
 
Attachment is, like caring, a psychological phenomenon implicated centrally in things 
mattering to us. But, attachment involves a mode of mattering that is stronger than caring 
about something. Attachment is related to our proper functioning. Again, this places it 
within the realm of dependence, as I outlined in chapter 6. As such, when we are attached 
to someone, this is not a matter of just having an attitude of desire for the person (as per 
the traditional philosophical concept of desire), or an emotional attitude of caring about 
her. As Wonderly emphasises in the passage above, attachment involves a self-focused 
concern for the continued presence of the object.47 It is not that we necessarily care about 
the other person, rather that we need her. When our felt need for another is so strong 
(perhaps due to a rolling schema that makes the possibility of abandonment especially 
salient), we can in fact fail to display care about her; being so focused on our own need of 
her, that she is neglected as a result. As mentioned in chapter 6, in being a non-
instrumental need for another, this will give rise to goal-directed activity to secure her 
presence, when this is felt to be under threat. Precursors to this are glimpsed in early 
childhood, in the caregiver proximity-maintaining behaviour that Ainsworth outlines 
above. Wonderly summarises this succinctly: “in virtue of (what I feel as though is) my 
need [for the attachment object], I am tugged this way and that” (2016 : p.228). 
                                                      
47 This corresponds to the thought I put forward in section 7.7 that the rolling schema 
involves a self-focused model of what others are like to you and those you are attached 
to. 
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The concept of attachment helps characterise how, post-childhood, the close personal 
relationships we have with others are tied to our sense of wellbeing and felt security. 
Those of us with an attachment concern have a disposition to form social bonds, and 
need close relationships, e.g. friends, family, romantic partners.  
 
The strong relationship between trust and the concern for attachment, finds support in 
cases of individuals with William’s Syndrome (WS), who are ‘pathologically trusting’. Such 
individuals find it difficult to distrust others, and are driven to approach strangers with 
the level of affection reserved for close friends (Dobbs 2007; Doyle et al. 2004; Järvinen-
Pasley et al. 2008; Moseley 2014). Empirical evidence suggests that this results from a 
lessened ability to detect threat of deception or ill will in facial expressions (Ng et al. 2015; 
Riby et al. 2014), such that WS individuals don’t have the necessary competing evidence 
of untrustworthiness to temper a strong drive for social approach. Such individuals 
appear to have heightened levels of oxytocin – the hormone implicated in affiliative 
attachment (mother/child, romantic partners, friends etc.) – when around individuals, as 
a result (Dai et al. 2012). Ng et al. (2015), though, note that WS individuals are able to 
discriminate between trustworthy and untrustworthy individuals when reflecting on 
abstract examples of behaviour. 
 
To summarise: Trust is assurance about a matter of trust. Distrust is wariness of another, 
also in respect of a matter of trust. Matters of trust are important, because they are 
situations where our attachment security – our need to matter to others – is at stake. 
Now, it may be intuitive that an attachment concern underpins matters of trust with those 
we already trust, but what about with strangers/non-intimates? It also seems much less 
intuitive that an attachment security is what we are concerned about in respect of those 
we distrust. In the next section I set out how attachment underpins matters of trust with 
non-intimates. In the final section, I set out how it underpins matters of trust with those 
we distrust. 
 
8.5 To the group 
I take it that there is a clear correspondence between two-place trusting relationships and 
the attachments involved in interpersonal relationships. However, I have suggested that 
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attachment concern gives rise to the interpersonal import of matters of trust more 
generally, because a matter of trust involves a window of vulnerability on a core 
attachment concern. Matters of trust, though, can arise with those we do not have a 
personal relationship with. As such, we require an explanation of how it is that we have 
our attachment concern at stake, such that we can trust or distrust those individuals we do 
not have a close relationship with. 
 
My proposal here is that we are (often via our close attachments), attached more generally 
to a social group. A sense of secure belonging to a group is core to our security, and 
wellbeing. Matters of trust with non-intimates can strike at our attachment security, 
insofar as they reflect our secure attachment to the group. We have a social dependence 
on the group at large. This corresponds to the notion of basic or one-place trust, discussed 
in section 1.4. 
 
We can motivate this by appealing to literature on the negative effect that social isolation 
has on our wellbeing. Brownlee (2013) puts forward a defence in favour of a right to 
social contact with others, such that deprivation is a violation of human rights. She argues 
that, “Having minimally adequate opportunities for decent or supportive interpersonal 
contact and social inclusion is both a necessary condition for a minimally decent human 
life and a constitutive part of such a life” (2013 : p.200). In defence of this she cites cases 
that illustrate the effects of social deprivation on astronauts, long-distance solo sailors, 
and prisoners left in solitary confinement. In each case, the effect of isolation constitutes 
not just emotional but also physical harm, such is the strength of the need for social 
contact. The behaviour of individuals subjected to isolation tends to become driven 
around the procurement of interactions with others, with long-distance sailors coming to 
“depend on radio and video communications for social contact” (2013 : pp.205–206). 
 
Cacioppo & Patrick (2008) argue that loneliness and social isolation have a profoundly 
deleterious effect on physical and emotional wellbeing. They suggest that the “special 
balm of acceptance that [social] bonds provide, and the uniquely disturbing pain of 
rejection when they are denied, is what makes humans so highly attuned to social 
evaluation. We care deeply what others think of us, and this is why, of the ten most 
common phobias that cause people to seek treatment, three have to do with social 
anxiety: fear of speaking in public, fear of crowds, fear of meeting new people.” Like 
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Brownlee, they note the punishment of banishment/ostracism constitutes “the most 
severe punishment, short of torture or death,” and that this is why in modern prisons, 
“the penalty of last resort is solitary confinement.” (2008 : pp.10–11). The lasting effects 
of isolation take their toll in physical health, even in cardiovascular functioning (2008 : 
p.31), because of the stressful effect of ongoing feelings of abandonment resulting from 
isolation. The effect of such a stressor also affects our ability to focus on simple tasks, 
with loneliness causing an attentional deficit when faced with tasks requiring higher levels 
of concentration. In a study involving students who were required to distinguish between 
sounds, played into their ‘non-dominant’ ear (from which auditory input is harder to 
differentiate), the students who reported higher levels of loneliness found it harder to 
perform the task (2008 : pp.36–37). This is no doubt because social isolation is 
experienced as an ongoing stressor; it weighs on our motivations, as a pressing concern, 
to the point that we don’t have the cognitive capacity to devote to other tasks, when we 
feel the threat of social isolation. 
 
The effect of lacking contact with other people, regardless of whether those are people we 
have a close relationship with, amounts to the effect of being deprived of something we 
are dependent on. This is regardless of whether the other person is someone we are 
closely attached to/who we have a personal relationship with. In a domain of interaction 
with an unknown, she has the capacity to make clear our lack of worth, so having the 
potential for manifesting our lack of worth to the group more generally. It is in that 
interaction with her we glimpse the possibility of being left behind by others. If an 
unknown is in a position to demonstrate concern for our situational vulnerabilities, then 
that situation can become a matter of trust; we have a window of vulnerability to our 
need to be anchored within a wider group. It is telling that the effect of being short-
changed, let down, or betrayed, in an interaction with an unknown, will prompt the sort 
of assurance/soothing seeking behaviour descended from that we see in the child who 
seeks reassurance from her caregiver. We might appeal to those we have close 
attachments to, such as our friends, to validate that what the other person did to us was 
‘not on’. What we are doing is seeking the comfort of secure bonds, to reassure us of our 
worth to the group. If our friends don’t validate us in that situation, we may be betrayed 
twice-over; first by the action of the unknown, then by our friends. We will likely feel 
rejection more strongly, as a result of the latter. The close relationships we have anchor 
us in a wider group. 
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Alternatively, we sometimes require the validation of the group more broadly. As 
discussed in section 1.4, Herman (2001) notes that the shattering of basic trust 
experienced in severe trauma, requires validation from the community as a whole, to be 
overcome. When the group fails to recognise and express non-instrumental concern for 
the victim’s standing in the group, the victim can feel lingering betrayal and ongoing 
distress. What the group does to us, and how the group responds to what members do 
to us, matters to us non-instrumentally. It’s plausible to suppose that the legal institutions 
we have to resolve disputes and rule on accusations of harm are, at some level, functions 
of our felt need for validation and assurance from the group.48 When another exploits 
our position in a situation of vulnerability, or fails to express the non-instrumental 
concern we need in such a position, we seek the affirmation from the group that we do 
indeed matter (plus, that the other person is made to understand this). But when the 
group as a whole responds with indifference, or against us, we feel betrayed, because our 
lack of worth to the group then is communicated clearly. 
 
The feeling that results from the group failing to express concern over our situational 
vulnerabilities, can come apart from the express commitments that have been made to us 
by that group. Nonetheless, we can feel betrayed - not as a result of broken commitment, 
but as a result of our lack of worth to those whom we have an attachment to (as seen in 
the actions of a member of that group). This was seen in section 7.6.2, when Leo’s distrust 
of Maeve didn’t appear to match up with the express commitments that had been made 
to him. His feeling of having been wronged, and resulting distrust, stemmed from a more 
basic concern about how others viewed him. An example from Herman illustrates a 
similar thought: 
 
The imagery of [traumatic] events often crystallises around a moment of 
betrayal, and it is this breach of trust which gives the intrusive images their 
intense emotional power. For example, in Abram Kardiner’s psychotherapy of 
the navy veteran who had been rescued at sea after his ship was sunk, the 
veteran became most upset when revealing how he had felt let down by his own 
side: “The patient became rather excited and began to swear profusely; his anger 
aroused clearly by incidents connected with his rescue. They had been in the 
water for a period of about twelve hours when a torpedo-boat destroyer picked 
                                                      
48 This is opposed to the view of the law, set out in section 1.8, as an enforcement 
agency we designed to ensure that we more effectively delay gratification, as the ‘defect’ 
option is most preferential. 
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them up. Of course the officers in the lifeboats were taken off first. The eight or 
nine men clinging to the raft the patient was on had to wait in the water for six 
or seven hours longer until help came.” 
The officers had been rescued first, even though they were already relatively safe 
in the lifeboats, while the enlisted men hanging onto the raft were passed over, 
and some of them drowned as they awaited rescue. Though Kardiner accepted 
this procedure as part of the normal military order, the patient was horrified at 
the realization that he was expendable to his own people. The rescuer’s 
disregard for the man’s life was more traumatic to him than were the enemy 
attack, the physical pain of submersion in the cold water, the terror of death, 
and the loss of the other men who shared his ordeal. (Herman 2001 : p.55) 
 
In this case, the procedure to rescue officers first was, we can presume, an expressed 
commitment (or a consequence of one). However, the veteran in question experienced 
the moment of being passed up by the torpedo-boat rescue team as a betrayal, regardless 
of what had been explicitly communicated. His extreme situational vulnerability – being 
left at the threat of death in the water – was, by the navy’s actions, made clear to not be 
a matter of pressing concern. The feeling of betrayal in this case stems from his deep 
attachment to a wider group being completely shaken. 
 
So, while we may not be tempted to say that we trust unknown individuals we encounter 
as part of living among the wider group, our interactions with these individuals can be 
matters of trust. That is insofar as it matters to us whether others manifest non-
instrumental concern to us, due to our need for secure attachment to that group. So, we 
can have trust stance attitudes toward them. It can matter to us that we have a basic level 
of concern manifested toward us by the group we belong to.  
 
This corresponds to a point made by Gudrun (2016), who notes the importance of low 
level gestures of goodwill and concern, in neighbourhoods comprised of disparate 
individuals, from diverse backgrounds. Gudrun points out from an ethnographic study 
that, while large diverse neighbourhoods don’t foster many personal trust relationships, 
neighbours place an importance on feeling “safe” (2016 : p.27). A large part of this feeling 
of safety hinges on conventions among residents of expressing minor gestures of social 
contact and recognition, such as nodding or greeting when walking on the same paths, 
fostering feelings of connection among different and relatively unknown individuals 
(2016 : p.31). While these neighbours don’t place importance on close two-place trust 
relationships with their neighbours, this isn’t as important to them as the feeling that they 
matter at a basic level to their fellow residents. This enables high levels of basic trust to 
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be hand, and a sense of safety as part of a group, even when surrounded by relative 
unknowns.  
 
Views of trust in the literature (like those considered in section 1.8) that de-emphasise the 
interpersonal import of matters of trust, from focusing on interactions between strangers, 
are short-sighted. Just because matters of trust between strangers appear not to require 
much of a strong personal attachment, this does not entail that attachment isn’t our 
underlying concern in our interactions with strangers. Our concern is with how others, who 
purport to be part of our group, regard us. We are concerned with whether we matter to 
the group or not. Even if these interactions occur in the detached exchanges of the 
marketplace, the possibility of such exchanges being construed as matters of trust, 
presupposes that we have an underlying concern about group attachment. The marketplace, 
after all, is a space of shared activity, governed by rules of fair exchange, buttressed by 
legal institutions to enforce them. Those rules are a reflection of a concern to maintain 
group cohesion, to ensure that we are validated in cases of being victim to another’s harm. 
We need rules that ‘contain’ the fallout of upset resulting from selfish behaviour (which 
a well-formed rolling schema would suggest is an inevitability; see 7.7), to minimise 
retaliatory behaviour, and so we can remain assured about engaging in that shared activity. 
Onora O’Neill remarks that Baier’s view, which emphasises interpersonal relationships, 
is “nostalgic,” and not for “trust in a complex social world” (2015 : p.49). She fails to 
recognise that the beating heart of matters of trust, in a complex social world, is our need 
for a sense of belonging to, mattering to, a group, and the individuals within it. 
 
The above discussion may explain how matters of trust can be had with those whom we 
already identify as belonging to a group we identify with. But what of those who we do 
not identify as possibly belonging to a group we identify with, as in a ‘state of nature’ 
case? My suggestion is that such an interaction can still implicate a potential for an 
attachment, either to the individual, or to the group this unknown belongs to. This, 
combined with the well-supported empirical claim that most of us have a disposition to 
seek out secure attachments, means that we can treat an interaction with a complete 
unknown as a matter of trust. On the other hand, if we are fearful, or wary, to the point 
will don’t open ourselves to the opportunity to receive non-instrumental concern from 
others, then we may be unable to get the ball cannot get rolling on that potential 
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attachment. But, recall Eunice & Bosco from section 7.7: it may be that this unknown 
has the ability to help us out anyway, so riding roughshod over the defences we put up. 
 
8.6 Betrayability varies with attachment concern, not with stative trust 
In this final section, I address the thought that while the attachment account can plausibly 
explain the interpersonal import of matters of trust with those we already trust, and those 
we do not know but have an attachment to a group of which she is also a part, the account 
cannot explain how distrust has interpersonal importance, i.e. how we can be betrayed 
even by those we distrust. 
 
The answer to this is hinted in the last paragraph of the previous section: it can still be 
important to us that we matter to those who we distrust, even if our distrust attitude is 
pulling us away from them. There is a feeling of tension in distrust that I suggest partly 
results from the underlying concern for belonging, with the protective anticipation that 
we ought to pull away, to protect ourselves from another. The attachment account helps 
explain this. Those we distrust, I suggest, have our attachment concern ‘in their teeth’, 
perhaps via their commitments.49 Consider the accompanying feeling of warmth and 
relief, when someone we previously distrusted, turns out to have our concerns at heart. 
This motivates the sort of bonding process we see, noted by Hawley, when we express 
sorrow for having previously distrusted another, who instead fulfilled our trust (2014 : 
p.3). If there was no attachment concern implicating the one we distrusted, prior to our 
now being helped by her, then the process would not involve the relief that we can trust 
her. It would be closer to beginning a new friendship, from a starting position of how she 
regarded us not previously being a matter of non-instrumental concern to us. 
 
Attachment concern underpins distrust, and the attachment account can help explain the 
claim that has been noted previously, that it is possible to be betrayed by those we distrust. 
We can, because we can have strong attachments to those we distrust. Stative assurance 
is not a pre-requisite of betrayability. To illustrate this I argue against a point that 
Hieronymi (2008) makes in defence of the opposite claim.  
 
                                                      
49 See footnote 41, p. 186 
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Hieronymi draws a distinction between ‘trusting belief’ (i.e. stative trust) as a ‘primary’ or 
fundamental sense of trust, and ‘mere entrusting’ (an activity of reliance, i.e. active trust). 
She argues that trusting belief is the primary sense of ‘trust’. She uses the trust-betrayal 
connection as a premise (the degree to which we trust is the degree to which we can be 
betrayed). Then, she argues that degree to which we can be betrayed (statively trust), is 
the degree to which we trustingly believe. From this, she concludes, the degree to which 
we trust another is the degree to which we trustingly believe her in some matter (2008 : 
pp.228–230). The argument form is as follows: 
 
P1. Degree of trust is the degree of betrayability 
P2. Degree of betrayability is the degree of trusting belief 
C. Degree of trust is the degree of trusting belief 
 
We arrive at C through the transitive. But, the argument is unsound, because P2 is false. 
Instead, what determines the degree to which we are betrayable is the degree to which we 
have a concern stemming from an attachment to the other. 
 
To support P2 Hieronymi compares two examples; (i) we trust a friend with a secret and 
“fully believe” that she is trustworthy, and (ii) where we have doubts about our friend. If 
the friend were to tell our secret to others, she argues that in the first case where we had 
a fully trusting belief, we are more betrayed than in the second case (2008 : p.230). 
Hieronymi also suggests that we often mitigate the possibility of betrayal by mitigating 
our trusting belief (2008 : p.231), i.e. we tell ourselves we never trusted anyway. This is 
why, she argues, the case of merely entrusting the secret to your friend has lesser 
betrayability than the first case. 
 
While it might be right that being uncertain or distrustful of another can incline us to begin 
the process of detaching from her, which shields us against the painful feelings of betrayal, 
this is distinct from not having assurance about her. An element of uncertainty or distrust 
about a particular matter of trust doesn’t diminish the extent to which we can be betrayed 
on that matter. Consider Yolanda who strongly suspects her partner Xavier of cheating, 
and is nonetheless severely betrayed when her suspicions are confirmed. Perhaps after 
many repeated violations of trust, Yolanda will have begun to detach to the point that the 
  204 
betrayals no longer sting. But this is not mitigating the extent of the stative trust attitude, 
it is mitigating the extent of her attachment.50 
 
There is an even bigger problem that results from the supposition that degree of 
betrayability is degree of stative trust, rather than the degree of attachment concern. It 
would allow that the sorts of harms that can be suffered by cheated on partners, are 
unproblematic, in cases where cheaters are distrusted anyway. At the extreme end, this 
would have the consequence that in cases of systematic abuse (e.g. of children by 
caregivers, women by abusive husbands), involving repeated betrayals, such abuses could 
become unproblematic.  That is, if the victim can be said to distrust the abuser anyway. 
The abuser would be warranted in saying that it wasn’t a betrayal that he committed, 
because he wasn’t trusted. Betrayability is not a by-product of one’s assurance, however. 
Rather, it is a product of your need for secure attachment. Betrayal is the turmoil that 
results from having someone you depend on, as a fundamental emotional source of 
security, make clear your lack of worth. It is a product of what that assurance was of, 
being shattered. The process of detachment following abuse and harm like that suffered 
in severe betrayal is wrenching, precisely because of the centrality of the need for 
attachment, to our wellbeing.  
 
8.7 Summing up 
The attachment account is well suited to explaining what the characteristic interpersonal 
import of matters of trust is, and what the trust stance attitudes are at a deeper level about. 
The account explains that matters of trust, and the trust stance attitudes, carry a 
characteristic interpersonal import, stemming from an underlying need for secure 
attachments, to individuals and to a group. This attachment concern being implicated in 
situations of vulnerability, gives rise to the possibility of interpersonal harms such as 
betrayal. Insofar as a situational vulnerability is a matter of trust, then we must have a 
window of vulnerability, such that another’s actions can affect us on the level of our 
attachment security. That is whether the attachment is to her, or to the group of which 
she is a member. In effect, matters of trust have a characteristic interpersonal importance, 
                                                      
50 Hieronymi, in endorsing P2, is inconsistent with her endorsement of the claim that 
distrust is able to be betrayed (2008 : p.229). 
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that presents opposing horizons. Beyond one lies increased contentment and a feeling of 
belonging. Beyond the other lies the pain of rejection. 
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Conclusion 
I have defended an account of interpersonal trust and distrust, as attitudes of the ‘trust 
stance’; attitudes we take toward others in matters of trust. Matters of trust are 
situations of vulnerability, where others have the power to help or harm us. These 
matters can be products of active reliance on others, or a result of our situation. Matters 
of trust have a characteristic interpersonal importance to us, otherwise they are not 
matters of trust at all. That importance is glimpsed in the possibility of being betrayed 
by those who act against our interests in such matters. I have defended an account of 
that interpersonal importance, as being the product of our need for secure social 
attachments, to individuals or a group. This is a form of social dependence on others, 
and relates to our core wellbeing. 
 
To support my account, I argued that the dominant ‘Reliance plus’ view of trust and 
distrust in current literature is flawed, for the primary reason that it fails to distinguish 
between an activity of trust (reliance on another) and a mental state of trust (assurance 
about her). Following this, I gave an account of reliance as involving practical 
dependence on things we harness in goal-directed activity. I then distinguished reliance 
from a more general notion of being dependent on things that relate to our core 
functioning and wellbeing. This account of dependence was used to support my 
attachment account of the interpersonal import of matters of trust. 
 
I have also defended an account of the trust stance attitudes as the products of a rolling 
schema; an anticipatory framework we have for discerning whether individuals, types of 
people, or people in general, are motivated non-instrumentally and capable of helping 
us in respect of situations of vulnerability. We develop a sense of assurance of others 
(and so trust them), or wariness of their motives (and so distrust them). The rolling 
schema, in conjunction with the attachment account, suggests that the trust stance 
attitudes reflect what individuals and group we feel we matter to. This will be as 
manifest in their actions toward us, in respect of situations of vulnerability. 
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